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This thesis is a critical analysis of the order for lifelong restriction (OLR). The OLR is a risk-
based indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. It is imposed when the offender satisfies certain 
statutory risk criteria for the protection of the public. This thesis has four main aims: (1) to 
identify an appropriate theoretical basis for the imposition of preventive detention that is 
capable of supporting an ethically defensible model of preventive sentencing, and of serving 
as an analytical model for application to the OLR; (2) to give a detailed and critical account of 
the OLR’s operational framework; (3) to assess the extent to which the current statutory 
framework conforms to the requirements identified in the analytical model proposed in relation 
to the first aim; and (4) in light of this to propose amendments to the relevant legislation. 
 
The thesis concludes that preventive sentencing is best conceptualised as a punitive form of 
societal self-defence, the right of which is engaged when an offender exercises his autonomy 
such as to violate the rights of others in a way that threatens lasting physical or psychological 
harm. Since the need to consider preventive detention has arisen from fault on the offender’s 
part, it is morally permissible to require him to bear the burden of any uncertainty as to repeat 
offending. The derogation from the principle of desert-proportionality requires to be tempered 
with threat-proportionality. This means that the offences to which preventive sentences may 
apply must be restricted to serious offences against the person, or other offences which threaten 
physical harm to persons – this has the effect of excluding property offences that do not 
endanger others. Finally, it is concluded that, while the OLR is, in general terms, an ethically 
defensible model of preventive detention, some modifications to the procedural framework 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE PROJECT 
This thesis presents a critical analysis of the order for lifelong restriction (OLR), which is a 
‘uniquely Scottish’1 indeterminate prison sentence. It is available in respect of certain 
“dangerous” offenders in cases where determinate sentences are considered inadequate to 
manage the risk they present to the public.2 The OLR is one of two risk-based indeterminate 
sentences available in Scotland, the other being the compulsion order with restriction order 
(CORO), 3 which is a mental health disposal allowing for detention in hospital without limit of 
time. As will be discussed later, both the OLR and the CORO are part of what might be called 
Scotland’s dangerous offender sentencing framework, and the intention had been to consider 
both sentences in detail. In the process of bringing the thesis together, however, it became 
apparent that there simply was not space within the confines of a PhD thesis to give both the 
attention that they warrant. The decision was therefore made to focus on the OLR for two 
reasons. First, because it is a unique sentence in terms of its scope and operation; and second 
because it is both explicitly punitive and explicitly preventive in nature.   
1.1.1 A UNIQUE SENTENCE 
The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (‘the 1995 Act’) identifies the OLR as an 
indeterminate sentence,4 but it is in practical terms a life sentence:5 there is a minimum period 
of imprisonment – the ‘punishment part’ – that must be served before eligibility for parole 
arises; the decision as to whether to release the offender is based on the manageability of risk 
in the community as determined by the Parole Board for Scotland; and, if release occurs, the 
offender will be subject to the conditions of a licence which will remain in force for life. It is 
‘a sentence of last resort’6 imposed when all other disposals are considered to be inadequate 
 
1 Y. Gailey et al., ‘An Exceptional Sentence”: Exploring the Implementation of the Order for Lifelong 
Restriction’ in K. McCartan and H. Kemshall (Eds.) Contemporary Sex Offender Risk Management, Vol. 1 
(London, 2017), 119. 
2 See section 6.3.  
3 See section 6.4.2.B. Although, as will be seen, the OLR most closely resembled the mandatory life sentence 
for murder, as will be seen, it is not classed as a life sentence by the legislative framework.  
4 s. 210F(2). 
5 See section 6.5.2. 
6 McFadyen v HM Advocate 2011 S.C.C.R. 759, at 13. 
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for the protection of the public. As it stands, there is no mechanism for review of the sentence 
itself. Unlike its nearest comparator – the mandatory life sentence for murder (MLS) – 
however, the OLR is imposed, not because of the specific offence for which the offender falls 
to be sentenced, but in virtue of his meeting statutory ‘risk criteria’ set out in the 1995 Act. In 
brief, these require that the offender, if at liberty, would ‘seriously endanger the lives, or 
physical or psychological well-being’ of the public.7 The 1995 Act provides for a very specific 
procedure to be followed where the court considers the risk criteria might be met, and to 
establish whether they are met. This pre-sentencing framework is the OLR’s most 
distinguishing feature. 
The court must instruct the preparation of a risk assessment report (RAR). Although 
consideration of risk assessments at sentence is routine, the RAR is a creature of statute and 
associated with the OLR specifically.8 The RAR must be prepared to standards and guidelines 
set by a specialist body called the Risk Management Authority (RMA),9 by a person accredited 
by the RMA specifically for this task.10 It is the most comprehensive of any risk assessment 
report considered by courts in Scotland,11 and its purpose is to assist the judge in determining 
whether the risk criteria are met. One of the OLR’s key features is that, if the criteria for 
imposing it are met, it must be imposed.12 The judge has no discretion. The only exception is 
where a compulsion order is made instead.13  
The provisions governing the OLR’s operation are extremely complex. Despite this, and the 
extensive deprivation of liberty the OLR entails, it has received relatively little academic 
attention,14 and most of that is descriptive. In particular, the statutory risk criteria which are 
 
7 s. 210E. 
8 s. 210C. 
9 CJ(S)A 2003, s. 5(1). 
10 Ibid, s. 11(2). 
11 Ferguson v HM Advocate 2014 S.L.T. 431, at 90.  
12 s. 210F(1). 
13 Ibid. 
14 See Gailey et al. (2017); R. Darjee and K. Russell, ‘The Assessment and Sentencing of High-Risk Offenders 
in Scotland’ in B. McSherry and P. Keyzer (eds.) Dangerous People: Policy, Prediction, and Practice (London, 
2011); I. Fyfe and Y. Gailey, ‘The Scottish Approach to High-Risk Offenders: Early Answers or Further 
Questions’ in B. McSherry and P. Keyzer (eds.) (2011); B. McSherry and P. Keyzer, Sex Offenders and 
Preventive Detention: Politics, Policy and Practice (Sydney, 2009), 14-17; C. Mitchell and C. Connelly, ‘Finite 
sentences, extended sentences, discretionary life sentences and orders for lifelong restriction’, (2015) 137 
Criminal Law Bulletin 1; Lord Carloway, The Lifelong Restriction of Serious Offenders and the Role of Risk 
Assessment in Scotland. Paper presented at the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law’s 27th 
International Conference, 26 June 2014; R. Darjee and J.H.M. Crichton, ‘The MacLean Committee: Scotland’s 
answer to the “dangerous people with severe personality disorder” proposals?’ (2002) 26:1 Psychiatric Bulletin 
6; L. Tuddenham and J. Baird, ‘The Risk Management Authority in Scotland and the forensic psychiatrist as 
risk assessor’, (2007) 31:5 Psychiatric Bulletin 164; J.H.M. Crichton et al. ‘Mental Health (Public Safety and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999: detention of untreatable patients with psychopathic disorder’, (2001) 12:3 
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central to the OLR’s operation have yet to be subject to detailed treatment. In providing a 
comprehensive account of the statutory pre-sentencing risk framework,15 and in offering an in-
depth analysis of each element of the risk criteria,16 this thesis is original.  
1.1.2 PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND PUNISHMENT 
A sentence of imprisonment is clearly a punishment and, therefore, so is the OLR.17 However, 
it is a risk-based sentence, meaning – as was said above – that it is imposed in virtue of the risk 
an offender poses rather than for whatever offence he was convicted of; the offence is a 
manifestation of that risk,18 but it is not the reason an OLR was selected. This means that it is, 
in effect, a sentence of preventive detention: its purpose is to protect the public from the 
offender’s future offending behaviour, and he will be detained until such time as the risk he 
presents can be managed in the community. The difficulty is that – from a theoretical 
perspective at least – punishment for what has been done, is prima facie incompatible with 
detention to prevent what has yet to be done. Chapter two addresses this dichotomy in detail, 
and little else will be said of it here; but the OLR is of interest because it is a punishment that 
explicitly presents itself as a form of preventive detention. This may be contrasted with, for 
example, the aforementioned CORO which, though it is a disposal on conviction19 – a sentence 
– is not considered a form of punishment, but an alternative to it.20  The OLR may also be 
contrasted with determinate prison sentences, which account for the majority of custodial 
disposals and are ‘basically retributive in character’,21 their duration being constrained by the 
seriousness of the offences for which they are imposed. 
To the extent that a critical literature base exists, it is confined to procedural analysis. Thus, 
the OLR is under-theorised. The discussion of punishment and prevention therefore takes place 
in the context of a search for a principled basis for preventive detention. This theoretical 
framework is constructed in chapters two and three and is the basis for analysis of the 
 
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 647; P. Ferguson, ‘Orders for lifelong restriction’, (2014) 13 Scots Law Times 
60; and F. Crowe, ‘Orders for Lifelong Restriction’, (2014) 59:4 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 24. 
15 See ch. 5.  
16 See section 6.3.  
17 McCluskey v HM Advocate 2013 J.C. 107, at 18. 
18 ss. 210B, 210E, and 210F(1)(d). See chapters 5 and 6 for detailed discussion.  
19 And also acquittal on the grounds of the defence set out in s. 51A of the 1995 Act: see s. 57 of the 1995 Act.  
20 McFadyen v HM Advocate 2011 S.C.C.R. 759, at 10; the requirement for punishment can override the 
medical recommendation that a compulsion order be made: Scottish Executive, Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003: Code of Practice vol. 3 – Compulsory Powers in Relation to Mentally 
Disordered Offenders (Edinburgh, 2005), 121, para. 3 (Hereafter ‘MHA 2003 Code’). 
21 Petch and Foye v HM Advocate 2011 J.C. 210, at 43.  
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legislative framework governing the OLR’s operation, though procedural analysis takes place 
throughout the thesis. Its evaluation of the OLR against a theoretical framework constructed 
specifically for this purpose is another way in which this thesis is original.  
1.1.3 AIMS 
The thesis has four main objectives:  
1. To identify and develop a theoretical framework of preventive detention capable of 
supporting a principled, workable model of indeterminate sentencing; 
2. To provide a detailed, critical account of the procedural framework that supports the 
OLR’s operation; 
3. To assess the extent to which the current statutory framework conforms to the 
requirements identified in the analytical model set out in relation to the first aim; and  
4. On the basis of the foregoing to identify areas where consideration should be given to 
amending the relevant legislative provisions.  
Conclusions reached in relation to each of these will be set out as the thesis progresses and 
summarised in the final chapter. The overall structure of the thesis is outlined at section 1.3 
below, but before proceeding a note about the use of data to support the discussion is 
appropriate. Statistical data from various sources is drawn upon where relevant. One of these 
sources is the RMA which inter alia has responsibility for certain key aspects of the OLR’s 
operation.22 The author of this thesis has been employed by the RMA since October 2020. It 
should, however, be made clear that no data to which the author had special access in the course 
of her employment was included in the thesis. Where unpublished RMA data is cited, this was 
obtained in the usual way: via a request submitted by email; such data would have been made 
available on the same basis to any researcher who requested it. Colleagues’ assistance in this 




22 For reasons of space it has not been possible to provide a full account of this organisation and its role, but see 
chapters 4, 5, and 6 which highlight some of its functions.  
23 Particular thanks are due to Emma Harley and Rachel Webb.  
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1.2 TERMINOLOGY IN THE THESIS 
Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying what is meant by certain terms that are employed. It 
is acknowledged that the use of certain terms is controversial, and where this is thought to be 
the case an explanation for the choice is offered.  
‘Preventive detention’: this was chosen over the variant ‘preventative detention’ for no other 
reason than it was the most common permutation observable in the literature. Whilst capable 
of applying to any period of detention for the prevention of some occurrence, such as a period 
of pre-trial remand, when it is used here it is generally used in reference to indeterminate 
detention following conviction for an offence. It is the term most commonly used in the more 
theoretical literature. 
‘Indeterminate sentence’: this is the form of preventive detention with which the thesis is 
specifically concerned. That is, a sentence imposed on conviction which renders the offender 
liable to imprisonment/detention for an indeterminate period.  
‘Index offence’: this term is sometimes used to mean the most serious offence of which 
someone is convicted on a single indictment but is used in this thesis and in the OLR case law 
generally to mean the offence in respect of which an OLR is, or may be, imposed. 
‘Mental disorder’: it is appreciated that this is somewhat controversial terminology, and that 
alternatives some consider to accord greater respect and better reflect the lived experience of 
people who experience mental ill health have proliferated in recent years. The language of 
mental disorder has, however, been retained here since it is the term used in law. It is inclusive 
of mental illness (e.g. depression, schizophrenia), personality disorder, and learning 
disability.24 
‘Personality disorder’: this term refers to an enduring pattern of thinking, feeling, and 
behaviour that can, to some extent at least, be distinguished from mental illness.25 The language 
of personality disorder is considered offensive and stigmatising by a number of patient/service 
 
24 MHA 2003, s. 328(1).  




user groups and some professionals.26 The validity of the construct itself has also been 
questioned over time.27 Like mental disorder, however, it is the term contained in legislation.  
‘Dangerousness’: this is used to refer to the propensity for serious offending in respect of which 
preventive detention may be necessary. It is also used, somewhat reluctantly, as a shorthand 
for the offender group with which the thesis is concerned. Aside from the reasons set out in 
section 3.3.1, the terminology adopted elsewhere of ‘high-risk serious violent and/or sexual 
offenders’ is simply not descriptive of the offender group the OLR captures.28  
Finally, the use of ‘he’ has been preferred over ‘he or she’ or ‘they’. This is primarily a stylistic 
choice, but as is discussed later, at the time of writing, all offenders who have been made 
subject to an OLR are male.  
1.3 STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis proceeds as follows.  
Chapter two is concerned with the moral permissibility of specifically post-conviction 
preventive detention. In particular it considers the objection from the principle of autonomy, 
i.e., that preventive detention is always unjustifiable because it (a) fails to respect the offender 
as a rational moral agent; (b) amounts to punishment of an innocent person; and (c) reduces 
the offender’s status to that of means to society’s ends. It is argued that, whilst preventive 
detention to prevent intentional conduct is properly characterised as punitive, it is not 
punishment of an innocent person based on presumed future criminal conduct. Nevertheless, it 
does entail derogation from the principle of proportionate punishment and this should be 
acknowledged. It is contended that a prediction of what someone will do does not amount to a 
claim that they lack the capacity to choose to do otherwise. It is suggested preventive detention 
is best conceptualised as a form of societal self-defence in which a culpability constraint is the 
 
26 See MIND’s guide to personality disorders for those directly or indirectly affected: 
https://www.mind.org.uk/information-support/types-of-mental-health-problems/personality-disorders/why-is-it-
controversial/ Accessed 21/11/2020. 
27 See, for example, L.A. Clark et al. ‘Personality Disorder Assessment: The Challenge of Construct Validity’, 
(1997) 11:3 Journal of Personality Disorders 205; and more recently L. Johnstone and M. Boyle, The Power 
Threat Meaning Framework (London, 2018) available at: 
https://www.bps.org.uk/sites/www.bps.org.uk/files/Policy/Policy%20-
%20Files/PTM%20Framework%20%28January%202018%29_0.pdf This is produced by leading members of 
the British Psychological Society’s Division of Clinical Psychology. It is a rejection of the premise of mental 
disorder and psychiatric diagnosis in general, but is especially critical of personality disorder.  
28 See section 6.2.2. 
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basis for an ethically defensible redistribution of the burden of uncertainty as to how the 
offender will behave in future, in favour of potential victims.  
Chapter three considers the concepts of dangerousness and risk to try to construct an account 
of the kinds of offences it is reasonable to claim protection from by way of an indeterminate 
sentence, and of the offenders who are properly within the scope of such a sentencing regime. 
It is submitted that the use of preventive detention to prevent violations that carry the risk of 
serious and long-term physical and psychological harms may be permissible. Property offences 
that do not, either in themselves, or in the manner of their commission, threaten physical harm 
to people should be excluded from scope. This is, it is admitted, somewhat arbitrary but regard 
must be had to the impact of the sentence upon the individual offender: lack of culpability-
proportionality must be tempered by ensuring, so far as is possible, that the sentence is 
proportionate to the threat.  
Chapter four considers the legal background and policy development of the OLR. Particular 
attention is paid to the recommendations of the MacLean Committee on Serious Violent and 
Sexual Offenders.  
Chapter five considers the statutory pre-sentencing procedures that must be followed when an 
OLR disposal is contemplated. The role of specialised risk assessment is central to this process 
and is considered in-depth with reference to legislation, case law, and the standards and 
guidelines produced by the RMA.  
Chapter six carries on the discussion in chapter five, from the point at which the statutory risk 
criteria are to be applied by the sentencing judge. These criteria are broken down into their 
constituent elements and examined in detail. Some discussion of other orders to which 
offenders may be made subject (a) when an OLR is made; and (b) when it is not made, is 
undertaken. This is to place the OLR in context and to permit some assessment of its 
relationship to those other orders and disposals. The chapter then proceeds to evaluate the 
framework as a whole against the analytical framework proposed in chapters two and three. It 
is concluded that, while the OLR broadly conforms to the principles identified, there is scope 
for consideration of reform. These points for consideration are then set out before the chapter, 
and the thesis, concludes.  
The law is discussed as it stood on 31st October 2020. 
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2. THEORETICAL BASIS OF PREVENTIVE 
DETENTION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER TWO 
This chapter is concerned with the moral permissibility of the practice of imposing preventive 
– specifically indeterminate – custodial sentences upon offenders considered to be especially 
dangerous. Its purpose is to describe and critique key approaches to overcoming the more 
philosophical objections to preventive detention (PD) in order to begin to construct an account 
of why such a policy may be justified, as well as to place this thesis within the broader 
literature. The highly influential report of the Working Party on Dangerous Offenders in 
England and Wales1 identified the fundamental objection to protective sentencing as being that 
it amounts to the punishment of an innocent person.2 For some theorists, the problem is 
essentially empirical. They hold that PD is morally impermissible because our risk assessment 
methodologies are not precise enough to ensure only truly dangerous individuals are singled 
out.3 For others, the objection is rooted in the principle that those capable of choosing whether 
or not to conduct themselves in conformity with the law ought to be permitted to so choose. To 
pre-empt that choice, they argue – even when the person concerned has been convicted of a 
serious offence – is to deny that person’s moral agency, reducing his status to that of means to 
society's ends.4 Thus, a refusal to detain a potentially very dangerous agent is always morally 
preferable to detaining him.   
If such a principle were to be accepted, it would amount to an injunction on detention to prevent 
very serious harms. The search for an ethical basis on which PD may sometimes be permissible 
 
1 J. Floud and W. Young, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice (London, 1981), hereafter referred to as ‘The 
Floud Report’ which is the convention in the literature. Presumably the reason for this is that while Floud and 
Young co-authored the report, Jean Floud chaired the committee. The working party was established in 1976 by 
the Howard League for Penal Reform to review the law and practices concerning the management of dangerous 
offenders in England and Wales. Along with the MacLean review in Scotland, discussed in chapter 4, it remains 
one of the most comprehensive investigations of this nature undertaken in the United Kingdom. 
2 Ibid, 39. See also R. Lippke, ‘No Easy Way Out: Dangerous Offenders and Preventive Detention’ (2008) 27 
Law and Philosophy 383; D.J. Baker, ‘Punishment Without a Crime: Is Preventive Detention Reconcilable with 
Justice?’ (2009) 34 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 120, at 122.  
3 This is mentioned later and discussed more fully in Chapter Three.  
4 Floud Report, 39. 
 9 
is therefore necessary, because the alternative is to accept that it is never permissible and that, 
to most people, is intuitively ethically unacceptable.5 
There is an obvious overlap between the empirical argument and the argument from the 
principle of autonomy. However, the latter presents a more formidable obstacle to the 
justification of PD: regardless of how sophisticated our predictive capabilities may become, it 
will never be possible to determine with absolute certainty how a person will conduct himself 
in the future. Since the principled objection is that it is morally impermissible to pre-empt a 
choice to conduct oneself unlawfully, it would follow that PD can never be justified. If this is 
so, questions regarding the role and accuracy of risk assessment in identifying dangerous 
people are redundant. Objections to PD in principle will therefore be dealt with in this chapter, 
leaving discussions of risk assessment efficacy until chapter three.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 addresses – and rejects – formulations of PD as 
civil confinement and argues that a culpability constraint is necessary. Section 2.3. argues that 
PD bears the characteristics of punishment, and ought to be conceptualised as such. 
Approaches that characterise PD as punishment for a specific offence (i.e., retributive-type 
approaches) are discussed, and largely rejected, in sections 2.3 to 2.6; and section 2.7 offers a 
critique of approaches which view PD as being permissible where an individual’s conduct 
creates a situation where PD must be considered. Those approaches discussed at section 2.7 
are then used to begin to formulate an indeterminate sentencing model which conceptualises 
PD as a form of societal self-defence.  
2.2 AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHT TO BE PUNISHED 
 
The autonomy objection to PD is – at least loosely – based on a Kantian conceptualisation of 
the person, central to which is a unique capacity to rationally evaluate reasons for action (or 
inaction).6 Since this rational agency is the defining characteristic of personhood, failure to 
 
5 See for example, S.J. Morse, ‘Blame and Danger: an essay on preventive detention’, (1996) 76 Boston 
University Law Review 113, at 116; R.A. Duff, ‘Dangerousness and Citizenship’ in A. Ashworth and M. Wasik, 
Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory: essays in honour of Andrew von Hirsch (Oxford, 1998), 151, N. Walker, 
‘Ethical and Other Problems’ in N. Walker (Ed.) Dangerous People (London, 1996), 7. 
6 I. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by A.W. Wood (London, 2002); M. Davis, 
‘Arresting the White Death: Preventive Detention, Confinement for Treatment, and Medical Ethics’ (1995) 94:2 
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine 92; J.T. Murphy, ‘Moral Death: A 
Kantian Essay on Psychopathy’, (1972) 82:4 Ethics 284, 291-292. 
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respect it would be tantamount to a denial of that individual’s humanity.7 This includes respect 
for a choice to conduct oneself wrongfully, and to do harm to others. The only appropriate 
response to such wrongdoing is punishment according to desert, which is viewed as recognition 
of this choice. If we are to pre-empt a person’s decisions – as would be the case if they were 
preventively detained – then, it is said, it is as if we are denying their capacity to direct their 
own conduct. Should this be accepted, it would seem to preclude PD completely, whether 
conceptualised as purely preventive, or as a form of punishment lacking a culpability-
proportionality constraint. This requirement to treat persons as rational moral agents by 
refraining from assuming failure to conform to the law, has been expressed as a right to be 
punished. It will be apparent that the construction of this objection as a right is problematic 
but, although this is touched on below, it should be noted that this approach is of interest 
because it constitutes an extremely robust, and absolute rejection of PD, rather than because of 
the rights formulation itself.8  
Although the concept of the person on which it is based is Kantian, the doctrine of the ‘right to 
punishment’ itself is generally attributed to Hegel:9 
[W]hat is involved in the action of the criminal is not only the 
concept of crime…but also the abstract rationality of the individual’s 
volition. Since that is so, punishment is regarded as containing the 
criminal’s right and hence by being punished he is honoured as a 
rational being.  
Hegel considered that all persons are fundamentally moral beings, and that their essential 
nature could be awakened by being subjected to punishment for what should be presumed to 
be a temporary failure of moral reasoning. In other words, the offender was to be addressed as 
having the potential to revert to a state of being in which he recognised the wrongfulness of the 
sin he had committed, and so resolving not to sin again.10 Hegel, like Kant, rejected 
 
7 See, for example, Murphy (1972); H. Morris, ‘Persons and Punishment’, (1968) 52:4 The Monist 475 (this 
paper is discussed in detail below).  
8 Although the conception of rights on which it is based is a compelling one. See Deigh (1984) for a full 
critique.  
9W.H. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right. Translated by T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1942) at section 100. Emphasis in 
original. It can apparently be traced at least as far back as Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Law. This is not 
entirely surprising given the overlap between the right to punishment, and social contract theory. Fichte’s 
account is unusual though, in the sense that punishment is not justified for breach of the social contract, but for 
the irrationality presumed to underpin it. In other words, the offender is punished for his personal 
characteristics. This is discussed later, but see M.D. Dubber, ‘The Right to be Punished: Autonomy and Its 
Demise in Modern Penal Thought’ (1998) 16:1 Law and History Review 113.  
10 J. M. E. McTaggart, ‘Hegel’s Theory of Punishment’ (1986) 6:4 International Journal of Ethics 479, at 483-
484. 
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consequence as a justification for action in itself:11 the intrinsic value of punishment is in the 
opportunity afforded to the offender to consider his own rational moral status which, should he 
recognise it, would lead him to desist. Implicit in the extension of this opportunity is that he is 
treated as a rational agent, with the capacity to engage in such an exercise. Therefore, although 
crime reduction may result as an incidental benefit, punishment has a value independent of any 
particular outcome, since it is seen as a recognition of personhood.  
Even if it were to be accepted that punishment affirms moral autonomy in this way, it is still 
difficult to envisage why anyone should ever want to be punished.12 One of the best known 
modern defences of the right to punishment is that of Herbert Morris.13  His approach is to 
contrast a backward-looking system of punishment with a system of commitment. In doing 
this, he aims to demonstrate that a rational agent would have reason to prefer punishment. In 
his model jurisdiction, order is maintained by a system of ‘primary rules’ which equate broadly 
to the ‘core’ of criminal law and which forbid, among other things, violent and dishonest 
conduct.14 These rules represent constraints placed on the conduct of individuals which, if 
adhered to by all members of the community, confer certain protections on all of them. 15 
Crime occurs when an individual chooses not to observe these restrictions, conducting himself 
as he pleases, to the detriment of others. Quite apart from any gains he may make at the expense 
of a victim, Morris argues that the offender gains an unfair advantage against society as a whole 
since he has enjoyed the protections conferred by others’ compliance with the rules while 
renouncing that burden himself. Punishment, he says, redresses this imbalance in the 
distribution of benefits and burdens, and ‘induce[s] compliance with the primary rules among 
those who may be disinclined to obey’.16 In the classical Hegelian formulation of the right to 
punishment, crime reduction is regarded as a desirable, incidental benefit that may inform the 
type of punishment;17 but here, it appears that Morris is willing to admit deterrence as a 
justification. This distinction is potentially quite significant since it appears to allow for what 
might be considered to amount to the use of a person as means to achieving a crime reduction 
 
11 But see D. Moyar, ‘Consequentialism and Deontology in the Philosophy of Right’, in T. Brooks (Ed.), 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Oxford, 2012) for a discussion of the blending of consequentialism and 
deontology in Heglian ethical theory. 
12 J. Deigh, ‘On the Right to be Punished: Some Doubts’ (1984) 42:2 Ethics 192. 
13 Morris (1968) 
14 Ibid, 447. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid, 477-478. 
17 See above. 
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objective.18 If, on this account, an offender really can be considered to have chosen or 
consented to his use in this way, then the distinction between punishment and commitment as 
being grounded in the affirmation of personhood seems slightly more difficult to make out.  
The preventive/therapeutic model that we are asked to compare with punishment is, by 
Morris’s own admission, something of a caricature. In this system, every aberrant behaviour is 
looked upon as if it were some form of dysfunction or disease:19  
With this view of man the institutions of social control respond, not with 
punishment, but with either preventive detention, in the case of ‘carriers’, 
or therapy in the case of those manifesting pathological symptoms. The 
logic of sickness implies the logic of therapy. And therapy and punishment 
differ widely in their implications. 
 
While punishment is directed at restoring a balance of burdens and benefits distorted through 
the fault of the person to which it is addressed, the good of therapy is, Morris says, a benefit 
conferred on the individual quite apart from any social interest: it is about helping. When the 
subject has recovered from whatever illness or dysfunction he is thought to be suffering, there 
is no value in continuing the treatment or detention; punishment, by contrast, is warranted by 
what has been done already. Crucially, since punishment is imposed in order to restore a 
balance, it is subject to proportionality constraints; but in the case of detention which has as its 
focus the correction of some disease-like state, proportionality has no place.20 In addition, 
detention for treatment is generally associated with fewer safeguards than punishment since it 
is considered to be in the interests of the patient to be treated.21 The therapeutic system may 
therefore place a more onerous burden on the individual compared to that which he may have 
suffered as punishment. Confronted by a stark choice between imprisonment (which is strictly 
time-limited), and detention for an indefinite period (which presumes lack of capacity to 
conform one’s conduct to law), it is not unreasonable to suppose that a rational agent might – 
as Morris contends – prefer to be punished.  
One of the difficulties with the right to punishment argument is, however, the extent of the role 
it claims that an offender’s choice plays. It relies on a quasi-contractarian ‘opt-in’ on the part 
 
18 R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford, 2001) 13-14; J.G. Murphy, ‘Marxism and 
Retribution’ (1973) 2:3 Philosophy and Public Affairs 217, at 219; D. Boonin, The Problem of Punishment 
(Cambridge, 2008), for example, though this view of deterrence has been challenged: see, for example, Z. 
Hoskins, ‘Deterrent Punishment and Respect for Persons’ (2011) 8:2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 369. 
19 Morris (1968), 482. 
20 Ibid, 484.  
21 Ibid, 485.  
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of the person subject to it:22 the individual, in choosing to offend, chooses to be punished. The 
appeal of this line of reasoning is readily apparent. The deprivations inherent in punishment 
self-evidently require justification23 and, if the offender can be conceived of as having actively 
chosen to be punished, such justification seems less difficult and the exercise less distasteful. 
In reality it would seem to overstate quite significantly the role an individual’s decisions play 
in his punishment.24 A responsible agent who commits an offence – if he is convicted – leaves 
himself liable to be punished, but punishment is, by definition, coercive.25 It is imposed by 
others on behalf of the state, and the offender’s wishes are irrelevant.26 If the offender can 
really be considered to have chosen anything it is, paradoxically, to relinquish at least some of 
his autonomy.27  
Even if the claim about the extent to which punishment is an autonomy-respecting institution 
is so qualified, it could still be contended that it is more respectful of rational agency than PD, 
and therefore morally preferable. It thus presents a problem for theorists who would wish to 
justify PD as a civil measure. Ferdinand Schoeman has, however, argued that civil PD need 
not violate the autonomy principle.28 This account conceptualises PD as a kind of quarantine 
for dangerous people and is worthy of some attention because it has been attributed significance 
in the theoretical literature.29 
2.2.1 PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND QUARANTINE 
 
Schoeman’s central thesis is that ‘no more serious problems arise in defending civil PD, 
suitably qualified, than arise from the practice of quarantine as a measure for protecting public 
health’.30 His threshold is one of ‘moral certainty’,31 established by the application of 
hypothetical risk assessment methodologies that can attain whatever standard of proof we 
 
22 Dubber (1998), 115. According to Dubber, though most commonly associated with retributivism, the right to 
punishment has at various times also been associated with contractarianism and rehabilitationism. 
23 This is not to suggest that deprivations that are (at least ostensibly) non-punitive do not require justification. 
This is discussed later. 
24 Dubber (1998), 197.  
25 A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice (Oxford, 2014), at 14. 
26 See the discussion at 2.2.1. 
27 But see the discussion on the right to be punished and pardons in Deigh (1984), 196-201. Also, McTaggart 
(1986). 
28 F.D. Schoeman, ‘On Incapacitating the Dangerous’, (1979) 16:1 American Philosophical Quarterly 27 
29 See, for example: Floud Report, 40; A. von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness 
in the Sentencing of Criminals (London, 1987); Davis, (1995); M. Corrado, ‘Punishment, Quarantine, and 
Preventive Detention’ (1996) 15:2 Criminal Justice Ethics 3; M. Davis, ‘Preventive Detention, Corrado, and 
Me’ (1996) 15:2 Criminal Justice Ethics 13. 
30 Schoeman (1979), 27. 
31 Ibid, 29. 
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determine: Schoeman suggests that comparable accuracy to that of verdicts returned by jury in 
criminal trials may be satisfactory.32 The value of presently available risk assessment processes 
in predicting criminal conduct is discussed in chapter three, but for the purposes of the present 
discussion it should be noted that the objection Schoeman is concerned with overcoming is 
philosophical, rather than empirical.33 
Schoeman argues that the ethical distinction that seems to be drawn between quarantine and 
PD is based on an erroneous belief that they are imposed for different purposes. For Schoeman, 
people are not, as is often assumed, quarantined because they are ill: they are quarantined 
because they are dangerous.34 What makes them dangerous is not the disease itself; it is that 
they are likely to conduct themselves in such a way that others become exposed to the risk of 
acquiring it. In this regard, he contends – levels of certainty aside – the quarantined individual 
is much like the potential offender preventively detained: both practices have the effect of 
preventing those subject to it from making choices that place others at risk and so, if we object 
to PD, we must also object to quarantine. This is important because the argument does not, as 
contended elsewhere,35 rest on a disease-dangerousness comparison, but on a comparison 
between different forms of dangerous conduct. As was discussed above, the objection from 
autonomy essentially holds that PD, unlike punishment, is morally impermissible because it 
fails to respect the person subject to it as an autonomous moral agent. Schoeman’s approach is 
to refute the claim implicit in the objection that a decision to preventively detain is a statement 
about the person rather than his conduct. As Floud and Young put it:36 
The analogy with quarantine is persuasive; but it seems to carry the 
obnoxious implication that ‘dangerousness’ is a disease-like condition. 
It is, of course, nothing of the kind; as critics are quick to point out…to 
advocate special sentences for dangerous offenders would be to 
advocate punishing them for what they are rather than what they have 
done; and that would be, if anything, a shade worse than punishing 
them for what they may do. 
 
Although quarantine is a particularly burdensome practice which has the effect of significantly 
curtailing a person’s freedoms, it at least appears much less controversial than PD.37 In part, 
 
32 Ibid, 28. 
33 Davis (1995), 92.  
34 Schoeman (1979), 30.  
35 Davis (1995), 92. 
36 Floud Report, 40. Emphasis in original. See also the discussion above on Morris’s therapeutic model.  
37 Ibid. 
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this might be because its necessity in any individual case is apparent and that it tends to be 
strictly time-limited. The problem for the quarantine analogy is that the need for quarantine is 
limited by the disease. At some stage, either the patient will have recovered sufficiently to 
return to the community, or he will have died. Either way, the risk he presents will have been 
eliminated or satisfactorily reduced. Dangerous persons are significantly more complex. As is 
discussed in chapter three, even if one accepts that some people must be preventively detained, 
it is harder to identify them. Treatment and rehabilitation may take years or may be lifelong; 
and just as it is difficult to identify dangerous persons at the point they are detained, it is 
difficult to identify those who have sufficiently “recovered”.38 The risk constraint which limits 
quarantine is therefore quite different to that which limits PD.  
If quarantine and civil PD are truly comparable in this way, then it seems that the issue is not 
whether PD is permissible, but when it is permissible, and what safeguards it should be subject 
to.39 But, as Floud and Young point out, acceptance of quarantine and PD as ethically 
equivalent requires that the role of choice in each is equivalent. It is not clear that this is so.40 
Anyone who accepts the practice of quarantine must acknowledge that it may 
be permissible, in some circumstances, to detain legally sane and innocent 
persons for the protection of others from unintentional harm; but he is in no 
way committed to the proposition if it is wilful harm that is envisaged. 
 
One of the difficulties surrounding PD is that the individual made subject to it may fully intend, 
at the point he is identified as dangerous, to conduct himself lawfully and may believe quite 
genuinely that he presents no risk of harm. This may cause the detention to seem to be 
particularly unfair. However, as Schoeman observes, a prediction of dangerousness may be 
just as much about the circumstances in which a person is likely to find themselves, as it is 
about his character.41  
To illustrate this, he gives the slightly odd example of a man who has given an express 
undertaking to refrain from using the telephone for a given amount of time but who, upon the 
discovery that his child has become severely unwell, uses the phone to summon emergency 
assistance. Schoeman’s point is that there are sometimes good reasons to justify disregarding 
 
38 See section 6.4.1.B and C on offender release and risk management.  
39 Floud Report at 41. 
40 Ibid. Emphasis in original. But see N. Walker, Sentencing in a Rational Society (London, 1969), 137 where 
the rationality of the distinction between unintentional harm and wilful harm is questioned. This is considered 
further in section 3.3.2.A of the thesis. 
41 The role of situational factors and their interaction with personality traits is the subject of an extensive body 
of literature. See section 3.3.2.D for further discussion. 
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someone’s sincerely offered assurances about how they will behave in future;42 he intends to 
show that the problem with predictions of this nature is not necessarily that a person is unable 
to refrain from acting in a particular way, but that he will not refrain. The example itself remains 
problematic, however. There is nothing about the circumstances themselves over which the 
man has control, and he could not reasonably be expected to remove himself from them. The 
situation is unavoidable. Though it is conceivable that people may find themselves in social 
contexts which make it extremely difficult for them to refrain from offending, it is difficult to 
imagine one in which the conduct he wishes to refrain from, and which risks criminal 
punishment or civil detention, is also compelled by some legal or moral obligation. Surely the 
people we are concerned about are those who disregard social norms, and it is this disregard 
that suggests to us that they may be unable or unwilling to submit to ordinary social constraints 
on conduct. Finally, detention imposed for intentional conduct that is effectively compelled by 
circumstances someone could not reasonably be expected to avoid, or withdraw from, would 
remain ethically problematic even where the conduct was criminal or otherwise harmful.   
2.2.2 PREVENTING INTENTIONAL HARM 
The fundamental difficulty for the quarantine analogy, therefore, is that PD and quarantine are 
imposed to prevent different kinds of harms. Although there may be some people who would 
deliberately infect someone, quarantine is not designed for those people:43 for the most part, 
the activities that would place others at risk would be ordinary activities. For the dangerous but 
responsible agent, it is different. Simply choosing, e.g., to go outside or answer the door to 
someone is not sufficient in itself for harm to occur; he must make a further choice to engage 
in some additional (abnormal) conduct for that to happen. PD therefore occurs earlier in the 
sequence of events that might lead to harm than quarantine does. Further, if the decision to 
preventively detain is completely isolated from any notion of culpability, as Schoeman 
suggests it should be, detention rests on purely consequentialist considerations. There would 
be no principled restriction on its use.44 Those who are quarantined for infection have no 
opportunity to avoid the situation; blame does not enter into the equation, and they are 
quarantined because they cannot manage the risk they pose to others unless they are segregated. 
Those who would be detained over fears about their future criminal conduct do have the 
 
42 Schoeman (1979), 32-33.  
43 Floud Report, 41.  
44 Ibid, 43-45; see also A. von Hirsh, ‘Prediction of criminal conduct and preventive confinement of convicted 
persons’, (1972) 21:3 Buffalo Law Review 717. 
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opportunity to avoid causing harm, and so they ought also to have an opportunity to avoid 
detention. As will be argued, it is this opportunity to avoid the preventive measure by refraining 
from blameworthy conduct – or lack of it – that is instrumental in determining whether the 
measure conforms to the autonomy principle.45  
The intention here is not to advocate an approach in which people are simply left to choose to 
cause harm to others, but given that dangerousness is not like an infection, and there is no 
simple medical test that can be done to confirm it, it would seem essential to have regard to 
past conduct. This is where assistance from the principle of autonomy may be sought. Since 
either punishment or detention involves a restriction upon freedom, then the autonomy 
argument makes – at best – a claim that an agent’s choice should be respected as far as possible: 
and that means being given the chance to avoid punishment.  In other words, however sceptical 
one may be of the existence of a right to punishment, it constitutes a robust argument in favour 
of a culpability constraint.  
2.3 THE PUNITIVE NATURE OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
The foregoing section has argued that PD cannot be justified as a form of civil confinement, 
and it is therefore necessary to consider other accounts of it. As was mentioned in the 
introduction, there are a number of theories of PD which seek to conceptualise, and therefore 
justify, PD as a form of punishment, but there is disagreement as to what, precisely, it is 
punishment for. Sections 2.4 to 2.6 discuss these approaches. But before considering what PD 
might be punishment for, it must be established that it is, in fact, punitive. H.L.A. Hart 
remarked that a detainee told that his continued detention at the end of a prison sentence was a 
preventive measure, and not a punishment, ‘might think he was being tormented by a barren 
piece of conceptualism – though he might not express himself in that way’.46 The recognition 
that PD is likely to be experienced as punitive is perhaps one reason that much of the core 
literature seeks to evaluate it as such, and a substantial proportion of this chapter is therefore 
devoted to discussing approaches that defend PD as a form of punishment. It is however worth 
considering the theoretical basis for claims that PD is inherently punitive; that is, to try to 
establish why the justification of PD should be a question of the operation of the criminal law, 
and why that matters. Section 2.3.1 discusses the characteristics of punishment, and section 
 
45 See section 2.3 below. 
46 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 2nd Edn. (Oxford, 2008), 166-167. 
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2.3.2 considers what may be termed ‘punitive preventive measures’, i.e., punishments imposed 
for the purposes of preventing some form of conduct. Finally, section 2.3.3 argues that PD 
ought to be considered a punishment, but that problems arise in justifying it as such.  
2.3.1 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PUNISHMENT 
Arguably the best-known definition of punishment is that of Hart,47 who identifies five 
essential characteristics: (1) [it] must consist of pain or other elements normally considered 
unpleasant; (2) [it] must be for an offence against legal rules; (3) [it] must be of an actual or 
supposed offender for his offence; (4) [it] must be intentionally administered by human beings 
other than the offender; (5) [it] must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted 
by a legal system against which the offence is committed’.48 This definition emphasises what 
others have termed ‘deprivation’ or ‘hard treatment’,49 but it has been criticised for lack of 
explicit reference to censure,50 which a number of theorists consider to be an essential element 
of punishment, alongside deprivation or hard treatment.51 ‘Censure’ (or ‘stigma’)52 in this 
context refers to the expressive function of criminal punishment:53 the hard treatment 
communicates disapproval to the person being punished, but also to victims and the public.54 
Theoretical constructions of criminal law as communicating disapprobation through 
punishment are complex, and no attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis will be made 
here;55 but for the purposes of the present discussion two things are of interest.  
First, the concept of censure engages desert considerations. It is a backward-looking construct, 
since logically it requires the person to have done something to be censured for. This is one of 
the reasons a tension arises in the literature between retributive accounts of punishment and the 
consequentialist considerations which underpin preventive detention.56 Distinctions between 
different types of offences must be made if the censure is to be meaningful in any sense; this 
 
47 Ashworth and Zedner (2014), 14. 
48 Hart (2008), 4-5. 
49 See for example, Ashworth and Zedner (2014), 14; and D. Husak, ‘Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as 
Punishment’ (2011) 48 San Diego L. Rev. 1173, 1181-1182. 
50 Ashworth and Zedner (2014), 14. Although this “omission” might be explicable in the context of Hart’s 
theoretical approach which draws a distinction between what punishment is, and what its purpose is. See Hart 
(2008), at 4. 
51 See for example, Husak (2011), 1182; Baker (2009), 131; A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth, Proportionate 
Sentencing (Oxford, 2005), 6; Ashworth and Zedner, ibid. 
52 Husak (2011), 1181. 
53 Ashworth and Zedner (2014), 14; A. von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford, 1996), 10-11.   
54 Ashworth and Zedner, ibid.  
55 But see R.A. Duff (1998); also more generally Duff (2011). 
56 Duff (1998), 145-146. 
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means the deprivation or hard treatment by which it is communicated must vary in severity 
commensurate to the offence.57 As Hart put it: 58 
[P]unishments for different crimes should be proportionate to the 
relative wickedness or seriousness of the crime. For though we cannot 
say how wicked any given crime is, perhaps we can say that one is 
more wicked than another and we should express this ordinal relation 
in a corresponding scale of penalties. 
Custodial sentences are the harshest punishments available, and therefore convey the most 
forceful censure,59 and the most onerous are indeterminate sentences. If indeterminate 
sentences can be regarded as respecting any sort of proportionality constraint at all, it is one of 
threat or risk-proportionality rather than culpability-proportionality.60 These sentences are 
therefore vulnerable to criticism from a retributivist perspective, since they could be considered 
to communicate more censure than is warranted.61  
Second, censure has a definitional as well an expressive function. It distinguishes between 
punitive deprivations, and deprivations imposed by the state upon its citizens other than as 
punishment;62 examples of these non-punitive deprivations include taxation, the stoppage of 
state benefits, and licence revocation.63 Perhaps the most relevant of these examples to the 
present discussion is the driving licence revocation, since, although it is most obviously a 
preventive measure, it could also be punitive. For instance, although driving licences may be 
revoked for reasons other than wrongdoing on the part of the licence holder, such as when the 
holder develops a disqualifying medical condition, they may also be revoked because the 
holder has been convicted of an offence such as dangerous driving.64 It would seem strange to 
argue that someone who had been disqualified for an offence ought not to consider it a 
 
57 Ibid. 
58 Hart (2008), 162.  
59 Baker (2009), 128. This is of course only true in jurisdictions that do not permit capital punishment, although 
Beccaria, whose social contract theory of punishment led him to reject the death penalty, considered that 
lifelong imprisonment was worse than execution. He nevertheless considered it justified in cases where the 
offender could be deemed to have “chosen” the punishment. See Dubber (1998); this was discussed above.   
60 Ashworth and Zedner (2014), 18. It could, of course, be considered that some offences are so grave that they 
do warrant lifelong punishment in retributivist term. However, the focus here is on special sentences for 
dangerous offenders, as outlined in the introduction. 
61 Duff (1998), 146.  
62 Husak (2011), 1181-1182; Baker (2009), 122; von Hirsch (1996), 9. 
63 Husak, ibid, 1182.  
64 Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, Sch. 2, para. 1, and the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 2. 
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punishment. Censure is inherent in the removal of a freedom because of blameworthy 
conduct.65 This is so even when the measure is underpinned by a preventive rationale.  
One of the claims that is made of PD by those who object to it is that it ‘blurs the boundaries’ 
between civil and criminal law.66 This is because what has been termed the ‘standard’ (i.e. the 
retributive) account of criminal law is that it addresses only intentional wrongs done by 
responsible persons and does this by punishing them in proportion to their culpability.67 In 
contrast, the PD of those who are thought likely to cause harm to others at some point in the 
future is the domain of civil law, and is legitimate only in the case of those who lack the ability 
to direct their own conduct.68 Detention to prevent future offending must either involve the use 
of criminal punishment to prevent future harm, or the subjection of a morally autonomous agent 
to civil commitment; the boundaries between civil and criminal law are, therefore, blurred.  
Regardless of which approach is taken, the argument is that if a rational agent is subjected to 
hard treatment which is not proportionate to the gravity of his offending behaviour, he is treated 
as though he lacked moral autonomy, and that this is morally impermissible.69  
The objection that PD collapses the distinction between criminal and civil law is very much 
one of abstract principle, and one that depends on holding to an almost deontological view of 
punishment that centres on a Kantian construction of autonomy. Little else will be said of it 
here, since it was discussed in detail at section 2.2. That being said, it is worth noting that the 
classification of a period of detention as criminal punishment or civil containment is of some 
practical significance. It was argued earlier that the autonomy principle should be construed as 
giving rise to the requirement for some degree of culpability constraint; what is of concern at 
present, however, is what Hart termed the ‘definitional stop’: that is, an abuse of definition 
employed to circumvent the need to justify punitive measures by classing them as something 
other than punishment.70 The human rights implications of PD are discussed more fully in 
 
65 For example, as von Hirsch has pointed out, the experience of being fined is not the same as that of being 
taxed, and that is because the deprivation is imposed in recognition of the individual’s culpability. See the 
discussion in von Hirsch, (1996) at 9.  
66 See, for example, S.J. Morse (1996); P.H. Robinson, ‘Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice’ 
(2001) 114:5 Harvard Law Review 1429; M.L. Corrado, ‘Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem 
of Preventive Detention’ (1996) 86:3 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 778. 
67 Morse (1996), 117.This claim is both normative and descriptive.  
68 Morse, Ibid. 
69 Ashworth and Zedner (2014), 19. See also the discussion above. 
70 Hart (2008), 6. Hart was speaking specifically about instances where the definitional stop was engaged to 
allow proponents of utilitarian penal philosophy to side-step questions about its lack of constraints on the 
punishment of innocent people in the interests of general deterrence.  
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chapter six, but the practical significance of the punishment/prevention distinction in terms of 
the ECHR is worth brief consideration at this point.  
2.3.2 PUNITIVE PREVENTIVE MEASURES 
As has been pointed out elsewhere, modern retributivism really only exists in an “impure” form 
where consequentialist considerations are given some weight, whilst culpability is still regarded 
as the essential constraint.71 Preventive rationales for punishment are therefore generally 
accepted as providing at least partial justification for its imposition, such as deterrence, 
rehabilitation and incapacitation.72 Preventive offences such as attempts, inchoate, and pre-
inchoate crimes, though not entirely uncontroversial, seem somewhat less controversial than 
PD. As such, one of the approaches to justifying PD is to aim to construe it as punishment for 
some kind of preventive offence. Some of these approaches are discussed later in section 2.5. 
Preventive devices that operate through hard treatment are what Ashworth and Zedner have 
termed ‘coercive preventive measures’:73 
[A] measure is preventive if it is created in order to avert, or reduce 
frequency or impact of, behaviour that is believed to present an 
unacceptable risk of harm. It is coercive if it involves state-imposed 
restrictions on liberty of action, backed by a coercive response, or the 
threat of a coercive response, to the restricted individual. 
However, it was said earlier that the punitive/preventive classification was of more than just 
theoretical significance; and although this chapter does focus on the more philosophical aspects 
of the literature, it is worth taking brief account, at this stage, of the approach to the definitional 
stop that has been taken by the ECtHR. As established earlier, punishment involves hard 
treatment and censure. The approbatory nature of punishment means that it is generally 
considered to require more substantial justification than similar deprivations that might be 
imposed by civil law.74 As such, punishment generally attracts more robust safeguards; for 
example, the presumption of innocence, and the requirement for proof beyond reasonable 
doubt.75 The ECtHR has determined that ‘penalty’ in the context of the ECHR has an 
 
71 Ashworth and Zedner (2014), 17. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid, 20. 
74 Ibid,19. 
75 Ibid. Of course these sorts of safeguards, though making it harder to impose a punishment, would have no 
place in a civil process where conceptions of guilt and culpability have no place. 
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autonomous meaning; this is to prevent states circumventing safeguards by labelling punitive 
measures as preventive.  
In Welch v United Kingdom76 the Court considered whether the retrospective imposition of a 
confiscation order under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 violated article 7 of the 
Convention. The critical question was whether the order was preventive or punitive in nature. 
If it was punitive, then Article 7 protections would apply; if it were preventive, as the UK 
Government argued, then the order’s retrospective application might be permissible. Although 
the Court accepted that the order was intended to discourage further criminal activity, that was 
not in itself enough to prevent the measure being held to be punitive. One of the factors taken 
as an indicator of the punitive nature of the measure was that the judge had discretion to weigh 
the offender’s culpability in fixing the amount to be seized: censure was a distinguishing 
feature. Also of relevance was the statutory presumption that any sums or goods of value 
acquired at any time during the six years preceding his conviction were proceeds of drug 
trafficking.77 The Court’s overall impression of the order – even if they did accept the 
preventive rationale – was that it amounted to a penalty,78 and as such the protections of Article 
7 were engaged.  
This approach was followed in M v Germany.79 Germany operated a ‘dual track’ system of 
incapacitation in which certain offenders who had completed a prison sentence could be moved 
onto the civil track, where they would be subject to PD. During PD, people were held on 
dedicated prison wings that differed cosmetically in certain respects from those on which 
offenders were held as punishment. The Court held that minor differences such as these were 
insufficient to distinguish the period of PD from imprisonment; and since the measure was 
punitive, it amounted to a retrospectively imposed penalty in breach of Article 7. This case is 
returned to in section 6.2.1.80 For the purposes of the present discussion, it is sufficient to note 
two things: first, that in determining whether detention is preventive or punitive, the extent of 
the deprivations it imposes is more significant than its stated purpose; and second, that where 
 
76 (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 247. 
77 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, s. 2(2) 
78 (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 247, at para. 33. 
79 (2010) 51 E.H.R.R. 41. 
80 But see also K. Drenkhahan et al. ‘What’s in a name? Preventive Detention in Germany in the Shadow of 
European Human Rights Law’ (2012) Criminal Law Review 167. 
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a measure exhibits both preventive and punitive features, then the punitive aspects appear to 
override preventive aspects in determining its ultimate character.81 
2.3.3 PREVENTIVE DETENTION AS PUNISHMENT 
In the preceding discussion, censure was identified as punishment’s distinguishing 
characteristic. Non-punitive measures, such as confinement for treatment, may involve 
deprivation of rights and freedoms, but they are not intended to communicate disapproval. The 
distinction matters, because punitive deprivations are generally subject to more stringent 
safeguards than those imposed by the civil justice system. It has also been established that, 
contrary to objections that insist a measure must amount to criminal punishment, or civil 
prevention, these features may well be present together; outwith the context of justifications 
for PD, this is not particularly controversial. Husak, whose retributivist construction of PD is 
discussed in detail later,82 argues that PD should be considered punishment. This is, he says, 
because ‘on any plausible account, the persons we hope to preventively detain have done 
something that leads us to want to detain them’.83  He then goes on to say that this ‘something’ 
should be construed as a crime. This is problematic; but given that most retributivist theorists 
will have regard to consequentialist considerations in justifying a particular type of 
punishment, Husak’s approach of distinguishing between what the detention is imposed for,84 
and its purpose seems to accord substantially with the ECtHR’s approach.85  
PD is, at the very least, what Ashworth and Zedner term a coercive preventive measure, and 
the approach that has been taken by the ECtHR emphasises the nature of the deprivations 
involved. The detail of particular models of post-conviction PD is discussed later,86 but it will 
be apparent that detaining someone for an indefinite period involves substantial deprivation of 
freedoms; this is so regardless of whether it is called detention or imprisonment. For these 
reasons, it is submitted that PD ought to be considered punishment. However, as will be argued 
 
81 But not universally: see United States v Salerno 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and discussion in M.L. Corrado (1996), 
778. In this U.S. Supreme Court pre-trial detention case the intention of the legislature was found more 
important in determining the detention’s essential characteristics than its effect. 
82 Section 2.5.1. below. 
83 D. Husak, ‘Preventive Detention as Punishment? Some Possible Obstacles’ in A. Ashworth et al. (Eds.) 
Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford, 2013), 179. Emphasis in original.  
84 Ibid, at 184.  
85 And also Hart’s approach. See 2.3.1. above. 
86 Sections 2.5 and 2.6. 
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throughout the remainder of the chapter, the lack of culpability-proportionality inherent in 
these sentences is problematic for justifying its use.  
2.4. PUNISHMENT FOR A FUTURE OFFENCE 
Having established that PD is a punishment, the chapter moves on to consider what it might be 
punishment for. This section considers approaches which conceptualise PD as punishment for 
a crime that has not yet been committed, in particular the approaches of New87 and Statman.88 
Although they accept that evidential constraints render their approaches impractical, they are 
worthy of consideration because if the conditions they identify can be satisfied they may, to 
some extent at least, overcome criticisms of PD that are founded on objections to the 
punishment of a person who has not yet committed a crime.  
2.4.1 NEW’S “PURE” PRE-PUNISHMENT MODEL 
New conceptualises pre-punishment as something similar to the pre-payment of goods in a 
commercial transaction: the buyer knows that the seller will in fact make delivery, and therefore 
it makes no difference whether payment precedes or follows it: ‘Equally, if it is known to all 
involved that [someone] intends…and will eventually carry out his intention to commit [an 
offence], we should have no reason to prefer postpunishment to prepunishment.’89 He presents 
us with the following scenario.90 The police are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that at 10.31 
the following morning, a particular driver will exceed the speed limit on a remote road. We are 
asked to accept that it will be impossible to issue a penalty after the incident. The driver 
contacts the police and offers to pay the fine for the offence before he commits it; we are told 
it is also impossible for the police to intervene to prevent it. The fine is issued, paid by the 
absent driver’s wife with money he left for this purpose and, at 10.31 the offence is committed 
exactly as intimated. In these circumstances, New contends that neither deterrence theorists 
nor retributivists can properly object to punishment in advance.  
The deterrence theorist cannot object because pre-punishment could conceivably have the same 
deterrent effect on potential offenders as punishment following the crime and, besides, in the 
 
87 C. New, ‘Time and Punishment’, (1992) 52:1 Analysis 35. 
88 D. Statman, ‘The Time to Punish and the Problem of Moral Luck’, (1997) 14:2 Journal of Applied Philosophy 
129.  
89 New (1992), 37-38.  
90 Ibid, 35-36. 
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example given it could not have deterred the driver from speeding.91 If it had done so, we could 
not have the requisite knowledge that the offence would be committed which would justify 
pre-punishment. He argues the retributivist objection fails because, although the desert 
requirement must be satisfied for punishment to be justified, it does not in itself preclude 
punishment prior to the commission of a crime: a person who definitely will commit an offence 
is not, he argues, innocent.92 The problem of justification is, for New, one of knowledge, and 
not moral principle.93 
This is problematic: in order to justify pre-punishment, we must be satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt that the offence will be committed – presumably with the level of accuracy concerning 
time and place exemplified in the scenario since his whole account is built around it. If the 
form of pre-punishment chosen will prevent that offence, we cannot be certain that the crime 
will be committed and therefore the punishment cannot be justified. In short, on this account, 
the state is committed to allowing an offence to take place in the same way as a seller is 
committed to the delivery of goods for which he has been paid in advance. In fact, one could 
go further and suggest that it is implicit in such an account that the offender becomes entitled 
to carry out his offence;94 perhaps the offender is even morally obliged to offend, since it is the 
certainty of the crime that justifies the punishment.  
New’s reply to this is that the pre-payment analogy should not be considered in contractual 
terms: it does not, therefore, give rise to entitlement or obligation to offend.95 This is rather 
unconvincing. If the decision to hand over money in advance of receipt of the goods is a 
reasonable one, it is only because there is a level of certainty that delivery will follow. In the 
context of pre-punishment, we are simply told that this certainty exists; in the context of pre-
payment, that (relative) certainty is derived from an enforceable obligation upon the person 
receiving payment. It therefore seems strange to argue the contractual element can be 
disregarded, or that entitlement can be isolated from certainty. A marginally more persuasive 
defence of this aspect of New’s thesis is outlined by Williams who concedes, for the purposes 
of argument, the possibility that pre-punishment may not be an intrinsically backward-looking 
construct:96 pre-punishment might simply be punishment that is given at an unusual point in 
 
91 Ibid, 38. 
92 Ibid, 37. 
93 Ibid. Emphasis in original.  
94 F. Feldman, ‘Desert: Reconsideration of Some Received Wisdom’, (1995) 104 Mind 63. at 77. 
95 New (1992), 38.  
96 J.N. Williams, ‘Beyond Minority Report: Pre-Crime, Pre-Punishment, and Pre-Desert’, (2012) 17 TRANS: 
Internet Journal for Cultural Sciences 3, at 6. 
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the chain of events, its normal place being determined by our lack of contact with the sort of 
scenario presently under consideration.97 That being so, we can evaluate it on the same terms 
as ‘post-punishment’ and could argue that if pre-punishment were to justify subsequent 
criminal conduct, that it must also be the case that post-punishment justifies the conduct in 
respect of which it has been imposed.98  
2.4.2 ‘MORAL LUCK’ AND PRE-PUNISHMENT 
If it is nevertheless accepted that pre-punishment, if it can be justified at all, requires the state 
to possess knowledge that a particular offence will occur, then preventive punishments must 
be precluded because they can never amount to justifiably imposed pre-punishment. Statman, 
however, disagrees.99 New’s account is, he argues, better understood as a ‘Kantian rejection of 
moral luck’,100 but one that does not follow the implications of this rejection through; to this 
extent the account is incomplete, and this is why New arrives at the conclusion that preventive 
pre-punishment cannot be justified. Broadly, the concept of moral luck concerns the 
relationship between intentions and outcomes, which are regarded as (largely) immune to 
circumstances and can therefore be considered to derive from moral character.101 Proponents 
of moral luck, most notably Bernard Williams102 and Thomas Nagel,103 hold that moral 
character cannot be insulated from factors outwith an agent’s control.104 The ‘problem of moral 
luck’ is therefore one of whether, and to what extent, a person’s blameworthiness may be 
influenced by chance occurrences.105  
New’s account holds that punishment is justified once the agent has formed the intention to 
offend but before the crime is committed, provided that there is certainty that it will be 
committed. Statman argues that New’s approach is predicated upon separation of moral status 
and luck. If this is so, and we are satisfied that someone has formed a particular criminal 
intention, and that they will indeed go through with that intention, then that is all we need to 
justify punishment: ‘the objection to moral luck assumes that character is both a necessary and 
 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid, 9. 
99 Statman, (1997), 129.  
100 Ibid, 131.  
101 For a comprehensive discussion of the concept see D. Statman (Ed.), Moral Luck (New York, 1993). 
102 See B. Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981), especially chapter 2. 
103 See, for example, T. Nagel, Mortal Questions (New York, 1979), especially chapter 3. 
104 Also N. Hanna, ‘Moral Luck Defended’, (2014) 48:4 NOÛS 683. 
105 See S. Sverdlik, ‘Crime and Moral Luck’, in Statman (Ed.) (1993), 181. 
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sufficient condition for moral responsibility’.106 If we accept the account of pre-punishment 
advanced by New is, in fact, founded on a rejection of moral luck as articulated by Statman, 
then that account must indeed be incomplete. This is because the significance of the actor’s 
conduct relative to his intentions is that it is an expression of his moral character. In other 
words, if the pre-punishment is justified on the grounds of moral character, the need for 
certainty that the conduct will occur is an artificial, unnecessary, and unjust constraint:107 
If we knew for sure that somebody would kill her husband if she found out 
that he was not loyal to her, why not put her in prison now? She, first of all 
deserves it, since she is the sort of person who would commit murder in 
these circumstances, and secondly, such prepunishment might be rather 
helpful; not least to her husband… 
 
This formulation of pre-punishment, though presented by Statman as a reinterpretation of 
New’s argument, is something quite different. New requires that intention precede punishment, 
but on Statman’s account knowledge of intention and of future conduct are proxies for 
knowledge of character type. We are no longer focused solely on the individual; instead, we 
are engaged in identifying classes of persons to which our hypothetical offender may be 
assigned and consequently punished. 
It is notable that, at the point the discussion moves from ‘pure’ punishment to preventive 
punishment, the emphasis shifts rapidly from the individual to the group. Membership of a 
class is used to justify punishment, albeit for a specific future crime rather than class 
membership itself. There is an extensive body of research on the efficacy and appropriate 
application of predictive assessments of offending behaviour, most of which rely on group 
characteristics to some degree, and it is touched upon later;108 however it is not generally used 
to justify punishment itself. Rather, in the context of what might be termed the ‘deserved 
prevention’ theories discussed at sections 2.5 and 2.6 of this chapter, punishment is justified 
on the basis of something that has occurred, but the nature or severity of the punishment is 
justified on the grounds that shared traits indicate a propensity to cause future harm.109 In 
reliance upon traits as predictors which justify conviction for a specific future offence, 
Statman’s defence of preventive action appears to be unique within the literature. However, for 
the reasons given in section 2.4 below, both these approaches must be rejected.  
 
106 Statman (1997), 133.  
107 Ibid. 
108 See section 3.4.2 of the thesis. 
109 See, for example, Duff (1998); and von Hirsch (1987).  
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2.4.3 KNOWLEDGE AND PRE-PUNISHMENT 
The first obstacle to making the pre-punishment approaches workable would be establishing 
that there is, in fact, a group of people who – despite being fully capable of complying with 
social norms – will invariably form and act upon criminal intentions in certain circumstances. 
These circumstances would also need to be known.110 It would then be necessary to accurately 
identify the individual concerned as belonging to that group. The objection raised here is 
framed as an empiric one. Lippke agrees with New and Statman that the barrier to justifiable 
pre-punishment is one of knowledge;111 the deficiency, he argues, is in our predictive 
methodologies. Numerous competing claims have been made about the value of attempts to 
predict future offending behaviour, and about their appropriate place in the criminal justice 
system. This is returned to in chapter three. However, the claim that Smilansky makes against 
New – that pre-punishment is unjust because it fails to respect the actor as a moral agent – is 
not one that can be overcome by advances in predictive capabilities and it is equally applicable 
here.  
It is worth acknowledging that in introducing considerations of practical assessment of future 
offending risk Lippke shifts the discussion somewhat. It is apparent from their discussions that 
neither New nor Statman actually intend that the arguments they construct be used to underpin 
a system of pre-punishment, and it is also apparent that they are assuming a level of certainty 
that could not conceivably be attained. What these authors are concerned to do is to establish 
the validity of the concept of justifiable pre-punishment. For New, this is punishment based on 
certainty of future conduct; for Statman, it is punishment based on certainty about the type of 
individual that would perpetrate that future conduct. The critical distinction between these 
accounts is that the former precludes punishment which prevents the crime, whilst the latter 
explicitly permits it. New’s account is of interest because it aims to establish the validity of 
justifiable pre-punishment as a philosophical construct and, if successful, this would go some 
way to answering principled objections to PD that assume the unjustifiability of punishment 
for future crimes. Statman’s account is worthy of consideration because he assumes the 
essential validity of New’s argument, and constructs what appears to be the only explicit 
defence of preventive pre-punishment in the literature base. However, both accounts ultimately 
fail for the same reason.  
 
110 Lippke (2008), 390. 
111 Ibid, at 389.  
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An acceptance that there is no meaningful distinction between pre-punishment and post-
punishment entails acceptance that criminal wrongs are righted by punishment. The logical 
consequence of this, as Williams points out, means abandoning a desert-based model: 
punishment could never be justified from a desert perspective because the conduct amounting 
to a crime is no longer wrongful.112 It is not at all clear, however, that one can dispense with 
the conceptual distinction between pre and post-punishment. As Smilansky has argued, 
punishing someone for conduct they have not yet begun to perpetrate denies them the 
opportunity to make a different choice.113 This failure to respect moral autonomy means that 
pre-punishment always amounts to the punishment of an innocent person;114 it is to adopt a 
hard-line determinist stance in which the distinctions between persons deserving of punishment 
and persons not are overridden by a sense that their conduct has been predetermined.115 In other 
words, Smilansky’s objection to pre-punishment is that it requires that the emphasis be placed 
so heavily on factors outwith the agent’s control that its imposition can never be just. New’s 
reply to this is that knowing what someone will do does not require denying their capacity to 
choose to do otherwise.116  
It appears, then, that in addition to having knowledge of an agent’s future conduct we must 
also have knowledge of a range of other factors not directly addressed by New which allow us 
to reach the determination that he had the capacity to control and direct his own conduct, but 
that he would choose not to. New’s defence of pre-punishment is offered as a means of 
demonstrating that the barriers to its justifiable operation are merely evidential, but it does not 
seem that what he calls the empiric objection can so easily be set apart from the principled 
objection that a person ought only to be held responsible, and therefore punished, for what is 
within his control. If it were possible – by whatever means – to ascertain unerringly a sequence 
of future of events then, as Smilansky and others have said, it is contrary to moral intuition that 
punishment is deserved.117  
 
112 Ibid. Perhaps also, as Williams suggests, from the point of view of the deterrence theorist, presumably 
because the routine use of unjustified punishments would be thought to result in a loss of behaviour modifying 
authority. See Williams (2012), at 9. 
113 S. Smilansky, ‘The Time to Punish’, (1994) 54:1 Analysis 50. See also L. Alexander and K.K. Ferzan, 
‘Danger: The Ethics of Preventive Detention’, (2011-2012) 9 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 637. 
114 Ibid.  See also H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford, 1968) pages 21-24, and 181-183; and 
R.A. Duff, ‘Choice, Character, and Criminal Responsibility’, (1993) 12 Law and Philosophy 345.  
115 Smilansky (1994), at 53.  
116 This line of reasoning is similar to Schoeman’s quarantine defence discussed in the last section.  
117 Smilansky (1994); Williams (2012); G. Yaffee, ‘Prevention and Imminence’, (2011) 48 San Diego Law 
Review 1205. 
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Although New and Statman attempt to frame their arguments so as to insulate them from 
practical considerations, their accounts serve to emphasise the inseparability of the empirical 
question from the principled: we cannot justly punish for future crime, because we can never 
properly establish that an individual will refuse to exercise their autonomy to refrain from the 
offending behaviour. If we try to, and we base a decision to punish – preventively or otherwise 
– on a prediction that the agent will choose to offend, then at the very least we deny that person 
the opportunity to remain a law-abiding citizen. At worst, these accounts could be regarded as 
treating those concerned as if they lacked altogether the capacity to conform their behaviour to 
law. Since the premise of these arguments is that the future is essentially predetermined, it is 
difficult to see how, in the context of circumstances yet to arise and conduct yet to take place, 
one could meaningfully distinguish between choice and compulsion. Statman’s preventive pre-
punishment is particularly vulnerable to this objection, since on his account it is not necessary 
for the future offender to foresee, intend, or plan, for the necessary conditions to obtain: 
punishment is justified at the point a person who will formulate such plans or intentions is 
identified.118  
2.5 PUNISHMENT FOR DANGEROUSNESS  
The last section considered punishment for a specific future crime and whether it is capable of 
supporting a system of PD. Such an approach was ultimately rejected on the basis that – even 
if one could be absolutely certain of what someone would do – it would require a view of 
human conduct as being so completely pre-determined as to be incompatible with the concept 
of punishment. The chapter now turns to consider a different set of approaches to the 
justification of PD as punishment. In these, the propensity for doing harm is conceptualised as 
a substantive offence, and PD as a deserved punishment for that offence. Two such approaches 
are discussed here: punishment for personality traits predictive of offending (in section 2.5.1); 
and punishment for committing a reckless endangerment type offence (in section 2.5.2).  
2.5.1 “POSSESSION” OF DANGEROUS PERSONALITY TRAITS  
 
A number of accounts of PD contain elements of trait criminalisation – even if the theorists 
refuse to characterise it as such119 – Husak, however, has constructed an account that is 
 
118 This is of course assuming such identifiable traits exist and can be reliably found to predict behaviour as 
these accounts suggest.  
119 See, for example, Morse’s reckless endangerment account discussed in section 2.5.2. 
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explicitly formulated as such an approach. He argues that people who are considered candidates 
for PD have done ‘something’ that has led to their being considered dangerous. Detention in 
such a case would convey stigma or censure and would therefore amount to punishment. In 
order to avoid the objection that such punishment would be disproportionate, and therefore 
unjust, Husak seeks to accommodate it within a retributivist framework. If this can be 
accomplished, the imposition of PD can be evaluated according to the normative standards 
against which the operation of criminal law is ordinarily assessed.120 This matters because if 
PD simply is punishment, and if it cannot be justified on the same terms as retributive 
punishment generally, then it cannot be justified at all.  
Husak argues PD cannot amount to the punishment of an innocent person if it is imposed for 
an offence; and so his solution is to create one.121 The offence he proposes is of possession of 
(hypothetical) personality traits that serve as an accurate predictor of future offending. Once it 
is established that an individual possesses these traits, the offence is complete. It should be 
noted that, in common with other approaches described here, Husak is concerned to isolate the 
empirical question from the discussion of principle.122 Though he declines to offer an example 
of how such an offence might operate in practice, he does address some of the likely objections 
to such a system. 
Perhaps the most obvious objection is that what is being proposed is a status offence which 
violates the criminal law’s act requirement. Husak, however, rejects the premise of the 
objection: possession offences, he contends, criminalise states of affairs rather than acts and, 
although he considers that some of these offences are controversial enough to warrant repeal, 
many are not. If the law, in any context, can impose criminal liability in respect of states of 
affairs – and do so uncontroversially – then this is, he argues, sufficient to declare the claim 
that the law contains an act requirement as a general principle false in both normative and 
descriptive terms.123 It is worth considering this further since establishing that punishment for 
what might be considered a state of being is (1) an ordinary consequence of the operation of 
 
120 Husak (2011), 1174. 
121Ibid, at 1184. 
122 Husak fully acknowledges that risk assessment methodologies could not identify such traits; he is clear that 
he is concerned only with the hypothetical. 
123 Husak (2013), 189-190. 
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criminal law; and (2) not necessarily unjust, would take us some way to establishing that 
punishment for dangerousness is not necessarily unjust.124  
Although criminal law’s requirement for a culpable act has had general acceptance,125 Husak 
notes that an increasing number of theorists have queried the true nature of the principle that 
the term ‘act requirement’ describes.126 The requirement as generally understood derives from 
a complex set of philosophical theories of action,127 detailed analysis of which is outwith the 
scope of this thesis; however in practical terms its role is to limit the reach of criminal liability 
to circumstances in which its imposition might generally be regarded as justified: 128  
The act requirement has been invoked to question or reject liability for 
(1) omissions; (2) nonvoluntary actions; (3) status of states; and (4) 
thoughts. When liability has been proposed for any of these four 
categories, courts and commentators are bound to object that liability 
would violate the act requirement. Punishment is said to be objectionable 
because it would violate the act requirement. 
The difficulty for those who hold that the act requirement renders these types of offences unjust, 
is that these categories may include conduct which in intentional, within the agent’s control,129 
and uncontroversially immoral.  
Corrado offers a hypothetical scenario in which he is driving on a straight road, with his car on 
cruise control, and his steering wheel is held in place with some sort of locking device. 130 We 
are not told what the nature of the device is, but that ‘some positive bodily movement is 
required’ to disengage it and release the wheel. At some stage the driver becomes aware that a 
long-time enemy is in the middle of the lane in which he is driving; her back is turned to him, 
 
124 There is, of course, a second necessary step which is to establish that an offence of dangerousness could 
conform to the requirements for just punishment in these circumstances. This is discussed later. 
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and she does not see the car coming. There is sufficient distance between the car and the woman 
in the road to allow for Corrado to retake control of the car, but he chooses not to. He looks to 
his passenger and instructs him to pay close attention so he can give evidence that Corrado did 
not move in order to cause the car to hit the woman. After this, he makes no further movement, 
the car collides with his old enemy, and she is killed. That it was an intentional killing is beyond 
dispute – an act, he says, without ‘volitional movement’.131 In this scenario, while punishment 
would, most likely, not be controversial, Corrado argues, his conduct could not be criminalised 
if the requirement really was for an overt, voluntary act. Indeed, he goes further to argue that 
its criminalisation is not even permissible as a generally accepted exception to the rule, namely, 
as a criminal omission arising from failure to rectify a dangerous situation unjustifiably created 
by the driver. This is based on his contention that the danger was not created by the driver, but 
by the victim standing in the road.132  
This is absurd. It is impossible to conceive of circumstances in which locking the steering wheel 
of a moving and otherwise fully operational vehicle could ever be considered justifiable; nor 
could it fail to create a dangerous situation. This is true regardless of the characteristics of the 
road. Indeed, in the circumstances Corrado describes, it would seem unnecessary to resort to 
omissions liability since it is entirely foreseeable that one may cause death through the acts of 
securing the car’s wheel and relinquishing direct control of its speed. However, accepting for 
the purposes of argument Corrado’s insistence that this is an example of an intentional killing 
caused by a failure to act in circumstances in which no duty of positive action exist, then it 
seems as though the scenario described falls foul of the act requirement as he and others argue 
it is commonly understood.133 Whether one actually accepts it or not, Corrado is arguing that 
there are circumstances which sit uneasily with a requirement for an act, but which intuitively 
appear to warrant punishment. His conclusion, however, is that it does not actually matter much.  
The explanation that he gives is that what is commonly termed the ‘act requirement’ is really 
a requirement that conduct only be criminalised where the agent could have chosen otherwise 
and was expected to have chosen otherwise.134 Husak’s position is similar to Corrado’s: 135 
 
131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid, 1359. 
133 See, for example, Hart (2008), ‘Acts of Will and Responsibility’ and Moore (1993)  
134 Corrado (1994), 1529. This has been articulated elsewhere as a ‘practical agency condition’. See Chiao 
(2009). See also Kilbride v Lake [1962] NZLR 590 where a conviction for a strict liability offence of failure to 
display a vehicle warrant was quashed on the basis that the loss of the warrant, after being properly displayed, 
was not within the appellant’s control.   
135 Husak (2011) in Deigh and Dolinko (eds.), 118.  
 34 
What is important to our theory of criminal responsibility…is not action 
itself, but something that actions typically presuppose. The identity of this 
“something” must relate to practical agency, our ability as autonomous beings 
to guide our behaviour by our reasons. 
Even Moore, whom Husak credits as one of few theorists who has characterised the act 
requirement as a requirement for action, agrees that the agent’s choice is key. His account is 
one which rests on a dichotomy of ‘views of morality’.136 The first is a classical 
conceptualisation derived from virtue-based ethical theory; the second is a norm-based 
‘nonclassical’ approach. The first is principally concerned with the character of the individual 
and has no particular external relevance. The non-classical view is concerned with compelling 
or prohibiting certain conduct. Moore’s contention is that the act requirement is an 
extrapolation of the latter, and that this explains why punishment for conduct is warranted, but 
not for thoughts or character traits which – on the classical account – are relevant only to the 
good of the individual’s internal moral character; they are not properly subject to criminal 
sanction because they have done nothing wrong.137  
Both Corrado and Husak are dubious about Moore’s account. There is no reason, Husak argues, 
to suppose that wronging oneself through a failure to cultivate virtuous attributes should be 
distinguished from wrongdoing in this way. 138 Corrado’s approach to Moore’s classical/non-
classical dichotomy is slightly different. He argues that a thought, in itself, is capable of causing 
harm without being accompanied by some action.139  
[Suppose] that pornography tends to change our opinion of the subjects of the 
pornography. If I knowingly listen to a pornographic broadcast and my view 
of women changes for the worse, is that not harm to women? If we refuse to 
punish the consumption of pornography (in this example limited to listening 
to pornography, so that there are no volitional movements involved), surely 
it is not because there can be no injury without physical conduct. It is more 
likely that we do not punish because there are some types of injury we will 
live with rather than countenance the sort of invasion necessary to prevent 
them. 
This example is a strange one not least because it is difficult to imagine how lowering the status 
of women in the mind of a consumer of pornography causes harm if his change of view is 
genuinely not, in any way whatsoever, reflected in his conduct.  
 
136 Moore (1993), esp. 49-53.  
137 Ibid, 53.  
138 Husak (2011) in Deigh and Dolinko (eds.), 118. Emphasis in original.  
139 Corrado (1994), 1529. 
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Husak arrives at a similar conclusion as regards liability for omissions, and his example 
concerns the private possession of nuclear weapons.140 Its criminalisation is, he points out, as 
uncontroversial as any could be. The difficulty with criminalising some offences is not, he 
argues, that they do not contain an act as commonly understood, but that – as Corrado suggests 
– the imposition of liability in those cases would place a more onerous burden on liberty than 
when imposed for an act.141 The CJS does in fact punish people in the absence of an act, as 
commonly understood, and in at least some circumstances it ought to do so. Thus, Husak 
concludes that the claim that the criminal law contains an act requirement is both normatively 
and descriptively false, and this can be explained by a reinterpretation of the requirement for 
an act, as a requirement for control over the conduct or set of circumstances which is to be 
criminalised. If the act requirement is indeed better understood as a control requirement, the 
criticism that punishment for character amounts to punishment for who someone is may be 
circumvented by ensuring that only the possession of traits over which an individual had 
control would be criminalised.  
The obvious difficulty with this is that it would prohibit the reliance on traits over which the 
individual does not have control142 but that are nevertheless thought to occupy a correlative 
relationship to future offending behaviour (this is a limitation that Husak acknowledges 
explicitly)143 which has the potential to limit preventive efficacy. As Husak himself admits, the 
inadequacy of predictive techniques is problematic for PD generally. Husak’s construction of 
PD as punishment imposed in the ordinary course of the CJS invites an additional layer of 
controversy: possession of the relevant traits would have to be proven beyond reasonable 
doubt, and the traits themselves would have to be accurately identified as being those which 
(1) accurately predict future criminal conduct of a serious nature; and (2) can genuinely be 
controlled by the application of the individual’s moral agency and practical reasoning. Since 
PD is imposed for the possession of traits at a particular time, it may not be just to impose it in 
respect of those traits which can only be amended through prolonged contact with specialist 
forensic rehabilitative services, since the likelihood is that these will not be accessible to the 
individual prior to his incarceration – for the imposition of punishment to be truly deserved, he 
must have had the opportunity of avoiding it.  
 
140 Husak (2013), 190. 
141 Husak (2011) in Deigh and Dolinko (eds.), 116.  
142 Age, unemployment, some personality traits etc. This is revisited briefly in chapter 3. 
143 Husak (2013), 190. 
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In summary, the strength of Husak’s account is its honesty in the sense that no attempt is made 
to disguise or otherwise work around what amounts to the criminalisation of the “possession” 
of a personality trait of dangerousness;144 though it will be apparent that his account – like 
others considered in this chapter – makes no substantial attempt to define precisely what this 
term means.145 It is also apparent that it fails to resolve the tension between culpability-
proportionality and risk-proportionality: there must be a trade-off between one value and the 
other.  Further, it is by Husak’s own admission unworkable in practice, at least as a unitary 
theory. This is not offered as a criticism of the account itself – Husak is clear that it is a wholly 
theoretical work – but since this thesis is concerned with formulating a model which could 
sustain a legal framework to support the PD of dangerous offenders, it is a necessary 
observation. To the extent that it can be taken as a restatement of the importance of ensuring a 
culpability/responsibility constraint in any legitimate system of PD, though, Husak’s approach 
has value for the purposes of constructing a system with principled limitations, which leaves 
scope for the offender to avoid the imposition of the penalty, which is why such detailed 
consideration of it is appropriate. 
2.5.2. RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT 
 
The next approach to be considered is one in which dangerousness is conceptualised as a form 
of reckless endangerment and PD is the punishment for it. Attempts to justify PD on this basis 
have been offered by Morse, and by Davis.146 Of the two, Morse’s defence is the most 
comprehensive, and the one that has garnered most attention;147 and therefore most of the 
discussion that follows will be focused on that account. The objective of the reckless 
endangerment approach attempts to reconcile the intuition that PD is punitive in nature, with 
the intuition that people should not be free to harm others. It aims to permit the incapacitation 
of those who may do harm to others, but to build in a culpability constraint so that they are not 
subject to indeterminate – and therefore unjust – detention.148 What is proposed is a kind of 
pure omissions liability based on a presumption of risk, and the criteria for its imposition are 
as follows: 149 
 
144 See, for example, the accounts discussed immediately below for comparison.  
145 The thesis discusses the concept of dangerousness at section 3.3.2.  
146 Morse (1996); Davis (1995); and Davis (1996). 
147 See for example also Lippke (2008). 
148 Morse (1996), 147.  
149 Ibid, 152.  
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(1) prior conviction of at least one serious crime of violence, or at least 
one prior occurrence of involuntary civil commitment for actual serious 
violent conduct; (2) conscious awareness of an extremely high risk that 
the agent will in the immediate future cause substantial unjustified 
harm; and (3) failure to commit oneself voluntarily or to take other 
reasonably effective steps to avoid causing future harm. 
An offence of reckless endangerment would be committed every time a dangerous agent 
refused to take steps to prevent himself harming others in the future and would be punished by 
a short determinate period of imprisonment.150  
Morse identifies the general (and unsatisfactory) justification offered for PD as being the right 
of persons not to be subject to unwarranted harm, and the corresponding lack of a right to inflict 
such harm upon others.151 More specifically he argues PD is employed (1) because a potentially 
harmful agent lacks responsibility; or (2) in circumstances where, although the agent is 
responsible, he presents an extreme danger to society.152 The intrusion into individual liberty 
is therefore warranted on the grounds of the agent being a greater potential threat to the liberty 
of others. The difficulty with these categories of dangerous, detainable person, Morse argues, 
is that many dangerous people do not fall under them, even though their detention may well be 
justified. Morse’s account, as set out above, aims to find a way to close this loophole by finding 
a basis upon which to criminalise their conduct, and use the criminal law to detain them. 
Two examples of Morse’s ‘dangerous undetainables’ are as follows: the convicted serious 
offender about to be released from prison who admits he intends to return to a life of crime 
upon his liberation; and the mentally disordered patient with a history of violence who is likely 
to stop taking his medication upon his discharge from hospital.153 Civil PD is morally 
impermissible, he says, because it would blur the boundaries of civil and criminal law in 
violation of the autonomy principle. His suggested approach is somewhat attractive for two 
reasons: first, it would engage the stringent safeguards associated with criminal law. Second, 
it incorporates a culpability constraint. In requiring persons who are consciously aware of the 
risk they pose to take reasonable steps to mitigate that risk this account should, in theory at 
least, represent an improvement upon those who hold that mere dangerousness is sufficient to 
 
150 Ibid, 153. 
151 Ibid, 116. 
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153 Ibid, 113-114. See also S.J. Morse, ‘Fear of Danger, Flight From Culpability’ (1998) 4 Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law 250. 
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warrant punishment.154 Yet, as Morse himself admits, it would be extremely difficult to prove 
these offences.155 Although he is at pains to emphasise that what he proposes is not thought 
liability,156 the lack of the requirement for any form of (otherwise) criminalisable conduct 
leaves the theory vulnerable to his own criticisms of punishment for dangerousness. Simply 
stating that the new crime is complete at the point at which the person fails to take reasonable 
steps does not overcome this objection because this offence is one of failing to take steps not 
to be dangerous. This is especially true of the prisoner, since merely stepping outside of prison 
upon his release, but with the intention to reoffend in his head amounts to a complete offence. 
However, perhaps the most fundamental problem, from a theoretical perspective, is that this is 
not a retributivist account of preventive sentencing despite its presentation as such.  
Insofar as it seeks to characterise a period of incarceration as deserved and proportionate 
punishment for past conduct it appears quintessentially retributivist – in fact it could be 
considered to represent the hard-line of retributivist theory in that blameworthiness is taken as 
both a necessary and a sufficient condition to warrant the imposition of punishment. Since the 
subject’s mere existence outside of conditions of confinement (be it physical containment, as 
in the case of the career criminal, or chemical, as in the case of the patient) is enough to 
complete the crime when the other conditions are met – specifically the requirement of 
conviction for a prior crime of a certain type – it might well be considered that it is little 
different to an assumption about future conduct. Although the offence could not be made out 
in the absence of proof of knowledge of dangerousness, the threshold is set extremely low in 
that it requires that the individual intends that he will do (or fail to do) something in the future 
which will place others at risk. It does not, therefore, amount to knowledge that harm will be 
done but a prediction by the subject that, at some point, the subject will conduct themselves in 
such a way that harm is threatened, and it does not allow for the possibility of the exercise of 
free-will in order to avert that outcome at any stage. In fact, as Lippke points out, ‘[the] reckless 
endangerment argument makes sense only if the offenders in question are prepared to take a 
fatalistic view of themselves’157and assume their own lack of ability to determine their conduct. 
The reason for this may be surmised to be that, whilst the author is concerned to produce an 
account upon which such incarceration may be justified as punishment, and his own 
retributivist sentiments preclude him from advocating anything other than proportionate 
 
154 See the discussion of punishment for dangerous character traits at 2.5.1. 
155 Morse (1996), 153.  
156 Ibid.  
157Lippke (2008), 404. 
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punishment for prior conduct, his real concern is to construct a principled basis for a coercive, 
preventive intervention. The difficulty is that, because the offence depends to such a great 
extent on processes that are internal to the individual, on this account the culpability constraint 
can only be purchased at the expense of preventive efficacy.  
The next section considers approaches which seek to demonstrate that PD can be justified as 
proportionate punishment of past offending. This is achieved either by conceptualising desert 
as encapsulating a range of just punishment, such as Morris’ ‘limiting retributivism’ approach 
(discussed in section 2.6 below); or by conceptualising blameworthiness as capable of 
aggregation, such as von Hirsch’s ‘no conflict’ thesis (discussed in section 2.7).  
2.6. INCAPACITATION AS DESERT 
This section considers approaches which seek to justify PD as punishment for past offending 
but base the justification on a conceptualisation of desert and prevention as compatible, rather 
than conflicting, constructs. Identifying a normative principle mediating the relationship 
between a finding that punishment is due, and a determination that it should take the form of a 
preventive sentence, is one of the more difficult tasks for philosophical defences of PD. Simply 
put, although theoretical works may tell us something about when a punishment may 
legitimately be imposed on a dangerous offender, they struggle to make the leap from desert-
proportionality to future-focused PD. Most of the approaches discussed in this chapter address 
this by resorting to abstraction, insulating themselves from any and all practical considerations 
that would be necessary for those accounts to form the basis for a workable model of PD in 
practice. There is, however, another approach to reconciling desert and prevention which is 
identifiable in the literature, most notably in the work of Morris, and von Hirsch. This approach 
is to argue that the apparent tension between these concepts is entirely illusory as a matter of 
principle. If this is true, then there is no ethical dilemma in the incapacitation of persons to 
prevent future offending. Although it will be argued that these accounts must fail, they are 
worthy of note since they represent rare attempts at overtly reconciling prevention and desert. 
They also come somewhat closer to functional models since they advocate adjustment of a 
penalty for dangerous offenders, but still require conviction for a serious offence, rather like 
some dangerous offender frameworks in operation.158 The first approach to be considered in 
this section is based on a ‘limiting retributivist’ account of punishment which attempts to create 
 
158 For example, the Scots legal framework discussed in later chapters. 
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scope for the use of PD by construing desert as a rather broader concept than most of those 
accounts discussed so far. 
2.6.1 LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM AND ‘NO CONFLICT’ 
Classic formulations of retributivism hold that desert is necessary and sufficient for both the 
imposition of punishment, and the form and severity of that punishment.159 However, Morris 
argues that desert proportionality, rather than determining the punishment an offender receives, 
merely delineates the boundaries of permissible penalties; this he terms ‘limiting 
retributivism’.160 The conceptualisation of desert as limiting a range of penalties, rather than 
determining a particular penalty,161 is based on the nature of moral intuition: when we say that 
a punishment is deserved, we mean simply that it is not undeserved, i.e. too harsh or too 
severe.162 On this account, the maximum and minimum sentence is determined by the 
seriousness of the offence, but consequentialist considerations such as the risk and the need to 
protect the public would be used to ‘fine-tune’ it. Two offenders convicted of the same offence 
may, therefore, receive quite different sentences even though their blameworthiness in relation 
to that particular offence may be assessed as being no different. For example, an offender who 
might otherwise be dealt with by a non-custodial sentence might find themselves subject to a 
period of imprisonment because the risk they present is regarded as ‘tipping the scales’ in the 
direction of the need to prevent reoffending. In the context of a model that, whilst holding 
desert to be indispensable, is concerned to permit a sentencer sufficient latitude to prevent 
reoffending, the possibility of such an outcome must be regarded as a feature, rather than an 
accidental oversight. A defender of the doctrine might, however, argue that the potential for 
such a result is less likely than suggested, because for a custodial sentence to be in 
contemplation the desert constraint would (should) ensure that the offender’s conduct had been 
sufficiently serious. 
Another approach is to argue that special incapacitative sentences for dangerous offenders are, 
in fact, culpability constrained because prior offending aggregates to increase 
blameworthiness: ‘The dangerous offender may be punished more severely, according to this 
 
159 von Hirsch (1987). Though it is doubtful that such ultra-Kantian retributivism really exists in contemporary 
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view, because his dangerousness makes him also deserving of more punishment.’163 Certainly, 
it is not entirely uncontroversial amongst retributivists that prior offences may have some 
bearing on punishment;164 but on this account an offender’s prior convictions serve as a proxy 
for dangerousness, shifting the emphasis away from future offending and onto his past 
offences. If the offender’s criminal record can be considered to disclose factors relevant to the 
risk he poses,165 and also his blameworthiness then, the argument goes, no conflict arises 
between the requirements of desert, and the need for incapacitation. He is not punished for his 
dangerousness, or what he might do, but for what he has already done.166 If incapacitation 
really could be deserved as Morris and von Hirsch suggest, it would resolve at least some of 
the ethical concerns regarding the choice to preventively detain. The difficulty for these 
approaches is, however, is that desert-proportionality cannot really be preserved where 
protective utility is required over the long-term. This is discussed next.  
2.6.2. PROPORTIONALITY AND PRACTICALITY 
The most persuasive objection to these kinds of approaches was mentioned earlier, but is 
essentially that this approach fails to respect the requirement for ordinal proportionality: that 
is, the requirement that crimes of comparable severity be treated comparably. von Hirsch 
identifies two key elements of ordinal proportionality: parity and rank ordering.167 There are 
proportionality requirements that require offenders convicted of like offences, demonstrating 
similar degrees of blameworthiness, receive similar punishments; and that punishments 
convey disapprobation appropriate to individual crimes, and so distinguish between greater 
and lesser offences. The problem with limiting retributivism is, according to von Hirsch, that 
treating desert as though it circumscribes a range of acceptable penalties is to disregard the 
censuring function of punishment. If consequentialist considerations determine the actual 
punishment, an offender deemed higher risk may receive greater punishment than one who is 
of lesser risk but more blameworthy.168 Or, as Duff puts it, punishments determined by risk, 
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whether or not tied to a conceptualisation of blameworthiness, will communicate a degree of 
censure that is not appropriate to the crime for which the individual is to be punished.169  
On von Hirsch’s account, his own model escapes this criticism because it is based on the 
principle that culpability may accumulate to justify harsher sentences than would otherwise be 
warranted for the most recent offence alone.  However, even if it were accepted that an 
offender’s criminal record might legitimately justify some increase in punishment it would not, 
as Duff points out, generally be held to justify any grossly disproportionate increase in 
sentence;170 that is, it would not permit the sentencer to exceed the upper boundary of what is 
deserved for the most recent offence. It is more a matter of failing to reduce the sentence as 
might be the case when sentencing a first time, or infrequent offender, who lives a generally 
law-abiding life. 171 This would seem to sacrifice a great deal of preventive efficacy.172 This is, 
of course, unless one takes the view that imprisonment for an indeterminate period of time 
could be considered proportionate punishment in conventional desert terms, although it is very 
difficult to envisage a system of ordinal distinctions between different offences (or offenders) 
delineated by periods of time which may – but will not necessarily – be determined by the 
natural life span of the offender.  
It must also be pointed out that in practical terms, both Morris and von Hirsch’s models 
presuppose the ability to accurately identify those who present the requisite degree of risk, 
whether cloaked as aggregate blameworthiness, or acknowledged openly as a consequentialist 
consideration.  In Morris’ limiting retributivism, risk directly impacts upon the severity of 
sentence; and, according to von Hirsch’s no conflict model, desert aggregates across offences 
and serves as an approximation of dangerousness. This makes no sense unless prior offending 
can be taken as a reasonable indicator of reoffending risk. Risk determination is one of the 
most controversial aspects of PD; this is because there is uncertainty at the point PD is imposed 
as to whether the offender made subject to it really would go on offending if not detained. 
Approaches to risk and dangerousness assessment are considered briefly in the next chapter. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, it is sufficient simply to note that for these 
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approaches to be workable in any practical sense, they require an ability to identify dangerous 
offenders.173  
In summary, the approaches of Morris and von Hirsch both aim to demonstrate that it is 
possible to create an incapacitative model in which the incapacitation is deserved as 
proportionate punishment, rather than simply a desirable ancillary benefit. The punishment-
centred approaches all have in common a conceptualisation of PD as being a response to some 
sort of culpable conduct,174 but the link is often tenuous. In seeking to elucidate the normative 
relationship between culpability and detention, and in using it to propose an operational 
sentencing model,175 Morris and von Hirsch make a unique and valuable contribution to the 
literature. However, in their conceptualisation of detention as so directly limited by desert, the 
tension between prevention and desert remains evident. In order to operate as a constraint, the 
scope of the concept of desert must also be constrained. Whether this is on the basis of 
cumulative blameworthiness or pre-determined upper and lower limits for certain offences, 
there is a trade-off between the desert constraint and preventive efficacy. In other words, these 
models might serve well in most cases where a custodial sentence is being considered, but they 
cannot ground a system of indefinite PD for the most dangerous offenders. If indeterminate 
sentences for the protection of the public are to be justified, they cannot be justified as deserved 
punishment in the way these authors propose.  
Two things have been concluded thus far. First, that PD bears the hallmarks of punishment, 
and should be conceptualised as such. This means that it must be imposed only where an 
individual is culpable, and that PD must be subject to the safeguards of criminal procedure. 
Second, that even though PD is punishment, there are difficulties in justifying it as punishment. 
The next section addresses approaches that might be considered to represent honest and 
pragmatic compromise between the need for a culpability constraint and the need to protect the 
public from the consequences of future offending. These are the ‘forced choice’ approaches 
which regard PD as something rather like self-defence occurring at the societal level.  
 
 
173 The ‘no conflict’ thesis is perhaps less vulnerable to this, assuming one accepts that blameworthiness can 
aggregate as von Hirsch argues. But since its purpose is to serve as a principled basis for incapacitation, and 
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models which do require risk evaluation. 
174 Or blameworthy state of affairs as in Husak’s trait liability approach discussed in 2.5.1.  
175 See von Hirsch (1987), especially chapter 14 on ‘Strategies for Synthesis’ of desert and incapacitation.  
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2.7. FORCED CHOICE  
Most of the approaches considered thus far have sought in some way to get around the inherent 
incompatibility of the principle that punishment must only be imposed when and to the extent 
warranted by conduct already exhibited, with the need to protect the public from a small class 
of high-risk offenders. The approach considered here entails a different conceptualisation of 
the relationship between incapacitation and blameworthiness. This ‘forced choice’ approach 
views PD as being permissible in circumstances where an autonomous agent has chosen to 
conduct himself in way that gives rise to a reasonable fear he may go on to cause serious harm. 
Barnett176 characterises this as a sort of societal or ‘extended’ theory of self-defence, and it will 
be argued here that this offers the most convincing explanation as to why PD may be morally 
permissible in certain circumstances. The purpose of this part of this chapter is to evaluate these 
approaches and build upon them to begin to construct a theoretical framework capable of 
supporting a defensible, workable model of PD.177  
2.7.1. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AND THE JUST DISTRIBUTION OF 
BURDENS 
Bartlett’s starting point is the nature of the CJS which, on his account, exists primarily in order 
to prevent harm-doing: what is experienced by the offender as punishment is just the means 
through which this crime reductive purpose is achieved.178 There is no requirement that we 
wait for harm to be done in order to obtain incidental protective benefit from a punishment 
proportionate to the wrongdoing; instead, the state may take pre-emptive measures where a 
credible threat has been communicated.179 These measures are, he argues, properly 
conceptualised as an exercise of a general right of societal self-defence by the CJS on behalf 
of the public. The right of societal self-defence is extrapolated from an individual’s entitlement 
to protect himself; but Barnett goes further than conventional self-defence doctrines by 
dispensing with the requirement for immediacy in the societal context180 arguing that it would 
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not be wrongful for an individual who is threatened to proactively seek out the would-be 
attacker in order to prevent the threatened harm. However, one of the reasons that the 
comparison with self-defence of the individual is not entirely apposite is that, in circumstances 
where the threat is not immediate, citizens are expected to seek the state’s intervention rather 
than taking direct action. For the purposes of Barnett’s argument, though, we must assume this 
option does not exist. 
Barnett is concerned with the moral permissibility of taking pre-emptive action where the 
threat is not immediate – his argument is not that private individuals have a legal right to seek 
out and attack those they are afraid will harm them at some stage in the future; it is that, if 
someone could be sure they were the target of a credible threat of serious harm, it would not 
be unethical for them to take proportionate steps to protect themselves. He gives the examples 
of the threat that would be communicated if he pointed a gun at a colleague and issued a verbal 
warning that he intended to kill him; if he pointed the gun without saying anything at all; and 
finally if, instead of presenting an immediate threat accompanied by such a gesture, he simply 
posted a full page advertisement in a newspaper that stated his intention. Barnett contends that 
in all of these sets of circumstances his colleague would be morally justified in taking 
proportionate preventive action provided that the threat could be considered to be credible.181 
The threat itself can take the form of words or gestures but, so long as the threat is clear enough, 
and is believable in its context, it is enough to trigger the right of the person to whom it is 
communicated to defend himself.182 From this general principle he extrapolates a justification 
for what he terms ‘extended’ or ‘collective’ self-defence. It should be noted that, while Barnett 
does require that the subject has committed at least one crime,183 its significance is to the 
communication of the threat; he is not seeking to justify the collective self-defence (detention) 
as a form of punishment.  
It will be recalled that Morse, in his reckless endangerment account, gave two examples that 
he considered fell outwith the established parameters of the civil and criminal justice systems. 
The first was the criminal who, at the point of his release from prison, indicates his intention 
to engage in further criminal conduct; the second was the patient with a psychiatric disorder 
 
Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life while Killing Moral Monsters’, in S. Shute and A. 
Simester, Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford, 2002); J. Horder, ‘Killing the Passive 
Abuser: A Theoretical Defence’, Criminal Law Theory; see also the discussion in F. Leverick, Killing in Self-
Defence (Oxford, 2006), chapter 5.  
181 Barnett (1996), 163. 
182 Ibid.  
183 Ibid, 167. 
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that predisposed him to violence, who regularly stopped taking his medication and was highly 
likely to do so when released from hospital.184 These cases were problematic for Morse because 
of his conception of what the criminal law is and what it may legitimately be expected to do; 
but Barnett considers that the primary purpose of the criminal law is to protect people from 
harm, and therefore it is forward-looking in nature. Since it is the threat a person communicates 
that is of concern, rather than his culpability, the dangerous agent in either scenario becomes 
an appropriate subject of PD. It is no objection that the person concerned presents a risk because 
of an illness over which they may have no (or very little) control; an inability to control one’s 
conduct, Barnett argues, makes one more of a threat than a fully rational moral agent.185 
Collective self-defence (PD) is therefore justified when: (a) a fully-responsible, non-mentally 
disordered person communicates a credible threat of harm to the community (or presumably 
any group or individual, since that should be of concern to the general public); or (b) where a 
person has a mental disorder that makes it highly likely that he will violate the rights of 
others.186 However, since this thesis is concerned with the sentencing of dangerous offenders, 
consideration is restricted to (a).  
Barnett’s conceptualisation of the CJS contrasts sharply with retributivist accounts. In his 
model, any punitive effect of the measures imposed is incidental to the aim of improving the 
victim’s situation. His reasoning is that (1) rather than waiting until harm is done and trying to 
mitigate its impact,  it is morally permissible for someone – or the state in their place – faced 
with a credible threat of unjustified harm (a rights violation) to take steps, proportionate to the 
harm threatened, to avert the risk; (2) the legal system is, contrary to common misconception, 
orientated towards protecting individuals from the effects of rights violations, and protective 
intervention may legitimately include pre-emptive action as well as impact mitigation; (3) the 
distinction that retributivists seek to make between civil and criminal law is therefore false and, 
as such; (4) culpability-proportionality can be dispensed with in favour of threat-
proportionality, in order that the CJS may intervene on behalf of a potential victim or group of 
victims.  
Even if Barnett’s assertion that such direct action in the individual case is morally permissible 
is accepted, in a societal context the attack and its potential targets are hypothetical. In 
 
184 Morse (1996), 113-114. See 2.5.2 above.  
185 Barnett (1996), 165. Although at the point at which Morse was seeking to justify intervention, the patient 
was, he considered, blameworthy and responsible because he was at the stage of deciding to stop taking the 
medication that was preventing his condition from deteriorating.  
186 Ibid.  
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response, he points to the existence of a presumption of harmlessness which can be rebutted 
when there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the individual can no longer be trusted to 
refrain from harming others.187 This is his general justification for pre-emptive action.188 His 
account of the nature and purpose of the criminal law, at the very least, significantly diminishes 
the need to consider issues of blameworthiness, and instead the focus becomes whether or not 
there is evidence to rebut this presumption of harmlessness. In the case of the prisoner in 
Morse’s first example, his prior offences plus the credible communication of a threat provide 
enough evidence to rebut the presumption. The agent, by his chosen conduct has forfeited his 
right to be presumed harmless and so, Barnett contends, if we reach the wrong determination 
about him, that is his fault; not ours.189 He does, however, stop short of equating forfeiture of 
the right to be presumed harmless directly with forfeiture of liberty. Rather he is arguing that 
rebuttal of the presumption of harmlessness excuses the mistake that would be made if someone 
who would not have gone on to do harm is preventively detained. This is returned to later. Even 
if one accepts the position that the imminence requirement is better understood as a requirement 
for a credible communication – and that the imminence of an attack simply increases the 
credibility of the threat – Barnett’s account still does not explain why intervention is (or might 
be) justified in the face of a threat.  
This issue is addressed by Montague.190 He observes that one reason we might consider 
preventive action justifiable is that we regard the restriction on the subject’s freedom as being 
a lesser harm than that which would be done to the subject’s victims if his liberty were not 
infringed.191 But, as he points out, proportionate intervention and even lesser restrictions of 
liberty require justification. He also requires the commission of an offence, but as a signifier 
of culpability. Blameworthiness is, for Montague, what justifies the intervention; not the threat 
itself. He asks us to consider a scenario in which x will do something which results in (innocent) 
y’s death unless z intervenes. x does not intend to cause y’s death but knows his intended 
conduct will cause it; he does not care. In this situation z is, we are told, presumptively justified 
in intervening.192  Accepting, for the purposes of the discussion, that we know that x will cause 
 
187 Barnett, 167. 
188 Ibid.  
189 Ibid, 165. See also N. Walker, ‘Ethical and Other Problems’, in N. Walker (Ed.) Dangerous People (London, 
1996), 7. 
190 Montague (1999). 
191 Ibid, 178.  
192 Ibid, 178. 
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y’s death,193 the reason that z is justified in taking this action is, according to Montague, that 
this is a ‘forced-choice situation’194 which has arisen through x’s fault: x has chosen to place y 
at risk, and so created burdens which must now be distributed. Given that x is to blame, z is 
presumptively justified in redistributing those burdens in favour of the innocent party who was 
x’s intended victim. Because it turns on culpability, Montague’s account cannot be used to 
justify quarantine or other forms of civil confinement, though he is clear he is not concerned 
with punishment. The action described in the scenario would, however, seem to bear the 
hallmarks of punishment identified in section 2.3.1. This aside, Montague’s ‘just distribution 
of burdens’ goes some way to explaining why preventive action may be justified where there 
is a credible communication of a threat by a culpable agent. 
As both authors acknowledge, there are problems of prediction associated with extended self-
defence. At the collective level, the threat is further removed and therefore likely to be less 
certain than that encountered in a more usual self-defence scenario: at the point at which an 
individual has the right of self-defence an attack is in progress; the colleague in Barnett’s 
example would have the option of seeking police assistance. It would be neither necessary, nor 
desirable, that he should seek out his would-be attacker himself. But this is less problematic 
for PD than it is for individual self-defence. PD is a measure taken by the state to protect 
citizens: analogies aside, it is state action with which we are concerned and that occurs in a 
different context and timescale than an individual’s self-defensive strike. A court’s reliance 
upon prior offending – or, as Bartlett suggests, perhaps multiple incidences of prior 
offending195 – to inform the decision as to whether a preventive sentence is appropriate is not 
the same as an individual’s reliance on an historical threat to justify seeking out his would-be 
assailant.  
2.7.2. FORCED CHOICE AS A PRINCIPLED FOUNDATION FOR 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
Of the approaches this chapter has considered, a conceptualisation of PD as an exercise of 
societal self-defence based on the just distribution of culpably created burdens is the most 
 
193 Though in practical terms it is impossible to know, at least in the societal context, that someone will cause 
harm. It will, however, be argued later predictability is not quite such a problem for this account as for the 
others covered in this chapter.  
194 Ibid.  
195 Barnett (1996), 167. 
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persuasive, for several reasons. First, and most straightforwardly, it recognises PD for what it 
is: a pre-emptive restriction on an individual’s liberty to protect others from harm. That is, as 
Barnett says, essentially what (individual) self-defence is. In recognising this, and that the 
existence of a right of self-defence is – though we might reasonably disagree on its precise 
requirements – generally accepted, it must also be recognised that the basic principle 
underpinning both is that we do not, and ought not, require persons to accept the preventable 
infliction of harm by an aggressor. Second, whilst not conceptualising PD as punishment, it 
recognises that what is imposed as a preventive measure is experienced as punitive by the 
subject. It is therefore compatible with the view, taken here, that PD – however intended – is 
punishment; though, on such an account, it cannot be justified as punishment because the basis 
for its imposition is the protection of potential victims from future harm. PD may be morally 
permissible, but it will always require a departure from the retributive principle.  
Third, it nevertheless recognises the requirement for a culpability constraint. For Barnett, this 
is achieved by the requirement for an offence which serves to communicate a threat such that 
our (potential) aggressor can no longer be presumed harmless. For Montague, however, the 
culpability has moral significance in itself because it is the choice to create the burden (risk of 
harm) that must then be ‘distributed’. The significance of this is that it recognises that PD does 
not create the burden; it responds to it. The ethical considerations associated with the decision 
whether to detain someone do not disappear if we choose not to intervene and let the chips fall 
where they may, so-to-speak. We are simply granting freedom to one individual to choose to 
harm others in circumstances where we could have protected them. It is difficult to see how a 
system which respected the autonomy of persons to create victims could be considered 
respectful of autonomy as a matter of principle; the essence of being a victim is the lack of 
choice in what is done to you.  
If there were nevertheless doubt as to the morality of preferring the freedom of potential victims 
from harm, to the freedom of would-be assailants to harm, Montague’s ‘just distribution of 
burdens’ offers a rational, albeit imperfect, explanation. Pre-emptive action is, he says, justified 
because the agent’s choice to cause harm is a wrongful one. This brings us to the fourth, and 
final, reason that ‘forced choice’ is most persuasive: it explicitly acknowledges and accounts 
for the potential for error while allowing for the protection of the public. The offender, however 
clearly a threat is deemed to be communicated, may ultimately choose not to act. We cannot 
know for certain. But the burden created by his choices means that, when we are forced to 
consider action, we may resolve that uncertainty in favour of those who have no choice as to 
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whether they will be harmed. If in doing so, we make a mistake because he would not, in fact, 
have gone on to cause harm, the responsibility lies with the offender. This line of argument is 
of particular interest when the problem of ‘false positives’ is considered. This is considered in 
the next chapter but, as mentioned earlier, one of the more common criticisms of PD is that we 
are not sufficiently precise in our identifications of individuals as dangerous to operate such a 
system. The requirement that an offence is necessary – though not, as will be argued, sufficient 
– to rebut the presumption of harmlessness may go some way to ameliorating those concerns, 
though it cannot – and should not – dispense with them entirely. This is so even though, as will 
be argued in section 3.3.2 of the thesis, the problem of the false positive is not as acute as is 
often assumed. Whether this is accepted or not, in a model where the individual presenting a 
culpable threat bears the burden of uncertainty the empirical question is cast in rather a different 
light. 
Finally, before this chapter concludes it is worth saying something of the terminology of 
justification. Black has argued that there is a difficulty in holding that PD may be justified as 
punishment, and it is perhaps here that the culpability requirement is most useful. She argues 
that, while the terminology of justification is employed almost universally by PD theorists, it 
is more accurate to say that they are concerned with the defensibility of PD, which she defines 
as something less than justifiability.196 Her argument is that, given the scope for error in these 
determinations, the language of justification is inappropriate; that instead, it is better to think 
in terms of a decision to preventively detain being considered ‘defensible’ or not. As she points 
out, it seems intuitively more acceptable to think of decisions to detain in terms of whether or 
not that they are defensible, rather than whether they are justified. Certainly, ‘defensible risk 
practice’ is recognised as the goal of practitioners in the fields of risk assessment and 
management.197 Whether or not there is a theoretical significance to the language of 
justifiability versus defensibility it would seem to have little, if any, practical import. 
Nevertheless, the language of permissibility or defensibility is generally preferred in this thesis 
because the uncertainties surrounding future conduct have costs that ought to be kept in mind; 
and because, as Black says, there is something intuitively unsatisfactory about the claim that 
the imposition of a measure with such serious consequences for its subject was justified when, 
 
196 J. Black, ‘Is the Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders Justifiable?’ (2011) 6:3 Journal of Applied 
Security Research 317.  
197 See, for example, Risk Management Authority, Framework for Risk Assessment, Management and 
Evaluation: FRAME (Paisley, 2011); and the discussions in chapters 3 and 4.  
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at the point the decision was made, the true necessity of that measure could never be known.198 
Imprisonment is a harm in itself not to be understated. In recognition of that insurmountable 
knowledge limitation, the best we can aim at is, as Black and others have said, defensible 
decision-making.  
2.8. CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER TWO  
 
This chapter has argued that PD should be conceptualised as a form of punishment and ought 
therefore to be subject to the same safeguards. A variety of approaches to justifying PD as 
punishment were discussed. It was noted that retributivist formulations of PD are all but 
unworkable, both in terms of knowledge requirements, and the loss of preventive efficacy. PD 
cannot, therefore, be justified in retributivist terms because the need to protect the public from 
dangerous offenders cannot be satisfied by those approaches which seek to impose 
proportionate punishment for wrongdoing. The most persuasive approaches to PD were 
identified as those which conceptualised it as something approximating societal self-defence. 
An analytical model based on an extended theory of self-defence was proposed, in which the 
culpability constraint was satisfied by a requirement for an offence (i.e., that PD ought to be a 
sentence for a crime). It was argued that this, together with other information – which may 
include prior offending history, and risk assessment – can legitimately serve as the basis for 
the imposition of PD when they indicate that the presumption of the offender’s harmlessness 
has been rebutted. Crucially, the power to avoid PD rests with the offender, since it can only 
be considered permissible where he has chosen to conduct himself in such a way as to 
communicate a threat that he will cause serious harm if not detained.  The next chapter builds 
on this, exploring the concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘dangerousness’ to establish when the presumption 




198 It may, in fact, be justified; but this cannot be known at the point the decision to detain was made because, as 
New points out, the detention removes the opportunity for the harm to be done.  
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3. DANGEROUSNESS AND RISK 
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER THREE 
The previous chapter addressed the philosophical position that PD is ethically impermissible 
because it fails to respect the offender as a rational moral agent. It was argued that the practice 
of imposing indeterminate custodial sentences is defensible where an individual by his own 
voluntary conduct has forfeited his right to be presumed harmless, and that in such 
circumstances resort to preventive sentencing can be considered to be analogous to a form of 
societal self-defence. This chapter considers the rebuttal of the presumption of harmlessness in 
more detail; that is, it seeks to determine who the “dangerous offender” is, and how such 
dangerousness must be demonstrated before a preventive sentence can be considered an 
acceptable option. The terminology of dangerousness and risk is prolific. It is used in the 
literature concerning PD and sentencing,1 in legal frameworks which support such detention,2 
and extensively in the media.3 Despite this, there is a lack of agreement as to what, precisely, 
these terms mean. Dangerousness is often looked upon as a character trait or disposition that 
someone possesses;4 others regard it as a mere social construct that lacks any objective 
substance.5 The more broadly accepted view, however, is that it is a combination of character 
traits and circumstances, the interaction of which may lead to harmful conduct.6  As is 
 
1 For example, K. Harrison, Dangerousness, Risk and the Governance of Serious Sexual and Violent Offenders 
(London, 2011), especially chapters 1 to 3; Ashworth and Zedner (2014), esp. chs. 6 and 7; McSherry and 
Keyzer, (eds.) Dangerous People: Policy, Prediction, and Practice (London, 2011); McSherry and Keyzer 
(2009); Floud Report; N. Walker (Ed.), Dangerous People  (London, 1996); J. Peay, ‘Dangerousness’ – 
ascription or description?’ in P. Feldman (ed.) Developments in the Study of Criminal Behaviour, vol. 2: 
Violence (New York, 1982); L. Harkins et al. ‘Treating Dangerous Offenders’ in G.M. Davies and A.R. Beech 
(Eds.) Forensic Psychology: Crime, Justice, Law, Interventions (Chichester, 2018); M. Brown and J. Pratt 
(Eds.) Dangerous Offenders: Punishment and Social Order (London, 2000); Y. Rennie, The Search for 
Criminal Man: The Dangerous Offender Project (Toronto, 1978). 
2 See, for example, the Australian Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), and Dangerous 
Sexual Offenders Act 2000 (WA); the NHS England and National Offender Management Service Offender 
Personality Disorder Pathway Strategy (Policy document available at: 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/02/opd-strategy-nov-15.pdf), the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003; the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, and Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003.  
3 Peay (1982), 201; J. Bennet, The social costs of dangerousness: prison and the dangerous classes (London, 
2008), 5 – 8. 
4 Peay (1982), 211; Floud Report, 24. 
5 See, for example, T.R. Sarbin, ‘The Dangerous Individual: An Outcome of Social Identity Transformation’, 
(1967) 7 British Journal of Criminology 285. 
6 See, for example, R. MacLean, Report of the Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders (Edinburgh, 
2000), 7, para. 2.4; and R.A. Butler, Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (London, 1975), 
57 – 58, para. 4.5. 
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discussed below, this has implications for the management of risk,7 and for one of the major 
objections to PD which was touched on in chapter two: that is, the objection that PD is always 
unjust because we cannot know what someone will or will not do in the future. This is what 
was termed the ‘empirical objection’. Risk and dangerousness are bound up in the concept of 
harm, and it is perhaps unsurprising that there is some disagreement as to the nature and degree 
of harm that must be threatened in order for PD to be considered an appropriate measure.8 For 
example, whether physical harm to persons is necessary, or whether psychological harm is 
sufficient, and whether or not such harm must have been manifest in prior offending. There are 
also questions as to how dangerousness and risk should be evidenced, and what the role of risk 
assessment should be.  
This chapter aims to construct an account of: (1) the offenders that ought to be considered 
dangerous for the purpose of indeterminate sentencing; (2) the harms which are serious enough 
to warrant societal protection in the form of an indeterminate sentence; (3) the threshold of 
certainty of future offending that is necessary to impose an indeterminate sentence; and (4) the 
way in which a societal claim to protection must be evidenced. This, alongside chapter two, 
will form the framework against which the OLR will be critiqued in the remainder of the thesis. 
Section 3.2 discusses the evolution of the concept of the dangerous offender and introduces the 
argument that, although classifications have shifted over time, it cannot be dismissed – as some 
theorists have asserted – as a wholly arbitrarily defined construct independent of the threat of 
objective harms. 
 
Section 3.3 discusses different elements or characteristics of dangerousness that can be 
identified in the literature, noting that it is most commonly associated with violent and sexual 
offending, and that repetition of intentional harmdoing seems to be at the construct’s core. It 
will be argued that dangerousness is a present status, distinguishable from risk which is a 
forward-looking construct concerned with future behaviour. This, it is contended, casts the 
‘empirical objection’ introduced in chapter two in a somewhat different light. 
 
Section 3.4 considers the nature of the harms identified in section 3.3 in more detail. It will be 
argued that indeterminate sentencing is only morally permissible in the prevention of serious 
crimes against the person. Further, though such reoffending must be considered likely, a 
 
7 See section 3.4.2. 
8 See sections 3.3.2 and 3.4. 
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determination of dangerousness is not necessarily invalidated if a prediction of future offending 
is falsified.  In other words, our inability to attain a threshold of absolute certainty does not 
preclude ethically defensible indeterminate sentencing. Instead, formalised risk assessment 
should be part of the risk management process, designed to ensure that – so far as we are 
capable – we are judging the offender accurately, and that the best possible interventions to 
help him reduce his risk can be offered. Finally, section 3.5 draws together the arguments made 
in this chapter, and chapter two, to propose a model of indeterminate sentencing which allows 
for the burden of uncertainty to be borne by the offender where he has intentionally conducted 
himself so as to give rise to a reasonable and defensible conclusion that, if not detained, he will 
go on to cause serious harm to others. This, it is contended, represents the least morally 
objectionable of the available options.  
 
3.2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE DANGEROUS OFFENDER  
  
It will be apparent from the preceding chapter that the literature concerning the moral 
permissibility of PD is diverse. Even amongst those theorists who consider that some form of 
special incapacitative measure may be justifiable in respect of some offenders, there is 
significant disagreement as to the proper nature and scope of those measures. Consequently, 
although the terminology of dangerousness is almost universally employed, definitions – if 
offered at all – differ. As Floud and Young point out, ‘[at] the heart of the controversy over 
dangerousness in criminal justice is the ambitious, historically shifting and essentially political 
notion of justifiable public alarm’.9 This variability of definition has implications for the 
understanding, analysis and, crucially, the application of legal frameworks which support 
detention of dangerous offenders.10 The first task for this chapter, therefore, is to establish a 
working definition of the “dangerous offender” that will inform the discussion throughout the 
remainder of the thesis. The starting point for this is a brief overview of the evolution of the 
concept of the dangerous offender,11 before a discussion of more recent debates in section 3.3 
below. 
 
9 Floud Report, 4.  
10 See Harrison (2011), ch. 1; also Peay (1982). 
11 For a more comprehensive account see Rennie (1978), esp. chapters 1, 4 and 8; P. O’Malley, ‘Risk societies 
and the government of crime’, and J. Pratt ‘Dangerousness and modern society’, both in Brown and Pratt (eds.) 
(2000); and A.E. Bottoms, ‘Reflections on the Renaissance of Dangerousness’, (1977) 16:2 Howard Journal of 
Criminal Justice 70. 
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3.2.1 FROM POLITICAL CLASSES TO CRIMINAL CLASSES 
Sarbin has argued that the concept of dangerousness is wholly socially constructed to represent 
persons over whom the state wishes to exercise control at any given time.12 Likewise, Rennie 
describes the dangerous offender as ‘a protean concept, changing its colour and shape to suit 
the fears, interests, needs, and prejudices of a society. It is an idea, not a person’.13 There is at 
least some degree of truth in this. For most of the nineteenth century, dangerousness was 
considered an attribute of the lower social classes, to whom a propensity for property offences 
and civil disobedience was ascribed:14 ‘Membership of the dangerous classes was based on a 
lack of wealth rather than behaviour, with the premise being that the labouring class…would 
inevitably have some lapse in moral integrity due to their economic state and dispossess honest 
citizens of their money’.15 Dangerous persons were, at this time, those who were considered to 
present a political threat. People who would, it was feared, seek to increase their social status 
by depriving others of wealth and property.16 They were, as Dinitz and Conrad put it, ‘feared 
not because of their power but because of the lack of it’.17 Pratt explains this further: 18 
[It] was as if the very structure on which modern society was being built was 
still, at this early stage of its development, a very fragile affair, with roots that 
still had to be firmly embedded in the social fabric. In these respects… the 
framework of modern society seemed to be regularly put at risk from 
disparate groups – trade unionists, urban masses, political agitators, 
dispossessed agricultural workers, criminals…and the like who, in unity, 
seemed to possess the power of destruction.  
Thus, although the dangerous included those who were thought to present a risk of criminal 
behaviour that might result in harm to other people or damage to their property, that risk 
acquired its significance because it was regarded as symptomatic of a much more general threat 
to the new social order.19  
It was not until the 1860s that the conceptualisation of dangerousness began to lose its political 
class associations.20 According to Pratt, ‘ameliorative social reforms’ and, simply, the passage 
 
12 Sarbin (1976). 
13 Rennie (1978), xvii. Emphasis in original. 
14 O’Malley (2000), 21; and Pratt (2000), 36-37. 
15 Harrison (2011), 4. 
16 Pratt (2000), 36.  
17 S. Dinitz and J.P. Conrad, ‘Thinking about Dangerous Offenders’, (1978) 10:1 Criminal Justice Abstracts 99, 
at 129 cited in Harrison (2011), 4. 
18 Pratt (2000), 36. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Harrison (2011), 5. 
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of time had improved acceptance of social restructuring, which in turn had greatly reduced the 
perception of the threat posed by those classes.21  
[Dangerousness] is a quality that is no longer possessed by a class but by 
individuals or small groups of criminals; it is a quality that no longer 
threatens to tear down the portals of the state itself in an orgy of blood and 
destruction; instead, it is targeted at the quality of life of its individual 
subjects; it is not a quality that threatens their physical existence, but 
insidiously puts at risk all by which their worth as citizens is judged – their 
property. 
Risk to the state was no longer the determinant of dangerousness. Instead, dangerous offending 
was considered in terms of a risk to property-owning individuals from recidivist offenders. 
This evolution of the construct of dangerousness was taking place in a context where 
developments in record keeping, and in procedures for the detection of crime and supervision 
of offenders, made it made it harder for repeat offenders to relocate, or to assume new 
identities.22 For example, a statutory consolidated register of offenders in England was created 
in 1869 and kept in London by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner.23 It included a range of 
qualitative and quantitative data such as occupation, marital status, physical attributes, 
distinguishing features, literacy, religion, educational background, number and type of prior 
convictions, observations about character, and behaviour while in custody.24 Subsequently, the 
Prevention of Crimes Act 1871, which applied to the whole of the United Kingdom, made it a 
requirement that detailed records – including photographs of offenders25 –  be kept for each of 
the jurisdictions.26 Schoemaker and Ward, who carried out detailed research relating to the 
contents and the development of these registers note that – although this sort of information 
was already being collected regionally – the statutory regulation and centralisation was of 
immense significance for the study of criminology.27 These developments were reflective of a 
broader drive toward more purportedly scientific classifications of offenders by certain social 
and biological trait associations.  Of particular significance at around the same time as the 1871 
Act was passed, was the Italian positivist school of criminology.  
 
21 Pratt (2000), 37; see also J. Davies, ‘The London Garrotting Panic of 1862’, in V. Gatrell et al. (eds.) Crime 
and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western Europe Since 1500 (London, 1980)  
22 Pratt (2000), 37. 
23 Habitual Criminals Act 1869 c. 99, section 5.  
24 R. Schoemaker and R. Ward, ‘Understanding the Criminal: Record-Keeping, Statistics and the Early History 
of Criminology in England’, (2017) 57:6 British Journal of Criminology 1442. 
25 Prevention of Crimes Act 1871 c. 112, s. 6(6). 
26 Section 6(1). Registers for England would be kept in London (s. 6(2)), those for Scotland in Edinburgh 
(section 6(3)), and for Ireland in Dublin (s. 6(4)).  
27 Schoemaker and Ward (2017), 1443. 
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3.2.2 THE INFLUENCE OF POSITIVISM 
In 1870 Cesare Lombroso, an Italian psychiatrist, had – based on studies of prisoners and 
psychiatric patients – declared that certain particularly problematic criminals could be 
identified from amongst general criminal populations and the “insane” on the basis of the shape 
of their skulls, size of their ears, and lines on their hands.28 These features, he contended, 
marked them out as ‘atavistic’ men belonging to some earlier human evolutionary stage.29 
These ‘primitive’ traits were causally connected to a number of psychological defects which 
he contended were characteristic of this group such as ‘a love of orgies, and the irresistible 
craving of evil for its own sake, the desires not only to extinguish life in the victim, but to 
mutilate the corpse, tear its flesh, and drink its blood’.30 However, Raffaele Garofolo, a 
criminologist working alongside Lombroso, disagreed with his sharp distinction between this 
particularly worrisome group of offenders and those who suffered from severe mental or 
neurological disorders.31 These states were not, Garofolo argued, mutually exclusive: a 
criminal could be ‘a savage and at the same time a sick man’.32 He used temibilità – 
‘fearsomeness’ or ‘frightfulness’ – to describe this class,33 and has been credited as the 
originator of the term ‘dangerous offender’;34 but it was another colleague of Lombroso, lawyer 
Enrico Ferri, who changed temibilità to pericolosità, or ‘dangerousness’.35  
Lombroso, Garofolo, and Ferri belonged to the Italian positivist school of criminology36 which 
was distinguishable from the traditional schools of jurisprudence by its near complete disregard 
of the culpability constraints by then typically associated with dominant retributivist narratives 
of punishment.37 As Bottoms explains:38 
Positivists were and are committed to the application of natural science 
methods in every respect to the study of man in society…the positivist is 
concerned only with the elimination of anti-social conduct, [and so] he is 
 
28 Rennie, 67. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Cited in Rennie, ibid.  
31 Ibid, 71. 
32 Ibid. This view of the dangerous offender as both ‘mad and bad’, and therefore difficult to place in the 
coercive social framework, would predominate the positivist conceptualisation – see Dinitz and Conrad (1978), 
105; also M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London, 1978). 
33 Harrison (2011), 6.  Garofolo was also the first to give a name to the discipline which would become known 
as criminology – see Rennie (1978), 71.  
34 See, for example, Bottoms (1977), 75.  
35 Rennie (1978), 72; Harrison (2011), 6.  
36 Harrison (2011), 6; Bottoms (1977), 75. 
37 See, for example, Rennie (1978), 73 – 75; Harrison (2011), 6; Bottoms, ibid.  
38 Bottoms (1977), 74 – 75.  
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impatient with the principle of limiting retribution, which he sees as 
frustrating his legitimate desire to protect society by applying appropriate 
measures of social defence to the offender, even if these exceed the penalty 
based on the seriousness of harm which [other schools of criminal 
jurisprudence] would impose. The positivist also… sees no reason why 
society should not intervene compulsorily in the lives of potential offenders 
even though they have as yet committed no anti-social act. 
This was the beginning of an approach targeted at ‘pathological’ persons,39 though it was not 
based on a therapeutic or rehabilitative philosophy and did not represent the individualisation 
of the dangerous offender. Rather, the dangerous were conceived of as something of a uniform 
group of habitual criminals that could be distinguished both from respectable members of the 
community, and from most other criminals.40 Plint describes this category of offender as being 
‘in the community, but neither of it, nor from it… completely isolated from the other classes 
in blood, in sympathies, in its domestic and social organisation – as it is hostile to them in the 
“ways and means” of temporal existence’.41 They were considered to be irredeemable 
characters from whose risk society could only be protected by their confinement.42 This, 
according to Harrison, was the beginning of sentencing offenders as dangerous people, rather 
than for a particular offence.43 It would not, however, be until the first half of the twentieth 
century that risk to persons, rather than property, would be the marker of the dangerous 
offender. 
3.2.3 FROM CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY TO CRIMES AGAINST 
PERSONS 
The shift in emphasis from crimes against property to crimes against persons  is evident in the 
1932 report of the Home Office’s Departmental Committee on Persistent Offenders which 
included within its definition of the dangerous ‘certain sexual offenders… particularly those 
who commit repeated offences against children or young persons and those who corrupt 
children’.44 The reasons for this change are not immediately clear, but it has been suggested 
that the co-occurrence of the rising availability of insurance, and of increasing placement of 
children with non-familial carers as people travelled inwards to cities to find employment, was 
 
39 O’Malley (2000), 16. 
40 Pratt (2000), 37. 
41 T. Plint, Crime in England (London, 1851), 153.  
42 Schoemaker and Ward (2017), 1456.  
43 Harrison (2011), 6 – 7.  
44 J.C. Dove Wilson et al. Report of the Departmental Committee on Persistent Offenders (London, 1932), 18. 
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at least partially responsible for facilitating the change. 45 This meant that at the same time as 
property was becoming more replaceable, awareness of the risks of children being abused by 
carers not well known to their family was rising.46 Thus, according to Sutton, the concept of 
the dangerous offender became sexualised for the first time.47 By the mid-twentieth century the 
term had generally ceased to be used in relation to property offenders.48 By the 1970s the 
definition had been expanded to incorporate those whose offending was considered to have 
arisen from ‘personal inadequacies’ such as drug abuse,49 with the 1975 Report of the 
Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders including an observation that the public had come 
to associate mental disorder with dangerousness;50 and in 1981 Floud and Young noted that 
‘violence is almost universally the hall-mark of dangerousness. Dangerous offenders are 
presumed to be violent and violent offenders are presumed to be dangerous.’51 These reports, 
amongst others, were instrumental in shaping the modern concept of the dangerous offender 
and will be discussed in more detail at section 3.3. For the time being, however, it is sufficient 
to note the emergence of the concept of the individual dangerous offender as both violent and 
disordered, and an appropriate subject of both treatment and incapacitative punishment to 
prevent harms it is thought they would otherwise likely cause.52 
3.2.4 CONCLUSION TO SECTION 3.2 
At the beginning of this section, it was said that there is at least some truth in the claim made 
by Rennie, Sarbin and others that the dangerous offender is essentially a political construct.53 
However, although the particulars of the classes of persons identified as such have varied over 
time, as have the means used to classify them, it is apparent that that the concept has maintained 
some consistency. Whether targeted at property or persons, the feared classes of offender have 
 
45 Pratt (2000), 39; Harrison, (2011), 6.  
46 Harrison (2011), 7. 
47 A. Sutton, ‘Drugs and dangerousness: Perception and management of risk in the neo-liberal era’, in Brown 
and Pratt (eds.) (2000), 167.  
48 Harrison (2011), 7.  
49 Sutton (2000), 167 
50 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee on Mentally Disordered Offenders 
Cmmd. 6244 (London, 1975), para. 4.4. 
51 Floud Report, 7.  
52 This could appear somewhat contradictory, however, it is worth noting at this stage some theorists consider 
that preventive confinement is not necessarily in opposition to rehabilitative principles in that it may encourage 
a therapeutic approach whilst permitting the decision-maker the security of knowing that 
detention/imprisonment is available as a ‘fail-safe’ should treatment be unsuccessful: A. von Hirsch and A. 
Ashworth, ‘Incapacitation’, in A. von Hirsch et al. (Eds.) Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and 
Policy 3rd Edn. (Oxford, 2009), 75. This is discussed later.  
53 See also The Floud Report, 4 – 9, and the discussion at 3.3.2 below.  
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been those who are thought to display a pattern of behaviour which manifests itself in the 
repeated violation of the rights of others,54 and which has been taken to imply possession of 
certain characteristics associated with dangerousness. As will be discussed in section 3.4.2, 
although the methods for determining dangerousness have improved somewhat, modern day 
approaches still generally rely upon the incapacitation of individuals identified as dangerous 
based on traits they share with a reference group which itself founds the basis of the 
dangerousness determination. Additionally, although the primacy of risk of harm to persons 
did not assert itself until the middle of the last century, it is clear that dangerousness did carry 
associations with violence from at least the 1850s,55 even though the state’s focus was on 
preventing insurrectionism, rather than harm to individual citizens.56 Nevertheless, it remains 
the case that there is no universally agreed upon precise definition of dangerousness, and that 
public perceptions and associated political pressures impact its nature and scope. No claim to 
offer a precise and all-encompassing formulation is made here. However, it will be necessary 
to consider modern constructions that have been offered, and from this to establish a working 
definition to support discussion of the existing preventive legal frameworks in subsequent 
chapters.  
3.3 DANGEROUSNESS AS AN OPERATIONAL CONSTRUCT 
 
The previous section of this chapter sought to demonstrate that the concept of the dangerous 
offender, despite having evolved over time, is not quite as arbitrarily defined as some theorists 
have argued. It was suggested that such consistency as it possesses may be considered to refer 
to the threat of repeated violations of the rights of others.57 That said, it is apparent that there 
remains a lack of clear agreement on precisely who is properly subject to preventive measures, 
and the harms from which the public may reasonably demand such protection.58 This lack of 
consensus is evident even amongst those who agree such protections are legitimate in principle; 
for example, whether conviction for one or more specific offences is sufficient for an offender 
to be considered dangerous, or whether it is necessary to consider other factors such as the 
 
54 Although this does depend on what one considers to be a right. This is discussed further at 3.4.3. 
55 As discussed in section 3.2.1. 
56 Pratt (2000), 36 – 37, and see above at section 3.2.1. 
57Although not all theorists would accept that such circumstances can, or should, be approached as a matter of 
competing rights claims, it is assumed here that retaining one’s bodily integrity can generally and uncontroversially 
be considered of value, however such value is conceptualised. For a rights-based analysis, see R. Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, (London, 1977).  
58 See, for example, the Floud Report, 3-15. 
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psychological characteristics of the offender, or perhaps his social circumstances.59 However, 
if there is to be any merit in using the label ‘dangerous offender’  –  or whatever shorthand one 
might choose to substitute for it –  in the context of preventive sentencing, it must be descriptive 
of persons against whom we consider it defensible to deploy such measures.60  This part of the 
chapter evaluates different constructions of dangerousness that have been offered in both the 
theoretical material, and the reports of influential committees that have considered preventive 
measures in England and Wales, and Scotland.61 Once a working definition of the dangerous 
offender has been offered, the chapter will proceed to consider the ways in which such a status 
should be evidenced.62 
3.3.1 TERMINOLOGY 
The terminology of dangerousness, risk and harm permeates law and the literature.63 These are 
distinct, but interrelated concepts:64 it is not possible to define dangerousness without reference 
to risk, and any discussion of risk is meaningless unless we specify the harms we are concerned 
to prevent. An offender may be considered more likely to reoffend than not, but a high risk of 
repeated minor property offending is plainly not as serious as a high – or perhaps even some 
lesser – risk of serious sexual or violent offending. Therefore, the nature of the harm that must 
be threatened to qualify a potential recidivist as dangerous requires consideration alongside the 
degree of risk.65 Dangerousness, applied as it is in this context to a person or persons, is the 
most controversial of these concepts, with some doubting that the construct holds any validity 
whatsoever. Radzinowicz and Hood, for example, say that ‘the concept of “dangerousness” is 
so insidious that it should never be introduced in penal legislation’;66 and Tanay argues that 
‘[the] quality of “dangerousness”, even if capable of definition, could only be analogised with 
some arbitrarily agreed upon standard’.67 Others appear to accept that dangerousness is an 
 
59 This is discussed further at 3.3.2 below.   
60 Floud Report, 20. 
61 The Floud Report, MacLean Report and the Butler Report.  
62 See section 3.4. 
63 See the examples in footnotes 1 to 3 above, and the remainder of this chapter. 
64 Although Floud and Young come close to arguing that the perception of risk is a harm in itself – p. 4.  
65 It seems generally to be accepted that the severity of threatened harm should be inversely proportional to the 
degree of risk required to authorise preventive measures: see, for example, A.E. Bottoms and R. Brownsword, 
‘Dangerousness and Rights’ in J.W. Hinton (ed.), Dangerousness: Problems of Assessment and Prediction 
(London, 1983). Though what qualifies particular examples of violent or sexual offending as ‘serious’ is itself a 
matter for discussion. These points are addressed later. 
66 L. Radzinowicz and R. Hood, ‘A dangerous direction for sentencing reform’, (1978) Criminal Law Review 
713 at 722. See also Sarbin (1967) who argues that dangerousness has no meaningful definition because it is 
wholly socially constructed as a means of controlling and dehumanising persons of low status. 
67 E. Tanay, ‘Law and the Mentally Ill’, (1976) 22:3 Wayne Law Review 781 at 786. 
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appropriate descriptor for something, but consider that it is too imprecise to operate as a 
constraining device in terms of research and legislation.  
Birgden has argued that the term ‘serious high-risk offenders’ should be used in preference to 
‘dangerous offenders’, the former being regarded as more descriptive of the class of individuals 
concerned.68 The MacLean Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders in Scotland, 
which is discussed in detail later,69 also chose a risk-based definition because it considered that 
dangerousness suggested that violence was something endogenous rather than the result of 
interaction between the individual and the environment.70 Labelling such persons ‘serious high-
risk offenders’ rather than dangerous offenders was regarded as more reflective of this 
complexity. The point about the context of violence is an important one and shall be returned 
to shortly.71 However, dangerousness’s validity as a construct depends on how we define it. In 
the context of discussions about the PD of dangerous people, dangerousness refers to the class 
of persons who do – or who ought to – fall within the scope of those measures. When Birgden, 
the MacLean Committee, and others72 substitute risk-based descriptors for dangerousness, they 
are simply indicating that they regard people who fit those descriptors as the relevant class. 
Leaving to one side the need to define ‘serious’ and ‘violent’ for the time being,73 there is no 
obvious reason why ‘dangerous offender’ should not be used as a shorthand for ‘serious violent 
or sexual offender’. There is perhaps an argument that the label of dangerousness is highly 
stigmatising, and that it carries with it an expectation that such conduct will be repeated in 
future,74 but, as will be argued later, no individual should be subject to indeterminate 
sentencing as a dangerous offender unless they are regarded as more likely than not to place 
others at risk of serious harm.  
Regardless, it does seem doubtful that labelling someone a serious violent or sexual offender is 
less stigmatising. As alluded to in part 3.2, the position adopted here is that the concept of 
dangerousness does have some substance, even if there is not universal agreement on what it 
ought to include (and what it ought not to). Further, risk and dangerousness are not synonyms 
and, as is discussed later, failure to distinguish these concepts has led to the erroneous reduction 
 
68 A. Birgden, ‘Assessing Risk for Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders: The Dichotomy Between Community 
Protection and Offender Rights is Wrong-headed’, in P. Keyzer (Ed.) (2013), 227. 
69 See section 4.5.1. 
70 MacLean Report, 7, para. 2.4 
71 See 3.3.2D below. 
72 For example, the Millan Report, ch. 27.  
73 See sections 3.4.1 and 6.3.4.  
74 See, for example, P.D. Scott, ‘Assessing Dangerousness in Criminals’, (1977) 131:2 British Journal of 
Psychiatry 172; Peay (1982), 211; the Butler Report, 57 – 58, para. 4.5 
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of the defensibility of PD to a question of predictability of future behaviour.75 This thesis 
therefore employs the terminology of dangerousness alongside risk, first, because it is reflective 
of the language of much of the literature; second, because there are no inherent advantages to 
substituting some other label or descriptor; and, third, because it is necessary to establish and 
maintain the conceptual distinction between dangerousness and risk. The reasons for retaining 
the language of dangerousness having been briefly set out, the chapter now turns to the criteria 
that must be met for someone to be considered dangerous. This is, as indicated above, somewhat 
contentious, and no claim to resolve that controversy is made here; rather, the objective is to 
offer a working definition to serve as a starting point for the critique of the indeterminate 
sentences which follows in subsequent chapters. 
3.3.2 WHAT MAKES SOMEONE DANGEROUS? 
A. PRESENTING ‘UNACCEPTABLE RISK’ 
As was discussed above, the concept of the dangerous offender is a politicised one because 
despite possessing something of a stable core it shifts over time, and because governments 
cannot afford simply to disregard the public’s perception of crime and its demands for 
protection from it.  The relationship between dangerousness, risk, public policy and public 
opinion is, therefore, worthy of some consideration. Floud and Young describe it in the 
following terms: 76   
Dangers are unacceptable risks: we measure or assess the probability and severity 
of some harm and call it a risk; but we speak of danger when we judge the risk 
unacceptable and call for preventive measures…Risk is a matter of fact; danger is 
a matter of opinion. Judgements of danger are not objective in the sense of being 
perfectly commensurate with risk; but for the purposes of public policy they must 
be rational in the sense of being principled.  
Floud and Young regard risk as objectively measurable, and properly the domain of experts.77 
What is dangerous, on the other hand, is subjective and substantially informed by emotion and 
intuition.78 This view of risk assessment as an objective, scientific endeavour is discussed 
later.79 However, public perceptions of dangerousness do not arise in a vacuum; they are 
created and reinforced by high-profile cases, primarily of violence and sexual offences, and the 
 
75 This was referred to earlier as the ‘empirical objection’.  
76 The Floud Report, 4 
77 Ibid, 5. 
78 Ibid. 
79 See section 3.4 below. 
 64 
role of the media in reporting these sorts of cases is well recognised.80 In what has been termed 
the ‘fear of crime feedback loop’81  the media responds to public interest in sexual and violent 
crime by providing more crime-related content for people to consume, and governments 
respond with policy designed to assuage the public’s fears arising from the ‘disproportionate’ 
focus; the result is that these perceptions of danger appear validated and the cycle is 
perpetuated.82 
  This is problematic in that, as Floud and Young point out, it would be unethical to formulate 
public policy concerning the management of dangerous offenders on the basis of what the 
preponderance of the general population considered to be desirable.83 Nevertheless, they 
recognise that public opinion cannot simply be brushed aside:84 it must be a factor, though they 
do not say how it should be weighed. Public perspectives on what is dangerous and what is not, 
they say, may diverge somewhat from that of policy-makers but, despite the emotional nature 
of the judgement, they are not quite so irrational as is sometimes portrayed: 85  
Fear converts danger into risk and it tends to be inversely proportional to time 
and distance. This is understandable, for personal vulnerability diminishes with 
time and distance: the longer the timespan and the greater the distance 
separating use from predicted harm, the greater the scope for chance and 
personal initiative to frustrate the harm or shift its incidence. As for clustering, 
multiple deaths convert an accident into a disaster and this seems to be a 
different kind of event. It does not seem altogether irrational to fear death by 
disaster more than death by simple accident, even if the probability is the same 
in either case; for the circumstances of a disaster are more fearful in themselves 
for the sense of helplessness is greater.  
Intentionally harmful conduct is also intuitively less acceptable to most people than equivalent 
– or perhaps even greater – harm caused unintentionally, and therefore a person who acts 
intentionally is, Floud and Young suggest, more likely to be regarded as a danger.86 When we 
decide on the appropriate punishment for someone in respect of their past behaviour, we 
consider their intentions and their motives; if these considerations in punishment are rational, 
 
80 Ibid, 9; J. Bennett, The social costs of dangerousness: prison and the dangerous classes (London, 2008) 5 – 
8; A. Maden, Treating Violence: a guide to risk management in mental health (Oxford, 2007), 1– 2. See also the 
discussion of the case of Ruddle v The Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 G.W.D. 29 – 1395 (Sh. Ct.) in part 
4.3 of chapter four. 
81 M. Lee, Inventing the Fear of Crime: Criminology and the Politics of Anxiety (Portland, 2007), 113 - 114 
82 Bennett (2008), 8. 
83 The Floud Report, 4. 
84 Ibid, 5. 
85 Ibid, 6. 
86 Ibid, 7. 
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then it must also be rational to consider them when the question is one of prevention of future 
harms.87  
It may be that people are more likely to consider those who act intentionally to be dangerous 
because they consider the conduct to be the expression of the individual’s essential 
characteristics.88 It might also be the sense that the person had a choice as to whether or not to 
cause harm, and in these respects the judgement of dangerousness may be bound up in 
judgements about punishment: as Floud and Young, and Redmayne, point out, these 
considerations are relevant both to questions of punishment and of prevention.89 The extent to 
which the general public’s perceptions of who is and is not dangerous are determined by 
intentionality is, however, unclear. As the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders 
noted in 1975, there is a tendency for the public to associate dangerousness and mental disorder, 
regardless of the degree of illness.90 That association persists.91  
The relationship between violence and mental disorder is, however, considerably more 
complex. Since the 1980s, an expansive literature on the subject has developed,92 which has 
consistently demonstrated a ‘modest, yet statistically significant relationship between severe 
mental illness (SMI) and violence’.93 This is true of disorders involving psychosis, such as 
schizophrenia,94 and some personality disorders.95 It is, however, also true that most violent 
offending is carried out by people who do not have mental disorders,96 that the single biggest 
risk factor for violence in those that do suffer from mental disorder is alcohol and substance 
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misuse,97 and that people with SMI are far more likely to be victims of serious violence than 
perpetrators of it.98  
Perhaps contrary to the view advanced in the Floud Report, belief that mental disorder causes 
a person to be dangerous seems to suggest that, in some circumstances at least, a lack of control 
or of choice is regarded as a marker of dangerousness.99 PD is, it appears, least controversial 
when it is deployed in respect of persons suffering from mental disorder whose capacity to 
consent to hospitalisation and treatment is impaired, and who present a risk of harm to 
themselves or to others. What is important in the context of preventive sentencing though is, 
as argued in the last chapter, that people who are subject to indeterminate sentences for the 
protection of the public had an opportunity to avoid the sanction; this means that an offender 
must have chosen to do what he did.100  
Consistent with the concept’s development as outlined in section 3.2 above, dangerousness 
remains difficult to define with any precision. Public perceptions of dangerous offenders tend 
to exaggerate the problem, and this perception is – at least in part – created and reinforced by 
the way the media report violent and sexual crime. Judgements of what is dangerous are not 
necessarily objective; they are strongly influenced by emotion, especially fear. Nevertheless, 
it is wrong to view these perceptions as wholly irrational, even if the focus is upon incidences 
and types of harm, such as homicides, which are much rarer than harms we more readily accept 
the risk of: it is not unreasonable to find the possibility of death or serious injury – however 
remote – at the hands of a violent offender more distressing and fearful than that resulting from 
a road accident. The difficulty, however, remains that whilst societal demands for protection 
cannot be ignored entirely, it is not possible to base a rationally defensible system of preventive 
sentencing on public attitudes alone.101  Thus, though dangers may be conceived of as risks 
society deems unacceptable, and what is acceptable depends on the context, ‘what [the public] 
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actually have to put up with is decided by government and the agencies of law enforcement 
and is in this sense a political matter’.102 
B. (INSUFFICIENCY OF) PROPENSITY TO HARM 
Because in practical terms the definition of dangerousness is ultimately a matter of policy, one 
of the major objections to dangerousness as a construct is centred on exclusions; that is, on 
what policy-makers determine dangerousness is not.103 The argument runs as follows:104 
[The] category of ‘dangerous offender’ is said to be arbitrarily and unfairly 
defined: it excludes many persons responsible for deaths, serious and lasting 
injuries and extensive loss and destruction of property, either because the 
harmful conduct of such persons is not made punishable or because, though 
punishable, it is viewed and treated leniently so that even a substantial risk 
of repetition does not make them eligible to be classed as ‘dangerous’. It is 
unreasonable from the point of view of the public interest and inequitable 
from the point of view of those already under control as being ‘dangerous’ 
that persons such as, for example, habitually drunken drivers and keepers of 
unsafe factories should be excluded from the class of high-risk, serious 
offenders.  
These are what Floud and Young term the ‘hazards of modern societies’.105 Other examples 
offered elsewhere include environmental polluters;106 perpetrators of financial offences;107 and 
‘refusal of compulsory benevolence’ such as the failure of a parent to ensure that their child 
attends school,108 or otherwise to provide an adequate standard of care.109  
In at least some of these cases, any harm that might arise will have been unintentional, even if 
the risk of it seems obvious and, it does seem to be the case that we are reluctant to respond to 
unintentional harms with special sentences for dangerous offenders.110 It is also possible that 
the fact of harm being done might disincentivise repetition quite apart from any sanction 
imposed.111 Cases where repetition is likely are potentially more complicated, though, 
especially where there are incentives to continue with the conduct to which harm done or 
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threatened is incidental; for example, where an employer consistently fails to provide adequate 
training or personal protective equipment to his employees in order to save money in a 
struggling business. Likewise, the dangerous driver who, for whatever reason, is repeatedly 
motivated to drive when it is not safe to do so because of intoxication, or even inexperience.112 
As Walker, and Floud and Young, note such individuals may be effectively prevented from 
presenting a risk by means other than a preventive sentence,113 e.g., by preventing the employer 
from carrying on business, or revocation of the reckless driver’s licence. This is not necessarily 
the case where the primary objective of the conduct is to cause harm, or where the offending 
is not so contextualised that exclusion from any particular environment is feasible as a means 
of prevention. Dangerousness is not, therefore, simply about the propensity to cause harm to 
others. If it were, then it would be considered appropriate to use preventive sentences far more 
extensively than we do, though Walker observes that since some of these cases at least will 
attract fairly long sentences it can be difficult to establish whether the primary purpose of the 
sentence is retributive or preventive.114 It should, however, be apparent that when sentences 
such as (the now partially abolished) imprisonment for public protection (IPP) in England and 
Wales,115 the order for lifelong restriction in Scotland,116 or indeed the mandatory life sentence 
for murder, are considered, that they are not concerned with ‘the hazards of modern societies’, 
even if what they are concerned with seems difficult to state precisely. This is because the 
dangerousness is least controversially equated with violence.  
C. VIOLENCE AS THE ‘HALLMARK’ 
The Butler Committee heard a variety of evidence on how dangerousness should be defined. 
Consultant Psychiatrists used ‘unwanted behaviour which is threatening or disturbing to the 
public and may require that the offender be placed in custody to protect the public’ as the 
standard.117 Whether such behaviour was tolerable was for the general public and the courts to 
decide. No suggestions were made to the Committee that property offences should be 
considered dangerous, the general sense being that dangerous offenders were ‘those who would 
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probably inflict harm on others’.118 The most comprehensive account was given by psychiatrist 
P.D. Scott who suggested that a determination of dangerousness could be arrived at by 
weighting several factors: ‘(i) the irreversibility of the damage done; (ii) the quantity of damage 
(including how long it goes on); and (iii) the infectiousness of the behaviour (which may be 
connected with the general climate of opinion)’.119 He also emphasised that part of the 
calculation included probability of repetition, there being a need for future risk in order for 
someone to be considered to be dangerous. The Committee itself settled on ‘a propensity to 
cause serious physical injury or lasting psychological harm’. 120 
Floud and Young agreed. ‘Violence is almost regarded as the hall-mark of dangerousness. 
Dangerous offenders are presumed to be violent and violent offenders are presumed to be 
dangerous.’121 Their work in this area was significantly influenced by that of Kozol, Boucher, 
and Garofolo who, at the time, were psychiatrists at the Center for the Diagnosis and Treatment 
of Dangerous Persons in Bridgewater, Massachusetts.122 The Centre dealt with offender-
patients who had, in most cases, been convicted of serious sexual offences although there were 
a number whose offences were of non-sexual violence. One of the difficulties that these 
clinicians faced was that there was no satisfactory working definition of dangerousness that 
could guide them in accurately determining which patients required ongoing detention and 
treatment and which could safely be considered for release. Kozol et al. noted that much of the 
legislation concerning the detention of dangerous offenders restricted the class of offenders to 
perpetrators of sexual offences,123 but they did not consider such a restriction to be appropriate. 
Serious violent but non-sexual crimes do, as they point out, present just as great a risk to the 
safety and wellbeing of their victims as do serious sexual offences. The definition of 
dangerousness that they settled upon was fairly simple: ‘the potential for inflicting serious 
bodily harm on another’.124 They did, however, make a distinction between the concept of 
dangerousness in itself and the concept of the dangerous person. This will be returned to 
shortly.125  
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The MacLean Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders and its report are covered 
in detail in chapter four, and its terms of reference effectively restricted its enquiry to offences 
against persons. Nevertheless, it still required to give consideration to the manner in which 
potential subjects of the sentencing framework would be identified. One of the approaches 
contemplated was a qualifying offence approach. Under this approach, a list of offences would 
be agreed and included in legislation, and a conviction for one or more of them would be a 
necessary condition (though presumably not sufficient one, since an automatic life sentence 
approach was rejected by the Committee)126 for the making of a preventive sentence.127 This 
approach can be seen in section 210A(10) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 which 
specified the offences for which extended sentences may be made.128 That list set out in section 
210A(10), which (if adopted) could have been adapted for use with the OLR, was focused 
almost entirely on sexual offences including rape,129 sodomy,130 indecent assault,131 lewd, 
indecent or libidinous behaviour or practices,132 and possession of indecent images of 
children.133 The Committee, however, rejected this approach on two grounds: (1) that a list 
approach would tend to be ‘both over-inclusive and under-inclusive’;134 and (2) that the 
Committee’s own terms of reference required an offender focus, rather than an offence focus. 
135 
While one might find general agreement that rape and assault to the danger 
of life are ‘serious’ offences, most offences against the person vary 
significantly in their severity according to the circumstances. This is 
particularly so for sexual offending. So, for example, while sexual intercourse 
with a fifteen year old girl is an offence…[society] would view the case of a 
seventeen year old youth who has sex with his fifteen year old girlfriend in 
quite a different light from the case of a thirty-five year old teacher who has 
intercourse with his fifteen year old pupil. A further problem arises from the 
fact that some types of offending, which might fairly be described as 
‘serious’, and which have significant sexual motivation, might not necessarily 
be included in any list of ‘sexual offences’. For example, sexually-motivated 
conduct which does not involve any overt sexual act, or any physical 
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interference with the victim, may only be charged under some other category 
of offence – typically breach of the peace. 
Additionally, as the Committee pointed out, many people who perpetrate serious offences 
against the person do not present an ongoing risk to the public.136 The example given was of 
murder: some people convicted of this offence may present an ongoing risk to the public, but 
most do not.137 It is also the case that there are people who present a significant risk but who 
have yet to be convicted of a serious offence.138  
There is some tautology in the definition adopted by the MacLean Committee in that its terms 
of reference stipulated that it was to be concerned with the sentencing of ‘serious sexual and 
violent offenders who may present a continuing danger to the public’.139 However, the focus on 
offenders who may present such a risk, rather than a category of offences, is significant. The 
Report’s first recommendation was that ‘[special] sentencing considerations [were] necessary 
for persons convicted on indictment of a violent or sexual offence, or exceptionally another 
category of crime, whose offence(s) or antecedents or personal characteristics indicate they are 
likely to present particularly high risks to the safety of the public’.140 This meant that it would 
not be necessary for an offender to have caused serious harm already, or even to have 
perpetrated an offence that would have been likely to result in such harm. It also meant that, 
rather than serving as the basis for determining punishment, the offence’s primary significance 
for the purposes of the proposed framework was as an indicator that the combination of the 
offender’s traits and certain situational factors might result in serious harm to others. 
D. A COMBINATION OF ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND SITUATIONAL 
FACTORS 
It was noted above that the MacLean Committee chose a risk-based descriptor for the group 
with which its proposals were concerned because it was considered to better reflect the complex 
causes of violence: 141  
The term risk is preferred to “dangerousness”, because the term 
dangerousness implies a dispositional trait, inherent in an individual, that 
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compels him/her to engage in a range of violent behaviour across a range of 
settings. That approach fails to take into account the complex interaction of 
psychological characteristics and situational factors in the production of 
violent acts…The response to risk presented by individuals should, therefore, 
not be restricted to an attempt to modify those characteristics in order to make 
the individuals less of a risk, but also seek to reduce the opportunities or 
triggers for violence. 
Three claims are made in the above excerpt. First, that dangerousness is an aspect of risk; 
second, that risk is a property of circumstances combined with individual personality traits; and 
third, that risk assessment is properly viewed as part of a risk management strategy rather than 
simply as means of predicting what any individual will or will not do at some point in the future. 
This last point is discussed below,142 but the first two will be discussed here.  
It will be recalled that one of the criticisms of PD is that it amounts to the punishment of a 
person for who he is, rather than what he has done.143 That argument, and others like, it were 
discussed in chapter two.144 The objection being raised in the above excerpt is somewhat 
different in that what is asserted is that it is wrong to imagine that there are people that just are 
dangerous, or that they are possessed of some essential characteristic which in and of itself 
means that they present a high risk of serious sexual or violent offending. It is not a question of 
whether or not we are punishing someone for being dangerous because, on this account, 
dangerousness is not properly conceptualised as a property of a person which can be dealt with 
in these terms. Floud and Young observed that there is a generally held – and deeply ingrained 
– belief that dangerousness is a pathological characteristic of a person that is properly identified 
by medical assessment and subsequently treated.145 However, the complexity to which the 
MacLean Report refers was also recognised in the Butler Report:146 
Dangerousness depends in the majority of cases not only on the personality of 
the potentially dangerous offender but on the circumstances in which he finds 
himself. The practice of referring to some individuals as “dangerous” without 
qualification creates the impression that the word refers to a more or less 
constantly exhibited disposition…It is true that there are people in whom anger, 
jealousy, fear or sexual desire is more easily aroused and whose reactions are 
more extreme than in most people, prompting them to do extremely harmful 
things. But these emotions are aroused and lead to harmful behaviour in certain 
situations. 
 
142 Section 3.4.2. 
143 See chapter two, especially section 2.5.1. 
144 See ibid, and also section 2.2.1 which critiques justifications of PD as quarantine for dangerousness which is 
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It was, however, accepted that there does exist a small category of people who are so motivated 
by a desire to cause pain and distress to others that they seek out victims of sexual or other 
violence and that these individuals, rare though they are, are appropriately considered 
‘unconditionally dangerous’.147 This was recognised by Kozol et al. as those exhibiting ‘a 
pathological self-serving potential for violence’,148 pathological meaning ‘a primary insistence 
on violence where alternatives do exist and without benevolent regard for the consequences to 
others’.149  They observe that their concept of the dangerous person is very like the concept of 
psychopathy,150 though not all psychopaths are violent.151  
Of interest at present is the notion that, whilst it is a valid construct, the dangerous offender 
label is only properly applied to those persons that actively seek out opportunities to do harm. 
No person exists in isolation; even the proactive serious violent or sexual offender cannot do 
harm unless the necessary external elements present themselves. There must be a potential 
victim. There must be an opportunity to follow through with the attack. Why, then, is the 
individual who is not proactive, but who readily succumbs to temptation or provocation in such 
circumstance not dangerous? The answer, when PD is in contemplation, would seem to depend 
– at least in part – on the nature of his “triggers”.  If his offending is highly contextualised we 
might consider that measures short of PD might be sufficient. For example, we consider that 
we can prevent the offender from being exposed to his triggers, i.e. that in practical terms the 
risk of serious violent and sexual offending is too small to warrant PD (omitting for the time 
being to define what degree of risk is sufficient). Alternatively, contextualised offending may 
not suggest to us the kind of generalised lack of empathy or compassion or desire to cause harm 
described by Kozol and colleagues, and the Butler Committee. It might also be considered that 
one or two such incidences were better considered individual aberrations in an individual’s 
behaviour, rather than a course of conduct that causes us to believe he is likely to go on 
offending if released.152 A very obvious difficulty, however, arises in cases where an individual 
can be provoked to do serious harm by ordinary, everyday occurrences the likes of which it is 
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all but impossible to avoid.153 This is addressed further below, but it is difficult to see why the 
man who fails to control his violent impulses in the face of the ordinary annoyances and 
obstructions of daily life should be considered any less dangerous than the person who seeks 
those situations out.  
It may be that the offender whose actions are premeditated is more blameworthy than the one 
who simply fails to control his impulses, but that is not a consideration that is relevant to a 
determination of dangerousness in itself. Such considerations may be relevant to the offender’s 
motivation and willingness to engage with rehabilitative efforts, but they say little about the 
risk posed at the point the decision to preventively detain is made. In holding that the first 
(calculating, predatory) offender is more blameworthy than the second (impulsive) offender, 
we recognise that the first offender is presented with a choice to seek out victims or not. The 
second offender’s circumstances are different. The choice he is presented with is the one to 
expose himself to circumstances that might precipitate violent conduct; and if those 
circumstances are the ordinary occurrences, his choice is tantamount to one of deciding whether 
to “quarantine” himself that was discussed in section 2.2 of the previous chapter. The offender 
who does not intend to cause harm – though perhaps less blameworthy – may be considered 
more dangerous if all that is necessary to give rise to the risk is exposure to the ordinary 
conditions of living, or at least to the living conditions that are ordinary for him.154 
This potential for reacting “explosively” to certain situational triggers has led some to engage 
an analogy between the dangerous offender and an undetonated bomb.155 Morris gives an 
account of post-war London in which such devices would be found from time-to-time.156 On 
most occasions disposal crews would make the bombs safe; they would never explode, and no 
harm would be done. Nevertheless, in the period between the device’s discovery and its 
disarming the surrounding area would be cleared of people. The ‘false positives’ – the bombs 
which could have detonated but were secured before they did so – were dangerous until they 
were disarmed.157 No one could reasonably have argued otherwise. It does not therefore follow 
that because an individual identified as dangerous does not do harm, the classification has been 
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made in error.158 This could be considered a good analogy for the impact of PD upon an 
individual thought to be dangerous: PD “disarms” him by preventing him from doing harm; it 
is no objection to his detention that we cannot know whether he was really dangerous or not 
because he was denied opportunity.159 But Morris’s point is not about incapacitation; it is about 
the predictive exercise that precedes it.  
Considerable attention has already been given to the significance of free-will as a mediator 
between conduct and environment.160 However it is clear that human beings are far more 
complex than a device that is constructed so that it will explode when it encounters certain 
conditions. If determinations that an offender will do harm if not incapacitated could be made 
with comparable certainty to a determination that a bomb will detonate if not disarmed then the 
calculation would be somewhat simpler. The false positive is the offender who would – like 
most offenders – not have sought to repeat such an offence. This does not necessarily mean 
that he would not in any circumstances. Someone who will not reoffend because he is capable 
of avoiding circumstances likely to bring it about, and who will do so, could be described as a 
false positive. To regard as a false positive the offender who would have done serious harm to 
another person but for the intervention of random chance to prevent that outcome, seems 
intuitively unacceptable. This is why classifications of dangerousness must involve 
consideration of external risk factors for violence as well as the characteristics of the 
individual.161 It is also why treatment of the language of dangerousness and risk as though it 
were interchangeable is problematic.  
On this point, Duff’s approach to the unexploded bomb analogy is perhaps more helpful than 
Morris’s. He engages the analogy in his discussion of special selective detention,162 but the 
primary comparison is between explosives that would detonate if not disarmed, and those that 
appear to be bombs but are subsequently determined to be incapable of exploding, or to be 
something else altogether. The determination of dangerousness is based on facts as understood 
at the time it was made: the limitation on knowledge means that the determination is a 
reasonable one and, he says, true.163 A dangerous person is, according to Duff, one who 
possesses characteristics that would result in seriously harmful conduct if certain circumstances 
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arose, but those circumstances must be likely to arise:164 there must be more between the 
characteristics of the offender and the threatened harm than random chance. Dangerousness is 
therefore properly regarded as a present status rather than a mere prediction of future 
conduct.165 Floud and Young agree:166 
[Whether] it be a person’s benevolence or his dangerousness that is at issue, an 
assessment takes the form of a predictive judgment, not a simple 
prediction…As the term implies, both evaluation and prediction are involved 
in predictive judgments: an evaluation of someone’s character – his disposition 
to behave in a certain way, and a prediction – an estimate of the probability that 
in foreseeable circumstances he will actually do so…For practical purposes 
[these elements] are inextricable: a predictive judgment is a prediction 
grounded in an evaluation. If the prediction is falsified, it does not at once 
follow that the evaluation was mistaken... 
It is quite obvious that a bomb capable of exploding is dangerous until it is disarmed. There is 
a difficulty though in claiming a bomb that is not capable of exploding, or an object thought to 
be a bomb, but which transpires to be something harmless, is dangerous. At best, what Morris 
and Duff describe are conditions under which it is reasonable to treat these objects as if they 
are dangerous.  
The value of the argument, though, is in demonstrating that something (or someone) can be 
dangerous, even if circumstances do not bring about the harm feared. Since dangerousness does 
not depend on someone actually doing harm, it is wrong to reduce the question to one of 
predictability of future conduct. This being so, the false positive does not present the degree of 
moral difficulty those who raise it suggest.167 However, the limitation on knowledge to which 
Duff refers does not create a truth; it creates an uncertainty. When new information about the 
nature and capability of the devices emerges, that assessment of dangerousness is revised. This 
is much easier to do with regard to an object than it is with a person, especially one who has 
been detained to prevent the threatened harm, because we can never know what he would have 
done if not detained. Though the bomb analogy is useful, it cannot be allowed to obscure the 
real issue at hand: bombs are just objects; people experience their “disarmament” and the form 
of incapacitation under discussion is the most onerous of any with the exception of capital 
punishment. Error in either direction carries costs and it must be minimised so far as possible; 
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but the question is one of when it is reasonable to treat someone as if they would seriously harm 
another, rather than whether the prediction itself is right or wrong.  
E. REPETITION 
Aside from the requirement that the conditions for the offence must be likely to arise, there 
must be evidence that the individual concerned is likely to respond to them with serious sexual 
or violent conduct.168 Some of the most persuasive evidence of likelihood arises where an 
individual has perpetrated an offence of the relevant type on more than one occasion. As Floud 
and Young explain:169 
[We] may say that a man acted “out of character” which is to give him (as well 
as ourselves, as judges of character) the benefit of the doubt. By the same token, 
fair-minded persons do not jump to conclusions about a man’s disposition from 
a single instance of relevant behaviour: they want to be sure he is behaving “in 
character”. 
Although it is difficult to be certain that any given individual will perpetrate future serious 
violent or sexual crimes, it has been shown that a history of such offending greatly increases 
the likelihood of it.170 Previous convictions are regarded by criminologists as being some of 
the most ‘reliable and powerful predictors’ of subsequent offending behaviour:171 the greater 
the number of convictions the more likely the offender is to be reconvicted, but one individual 
might perpetrate a variety of different kinds of offences. A criminal record, however long, is 
therefore not necessarily sufficient to support a finding that an offender poses a particular risk 
of serious violent and/or sexual offending.172 As such, the only prior offences that ought to be 
considered relevant to a determination of dangerousness are those that are serious offences 
against the person,173 or, according to the MacLean Committee, less serious offences which are 
suggestive of a pattern of conduct that could lead to such an offence.174 Kozol et al. are much 
more restrictive than this and consider that it is not possible to predict future episodes of 
violence unless there is a history of it.175 Floud and Young insist that the offender’s ‘criminal 
conduct must have manifested the grave harm which is to be prevented’ before even the risk 
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assessment process is justified.176 Likewise, Duff requires that any propensity to cause serious 
harm is one that an offender is found to have acted on – the propensity itself is not sufficient.177  
One of the purposes of restricting the offences which may be considered relevant to those of 
the kind we are concerned to prevent is to ensure that a series of minor offences can never serve 
as a basis for an indeterminate sentence.178 Requiring a conviction for a serious offence is also 
a means of ensuring that an offender’s propensity to harm others is not just hypothetical, but 
that he has acted upon it. As Duff puts it: 179 
[The] connection between the character traits which make a person criminally 
dangerous, and the criminal conduct which would manifest those character traits, 
is logical, not contingent. To have those character traits is to be disposed to 
behave in those criminal ways in situations of the appropriate kind; to say that 
the criminal conduct manifests those character traits is to say that conduct 
constitutes the public actualisation of those traits. 
The tautology in reliance upon conduct as evidence of disposition, and disposition as evidence 
that the conduct is likely to be repeated, has been commented on above,180 but the requirement 
for a conviction of a serious offence against the person serves a purpose beyond prediction: it 
is robust evidence that the offender has made a choice to conduct himself in such a manner that 
we might reasonably fear the way he will conduct himself in future. As Walker points out, ‘a 
murder or a sexual assault at least shows what a person is capable of; and…a capability is 
something that can be exercised more than once’.181 Duff, however, requires that propensity is 
evidenced by more than a single serious offence. On his account, indeterminate sentences are 
only permissible where such offending is persistent:182 
“Persistent” offenders are not merely repeat offenders who break the law more than 
once (or who repeat the same kind of offence): they are those whose repeated crimes 
cannot, given the character and contexts of their commission, be seen merely as a 
succession of discrete aberrations in otherwise law-abiding lives; they rather 
display a pattern of offending, which persists despite regular convictions and 
punishments. 
It is of some interest that Duff’s repetition requirement does not seem to be weighed against 
severity of harm.183 He defines serious violent offences as those of ‘murder and other life-
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threatening attacks, rape, and other serious sexual assaults’;184 and the difficulty is that, if 
indeterminate sentencing is only permissible in cases of persistent serious offending so defined, 
it means the offender must be permitted to do potentially severe harm to a succession of victims 
before preventive action can be taken. This would be so even if there had been offending 
behaviour in the interim that, whilst of lesser severity, was indicative of the sort of pattern of 
offending to which Duff refers. As an example, consider an offender who has been convicted 
of theft by housebreaking in which he stole a woman’s underwear, but who also has a conviction 
for assault to severe injury perpetrated by breaking into his victim’s home, from which he also 
stole her underwear.185 It would, it is argued, be reasonable to infer that the lesser offence 
demonstrated an ongoing risk that the more serious offence – or some offence like it – may be 
repeated, or that the behaviour may otherwise escalate.  
Whilst a requirement for repeated serious offences would undoubtedly increase confidence that 
the decision to detain is a legitimate one, it must be recognised that it places a heavy burden on 
the community; it amounts to a demand that potential victims accept the risk the offender will 
choose to cause them harm. As has already been said, the risk of being harmed by others exists 
all the time, and is one that the public generally accepts, for some things at least. Nevertheless, 
it seems morally problematic to take the view that we must simply allow severe harm to come 
to others, even in the face of evidence that suggests repeat serious offending is likely. There is, 
as Duff contends, a need to ensure that individuals who are labelled dangerous are labelled on 
the basis of what they have done rather than a mere prediction,186 but this does not necessarily 
require that we permit repeated incidences of serious harmdoing before PD can be considered. 
The need to ensure that the offender has elected to run the risk that we will consider him 
dangerous mandates that there be a conviction for a serious violent or sexual offence and not, 
as the MacLean Committee argued, only a series of lesser offences suggestive of a propensity 
to escalate. This, however, does not mean that the index offence – i.e., the offence in respect of 
which the sentence of PD is imposed – must be for a serious violent or sexual offence, but that 
there must be a history of serious violent or sexual offending. On that basis the MacLean 
recommendation that a lesser offence may serve as a basis for the decision to impose an 
indeterminate sentence if it is part of a pattern,187 is sustainable. This may reduce the certainty 
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with which we can say an offender is likely to cause serious harm in the future but, as was 
discussed earlier,188 the unfairness arising from that reduction in certainty is mitigated  by the 
offender’s choice to use his freedom to harm others.  
3.3.3 CONCLUSION TO SECTION 3.3 
This section aimed to approach the concept of the dangerous offender as a constraint on PD, 
that is, to identify the core characteristics of people who might properly be made subject to an 
indeterminate sentence, and to exclude those who may not be. Despite objections that have been 
made to the use of the term ‘dangerous offender’, there are no inherent advantages in using 
other terms. There are definitional issues with alternatives, such as ‘high-risk serious violent 
and sexual offender’, the reality being that they are simply shorthand descriptors for the class 
of persons we consider potentially liable to PD, and it is still necessary to set out what is meant. 
Despite the ambiguity, it was noted that dangerousness is generally associated in the minds of 
the public and professionals with violent and sexual offending. There are many other offences 
that risk serious harm on a large scale that are nevertheless tolerated by society, at least to the 
extent that we do not seem willing to resort to indeterminate sentences to prevent them. In at 
least some of these cases any harm resulting will not have been intended, and recurrence may 
be prevented by less restrictive means: the emphasis in the literature on dangerous offenders 
and indeterminate sentences is the prevention of intentional (though not necessarily 
premeditated) harm to others.  
Dangerousness should not be understood as an attribute of a person that operates in isolation. 
The risk of serious harm being done depends on the interaction of the person with his 
environment; there are very few people who are calculating predators that actively seek out 
victims, but this does not necessarily mean that those who are impulsively violent should be 
considered less dangerous. It is also possible that someone may possess character traits which 
make it likely that they will commit a serious offence, but that they do not do so because they 
never encounter the circumstances which create the opportunity or otherwise bring it about. It 
may be true to say that someone is dangerous even if a prediction of reoffending that supports 
it turns out to be false. Dangerousness is therefore properly regarded as a description of present 
status – that is, that someone currently possesses characteristics which mean they are likely to 
conduct themselves so as to harm others – rather than as a wholly forward-looking construct. 
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Finally, past behaviour is extremely important. It is not enough to say that we believe someone 
has the potential to perpetrate a serious offence; he must have a conviction for such an offence. 
It was argued that a less serious offence may serve as the trigger for considering the 
appropriateness of a preventive sentence where it is suggestive of an ongoing risk of serious 
offending, but there must still have been a previous conviction for a serious offence. Having 
discussed the characteristics of the dangerous offender in this section and having noted that 
serious violent and sexual offending are the offence types most generally associated with it, it 
is necessary in the next section to say something further about how ‘serious’ in this context 
should be understood, and how certain we must be that the threatened harm will be caused or 
attempted. 
3.4 SERIOUSNESS AND CERTAINTY 
The preceding part of the chapter has involved some discussion of the harms that must be 
threatened in order to warrant the attribution of the label of dangerousness to a person. It 
concluded that we are principally concerned with offenders who present a risk of repeat serious 
violent and/or sexual offending. The conduct must be serious so as to ensure that an 
indeterminate sentence is used only in respect of the most high-stakes cases, and only in respect 
of the smallest minority of offenders. This is an essential safeguard.189 This section of the 
chapter builds on the previous discussion to try to explain why the emphasis is – and ought to 
be – on serious offences against the person, before considering the degree of certainty that 
should be required, and how that should be evidenced. 
3.4.1 WHICH HARMS? 
In addressing the question of which harms might warrant PD, Floud and Young draw heavily 
on the work of Nigel Walker, who gave evidence to the Committee. His approach was to 
discard concepts such as ‘seriousness’ and ‘gravity’, in favour of what he considered a more 
pragmatic question: ‘Against what sorts of offences is it rational…to demand a high degree of 
protection?’190 This approach, he argues, removes the ‘emotions and superstitions’ associated 
with criminal law from the equation.191 This question is subdivided into two: how difficult 
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would it be to reverse the harm, if it were inflicted; and how certain are we that the harmful 
behaviour will occur? As regards the first, Walker argues that only if it would be ‘impossible’, 
‘probably impossible’, or ‘very difficult’ to undo the harm, and if its occurrence was highly 
probable, is it acceptable to contemplate PD.192 As regards the second, it is important to note 
that Walker does not require that harm is actually done in the individual case: it is sufficient 
that the conduct in question would be likely to cause harm that is difficult or impossible to 
reverse.  The appropriateness of such a threshold depends in part upon what is meant by ‘undo’ 
in this context. People may sustain life-threatening injuries and survive with little or no 
physical impairment because of excellent medical care, for example. But has the harm been 
undone?  We could certainly include the leaving of very long-term or permanent marks or scars 
on the body from an attack as harms that cannot be undone, but Walker is concerned with more 
than physical damage.  
He gives the example of an offender who robs his victim with a loaded gun. It would be wrong, 
he argues, to say that the conduct did not threaten irremediable harm. If the circumstances are 
such that the impact on the victim is not readily apparent, the court should take evidence from 
experts and reach a conclusion on that basis. Any uncertainty should, Walker says, be resolved 
in favour of the offender.193 The harm that results from the conduct in this example is 
psychological rather than physical and could equally result if the firearm presented was not 
loaded: it arises from the fear and distress at the apparent threat of death or serious injury and 
does not depend on what the victim knows of the weapon’s state. It is of course true that a 
weapon without ammunition is incapable of firing and therefore of causing physical harm 
(unless it is used to create a blunt injury, but that does not seem to be what is being 
contemplated), and that the danger is objectively greater if the gun is loaded.194 It might also 
be that reference to the weapon being loaded, in the absence of any reference to attempt to 
discharge it, is a means of Walker emphasising the need for a threat-of-physical-harm 
constraint in cases where the harm done/threatened is psychological. He does himself 
acknowledge that the examples he can construct are overwhelmingly those involving physical 
injury or sexual assault, but he is clear that the basis on which he regards sexual offending as 
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If it is personal violation, rather physical harm per se that is the constraint, then it should follow 
that psychological harm caused (or likely to have been caused) by the threat of death or serious 
physical injury could be sufficient to warrant PD, even when the injury the victim envisages 
cannot, in fact, be done. It appears that Floud and Young also regard the constraint as one of 
violation, rather than physical harm.196 
Offences such as theft, rape and kidnapping inflict personal injury – pain, 
suffering, shock and fear, injury to health, inconvenience – but their essential 
character is that they are violations of right and that they are prejudicial to the 
community. A society in which they were endemic but always duly 
compensated would not be preferable to one in which they were contained 
but never compensated. If prohibitions with sanctions are insufficient there is 
a prima facie case for prevention. 
Requiring that psychological harm be connected to some sort of physical violation might have 
value in policy terms since, as was said earlier,197 what is regarded as sufficient to warrant PD 
depends – to some extent at least – on what the public considers sufficient.198 People, Floud and 
Young argue, tend to take for granted that there is a clear demarcation between psychological 
and physical harm,199 and often regard psychological harm as of lesser significance.200 In 
reality, the distinction is not so easy to maintain. An offence may deprive someone of a physical 
capability such as the power to talk or to walk or to see, but it is the psychological impact upon 
the person that makes these physical changes so utterly destructive: the harm extends to the 
distress and the sense of loss that accompanies the injury, whether that be loss of physical 
capacities or of a job or profession that can no longer be undertaken.201 For this reason, they 
consider any distinction that might be made between psychological and physical harm is 
irrelevant.202  
The logical conclusion of this line of reasoning, as Floud and Young recognise, is that if 
psychological and physical damage are harms of equal status, then the inclusion of at least some 
property offences becomes open to argument.203 The loss of an object of great sentimental value 
may cause great suffering, and may entail a great sense of personal violation, especially if it is 
taken from the home. Conversely, the theft of an item of no sentimental value whatsoever can 
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be extremely serious, for example, the theft of a railway signalling wire.204 On that basis, they 
consider the presumption that property offences should never be sufficient to warrant PD, to be 
inappropriate; restriction of the use of PD to offences against persons would be an ‘arbitrary’ 
limitation.205 Their concern is the potential impact of the offending, rather than how that is 
brought about. Questions about the appropriateness of PD are, of course, closely bound up in 
considerations of what the impact may be if an individual is not detained; but the long-term and 
devastating impact of such a sentence must be part of the consideration. Simply put, we must 
try so far as possible to restrict our use of these sentences to cases where the conduct with which 
we are concerned threatens long-term devastation for those to whom it is directed. This is what 
was called threat-proportionality in the last chapter. Imprisonment places restrictions on every 
aspect of a person’s life; it removes choices that most of us take for granted on a daily basis and 
creates psychological and social detriments that persist well beyond the period of 
confinement.206 An indeterminate sentence leaves someone liable to these extreme restrictions 
indefinitely. For the reasons discussed above, psychological harm warrants, on the face of it, 
prevention just as physical harm does. But difficulties arise in holding that psychological harm 
completely divorced from threatened physical harm may warrant PD. The further we stray from 
offences that endanger life or otherwise significantly diminish its quality, the harder it becomes 
to maintain that the impact on the subject of PD is ethically acceptable. This is quite apart from 
any considerations of certainty of future offending. The problem with trying to identify relevant 
harms by reference to remediability is that it is still necessary to decide which particular 
irremediable harms might be sufficient. It is not, therefore, clear that irremediability places any 
meaningful constraint on PD’s application.  
Floud and Young also recognise that some violations are serious independent of whether any 
suffering is experienced: 207  
[The] peculiar wrongfulness [of rape and kidnapping] cannot be explained or 
measured in terms of pain or hardship, though of course they may entail both. 
They are harmful only against the background of a certain value and respect for 
the person. The wrongfulness of rape does not depend on its causing mental 
distress – on the painful consciousness and unhappy remembrance of the victim; 
not upon its resulting in lasting psychological damage – though these harmful 
effects would bear on the seriousness of the particular offence. 
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The case of rape in which no harm is done has been considered by Fiona Leverick in the context 
of (individual) self-defence.208 She draws on the work of Hampton,209 and Gardner and Shute210 
concerning the nature of the wrongfulness of rape to construct an account of why killing to 
prevent rape may be morally permissible even in the absence of harm, for example where the 
victim is unconscious and never wakes up to learn of the assault. Leverick argues the wrong of 
rape is not tied to the particular physical or psychological harms that might be done. Instead, it 
is the denial of personhood inherent in the use of the victim as an object for the rapist’s 
gratification.211 Whilst, as Leverick acknowledges, many crimes involve the use of a victim for 
the offender’s own purposes, the social significance attached to the act of sexual penetration 
differentiates rape from those other offences.212 On Leverick’s account, this wrong 
approximates the wrong of killing, and so killing to prevent rape is justified.213  
Whether lethal force can really be justified to prevent rape absent the threat of significant 
physical harm is doubted here, but that sexual offences – especially rape – occupy a special 
position in society, and therefore in the criminal justice system, cannot be disputed. Leverick’s 
account may help to explain why; it also helps to explain why it is perhaps better to think in 
terms of violations than harms. In any case, this thesis is concerned with the moral 
permissibility of PD, not killing. As has been said, the peculiar harms of indeterminate 
sentences must be recognised, but people can leave custody and return to the community; 
indeed, as is argued later,214 there ought to be a presumption that they will be managed in the 
community, where possible, and that every opportunity to reduce their risk to facilitate that 
must be extended. There are parallels between self-defence and PD, but the considerations are 
not quite the same as when the action of terminating the existence of another is in 
contemplation. Further, self-defence is concerned with an attack in progress; PD, by definition, 
anticipates a future attack. We may have good reason to take the view that someone who rapes 
unconscious women presents a threat to society and, as has already been argued, if that belief 
is erroneous, it is morally permissible to require that the offender bear the burden of uncertainty. 
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Even if we did not believe that such a threat was posed, a substantial custodial sentence would 
still be warranted.  
Again, the construction of the trigger for defensive action as violation, rather than harm, only 
takes us so far: it remains necessary to decide which violations are sufficient since there are 
offences not of a sexual or violent nature that may result in a profound sense of violation. The 
issue of property offences raised by Floud and Young,  and Walker,215 must be addressed. Floud 
and Young give an example of a property offence that would satisfy both a potential harm, and 
a potential violation constraint: the theft of railway signalling wire.216 The case cited is R v 
Yardley,217 reported in 1968 and, whatever the detail of 1960s rail signalling operations, the 
extent to which it remains an appropriate example is doubtful. Although such thefts do still 
occur, Network Rail says that the network’s ‘fail safe’ infrastructure means their impact is 
largely confined to passenger inconvenience caused by delay.218 But whether it is just a matter 
of inconvenience – which even on a large scale, and even if considered a violation of sorts 
surely could not be thought to warrant PD in and of itself – or it really can lead to catastrophic 
injury, it is sufficient to support Floud and Young’s argument that blanket exclusion of property 
offences is neither necessary nor desirable. What matters is violation, not the manner in which 
it is accomplished so, on this account, at least in principle, a property offence that placed others 
at risk of serious harm could serve as a basis for an indeterminate sentence.  
The difficulty, after all these considerations, is that one is still left with the task of delineating 
scope and even when couched in terms of violation, this is extremely difficult to do without 
having at least some regard to the potential impact of those violations. If it were not for the 
recognition that the kinds of conduct discussed here would – apart from any special 
circumstances like that of the comatose rape victim – likely have  physical and/or psychological 
impacts, we would probably not regard them as violations. Prevention of harm is, ultimately, 
what we are concerned with. On that basis, it is submitted that the use of PD to prevent both 
physical and psychological harms resulting from personal violation is legitimate. In any case, 
it seems that in practical terms the focus of special sentences for dangerous offenders is on 
crimes against persons. For example, more than half the OLRs that have been made have been 
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imposed for sexual offences, the majority of the remainder having been imposed for violent 
offences; there is a small residual category of ‘other offences that endanger life’, those offences 
that are not serious in themselves, but demonstrate a propensity to go on to perpetrate serious 
offences in future.219 The nature of the offences that attract these orders is instructive as regards 
the nature of these sentences themselves, and is returned to later in the thesis.220 For the 
purposes of the present discussion, however, it is sufficient to note that the emphasis is firmly 
upon offences against persons.  
This is, it is submitted, the correct approach. Indeterminate sentences are the most burdensome 
punishments at the courts’ disposal entailing, as they do, the most serious abrogation of a 
person’s freedoms. It follows that it can only be morally permissible to subject someone to them 
in order to prevent the most serious violations of others. The expansion of categories of offence 
away from serious crimes against persons may be open to argument, but in establishing the 
parameters of a rationally defensible model of preventive sentencing it is appropriate to restrict 
the focus to serious violent and sexual offences, whilst allowing that property offences might 
exceptionally be included where they entail a significant threat of physical harm to others. 
Where psychological harm is what we are concerned with, this should be tied to the threat of 
violent or sexual offending. The rationale for this is: (1) because restricting PD to cases where 
there is a threat of physical violation tempers the lack of culpability-proportionality with threat-
proportionality – the most uncontroversially serious offences fall into this category; and (2) if 
the use of PD is not defensible in these cases, it certainly cannot be defensible in cases where 
such threat is not presented.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that violent and sexual offences vary in their seriousness, 
whatever the basis of the wrong. We cannot, therefore, as we have seen, delimit the use of PD 
by creating a list of offences to which it can apply. Besides,  as the MacLean Committee pointed 
out, that would deny the public protection where it was warranted, while simultaneously 
resulting in – potentially many – unnecessary detentions.221 How, then can we decide what is 
serious enough? It may be that the somewhat unsatisfactory answer is that we do it in the way 
the criminal justice system does this generally. Prosecutors and judges distinguish between 
severity of offences as a matter of course, deciding on what is charged on indictment or 
complaint; and what sentence is appropriate. The sorts of violations discussed here – rape, 
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including that of the comatose, “unharmed” victim, threatening someone with gun violence, 
threatening life and permanent physical impairment etc. – would all warrant substantial 
custodial sentences even if we did not consider that an indeterminate sentence was necessary. 
Any determination as to what ought to be included is bound to be somewhat arbitrary and to 
reflect intuition. There must, however, be some kind of seriousness threshold and perhaps the 
best we can do is to say that PD may be permissible where a substantial custodial sentence 
would otherwise be imposed upon conviction; at the very least, the offence must be serious 
enough for the offender to be sentenced by a court that has the power to impose an indeterminate 
sentence. That, however unsatisfactory, is the view taken here and it is returned to in chapter 
six: the alternative to holding that PD is sometimes permissible, is to hold it is never permissible 
and that, for reasons discussed in chapter two, is even less satisfactory. In holding that it is 
sometimes permissible, we must try to balance fairness to potential subjects of unjust PD, with 
fairness to potential victims of personal violation; that means making a choice constrained by 
our abilities to determine what is a sufficient threat. It has also been argued that some degree of 
over-inclusivity is appropriate, to the extent that we have a moral obligation to prefer the rights 
of potential victims over potential aggressors. In this we can claim assistance from two things: 
(1) the concept of the culpable creation of a burden that forces the choice that was discussed in 
chapter two; and (2) the concept of certainty, i.e., the knowledge we have of how likely a repeat 
offence of the relevant nature is. This was discussed above and is returned to now.  
3.4.2 ASSESSING THE RISK OF FUTURE OFFENDING 
In order for an offender to be deemed a dangerous offender, it is necessary to show that repeat 
criminal conduct threatens serious personal violation of the nature we would expect to result in 
physical and/or psychological harm. It would, however, be unjust if any risk of a serious 
violation was sufficient.222 We must have reason to believe the use of PD is necessary. The 
difficulty is in trying to articulate a standard that adequately constrains the use of PD, and still 
permits society to protect itself. It was said earlier that dangerousness does not depend on the 
accuracy of a prediction of future serious offending, but risk assessment cannot be ignored 
entirely for two reasons. First, because if past offences were sufficient then anyone who 
committed an offence of that type could be liable to PD – an approach that has already been 
rejected; and, secondly, because risk assessment has significant value in developing risk 
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management strategies for the offender.223 In other words, it can also help us identify cases in 
which measures short of PD may be sufficient. Detailed evaluation of different approaches to 
risk assessment is properly the domain of those with expertise in the application and 
development of risk assessment methods, and is the subject of an extensive literature.224 Some 
discussion is, however, warranted since in practice risk assessments inform decisions about 
detention and release, because there must be a standard, and to support later discussion of risk 
assessment in the OLR context.225 This section briefly covers actuarial and clinical methods of 
assessment before considering their role in the PD process.  
Floud and Young,226 and Walker,227 recognise that criticisms of risk assessment methodologies 
are not without merit. For Duff, the objection to the use of actuarial assessment in particular is 
a principled one. Actuarial instruments (ARAIs) use statistically derived probabilities to predict 
reoffending risk by assigning an individual to a group sharing certain factors that the tool weighs 
in a mathematical formula.228 They allow virtually no operator discretion. Being highly 
standardised, ARAIs have high inter-rater reliability,229 but they cannot identify which members 
of the group will go on to reoffend. According to a meta-analysis conducted by Stephen Hart et 
al. individual-level ARAI predictions are so unreliable ‘as to render the test results virtually 
meaningless’.230 In any case, Duff argues attribution of dangerous based on group membership 
is unjust.231 Risk assessments must be individualised, and they must be capable of informing 
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risk management practice,232 but if the evidence they produce is to be properly evaluated there 
must be some element of standardisation.233  
 (Unstructured) professional judgement is the most widely used method,234 emphasising 
assessor discretion and the circumstances of the individual. Lack of standardisation, however, 
means inter-rater reliability is the lowest of any approach and, though it is difficult to evaluate 
accuracy of predictions, it appears error rates are extremely high.235 Structured Professional 
Judgement (SPJ) aims to address that by utilising standardised assessment tools.236 The 
development of SPJ  has accompanied a shift away from assessing risk in terms of binary 
prediction as to whether someone will or will not offend.237 Its efficacy is therefore not 
considered in those terms, but on whether graded attribution of risk level is defensible. Someone 
might, for example, be classed as high, medium, or low risk of violent/sexual (re)offending.238 
This is discussed in more detail later.  SPJ retains the individual focus of UPJ, but – while 
numerical accuracy values are not generally assigned – inter-rater agreement on risk level is 
higher than that associated with UPJ predictions.239 Crucially, since SPJ considers dynamic (i.e. 
modifiable) risk factors,240 it is capable of informing interventions and therefore supports risk 
management planning. For these reasons, the approach prescribed by the RMA for the 
assessment of individuals considered for an OLR is structured professional judgement (SPJ).241 
Walker’s ‘forthright, if arbitrary’ proposal is that PD be considered justified where an assessor 
regards that an individual is more likely than not to reoffend. 242 He argues that there is no moral 
wrong in engaging PD provided that decision is grounded in the best practices of which we are 
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capable.243 It is generally accepted amongst clinicians that risk assessment is ‘is a highly fallible 
undertaking’ and that this should be acknowledged explicitly.244 As such, the professional 
consensus appears to be that the emphasis should be on defensible practice, rather than on 
predictions which are right or wrong.245 To be considered defensible, the decision must be 
reasonable which, according to Carson, is a decision that a ‘responsible body of co-
professionals would have made’.246 For Murray and Thomson, the primary objective should be 
to identify ways of managing and reducing risk which is ultimately in the offender’s interests.247 
An indeterminate sentence must be a last resort; risk assessment must be able to identify where 
measures short of PD will be sufficient.248 Even if the conclusion reached is that PD is 
necessary, risk assessment informs opportunities that may be extended to the offender to help 
him rehabilitate. This is absolutely central to any ethically defensible model of PD: if the 
offender’s exercise of autonomy is the basis of his detention, then he must be afforded 
opportunities to choose to reduce his risk.249 On this basis, it is submitted that we should not 
conceptualise “accuracy” in numerical terms, such as Walker’s 51%. Rather, PD should be 
considered morally permissible where, on the basis of defensible practice, it is concluded that 
an indeterminate sentence is necessary to manage the offender’s risk. This will be returned to 
in chapter six. 
3.4.3 CONCLUSION TO SECTION 3.4 
 
This section has argued that PD should be restricted to cases where serious violations that risk 
physical and/or psychological harm to members of the public is threatened. Although some 
theorists have suggested that offences against property (without the accompanying threat to the 
person) might cause sufficient psychological harm to warrant PD, this was rejected. 
Indeterminate sentences should generally be reserved for serious crimes against persons, and 
in these cases the distinction between physical and psychological harm becomes immaterial.  
At the point that an offender is to be sentenced to PD, the harms of that sentence are certain; 
as such, it follows that some degree of certainty of serious violent or sexual recidivism should 
 
243 Ibid, 4. 
244 Kemshall (2002), 21. 
245 D. Carson, ‘Risking Legal Repercussions’ in H. Kemshall and J. Pritchard (Eds.) Good Practice in Risk 
Assessment and Risk Management Vol. 1 (London, 1996), 4. 
246 Ibid.  
247 Murray and Thomson (2010), 133. 
248 Duff (1998), 162. 
249 Ibid, 159. This is returned to below.  
 92 
be required. “Accuracy” of risk assessment ought not to be considered in numerical terms, but 
on the defensibility of determinations about the level of intervention necessary to protect the 
public. Beyond the decision to inform sentence, risk assessment supports risk management and 
provides a more individualised approach than sentencing based on a conviction alone. It offers 
an opportunity to establish whether an indeterminate sentence is truly necessary, and to 
formulate options for rehabilitation so that an offender, when detained, may be given the 
chance to address his risk. 
The thesis has so far considered the theoretical basis for PD, arguing that it is best understood 
as the exercise of societal self-defence against a culpable individual. Key concepts were then 
addressed with a view to delineating the scope defensible use of PD; this included an 
exploration of the concept of the dangerous offender, the nature of harms we might legitimately 
use PD to prevent, and the role of risk assessment in the PD process. Section 3.5 below draws 
the discussion together to sketch out a workable analytical model of PD which respects, so far 
as possible, the requirements that have been set out. The chapter then concludes before detailed 
consideration of the OLR, its development, and supporting framework begins.  
3.5 DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, SOCIETAL SELF-DEFENCE, 
AND THE PRESUMPTION OF HARMLESSNESS 
In the last chapter, it was argued that PD is best conceptualised as an exercise of societal self-
defence which becomes permissible when a credible threat of serious harm to others is 
communicated by the offender.250 In these circumstances, we can no longer presume that the 
offender will refrain from action likely to cause harm and can take action to protect ourselves 
from his behaviour. This presumption of harmlessness is a theoretical construct which is 
intended to explain why people generally are, and ought to be, permitted to go about their 
business without interference: they have a right to be regarded as responsible moral agents, and 
not as potential attackers.251 The presumption of harmlessness is not irrebuttable, and is capable 
of being forfeited by an offender who chooses to harm others. Bartlett,252 whose account of PD 
as ‘extended’ self-defence is set out in part 2.7, stops short of equating the rebuttal or forfeiture 
 
250 Section 2.7. 
251 See, for example, Barnett (1996), 157; Walker (1996), 7; Duff (1998), 152; Redmayne (2015), 268; and the 
Floud Report, 44. 
252 Ibid. 
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of the right to be presumed harmless directly with a forfeiture of the right to a proportionate 
sentence. However, an argument of this nature is advanced by Walen who contends that an 
offender who perpetrates one or more serious offences may justifiably be subject to ‘long term 
preventive detention’ on the grounds he can no longer be considered to be law-abiding.253 For 
the reasons discussed above though, that is considered here to be too large a leap: something 
more than a conviction for an offence of a given type is necessary. As Walker points out, a 
rebuttal of the presumption of harmlessness creates a right to deviate from the principle of 
proportionate sentencing, not a duty,254 and this is one of the reasons why an extra step in the 
form of an individualised risk assessment is necessary.  
The presumption of harmlessness is useful because it not only explains why people should, as 
a matter of principle, not be preventively detained, but it is also capable of supporting 
derogations from that principle in certain cases. Ashworth and Zedner have, however, 
suggested that, although the presumption of harmlessness and the presumption of innocence 
are distinct principles, the operation of the former has implications for the latter.255 It appears 
that they consider the rebuttal of the presumption of harmlessness to amount to the attribution 
of a general criminal character that is divorced from the context of particular offences; the 
presumption of innocence could therefore be undermined by presuming that the accused will 
harm others, and detracting from the requirement that the prosecution prove the elements of 
the offence.256 They argue that ‘every positive risk assessment constitutes a denial of the 
presumption of harmlessness and that denial cannot easily be squared with the right to be 
presumed innocent of future crimes’.257 
The problem with this, as they acknowledge, is that the two presumptions relate to different 
things. The presumption of innocence relates to past behaviour that the individual is accused 
of; and the presumption of harmlessness relates to what may be done in the future.258 A claim 
that someone, by his own past conduct, has lost the right to require that others presume him 
harmless does not amount to a claim that he will have acted harmfully in any future case where 
is accused of doing so, nor does it obviate the need for proof beyond reasonable doubt in any 
 
253 A. Walen, ‘A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: Lost Status as a Foundation for a Lost 
Immunity’, (2011) 48 San Diego Law Review 1299. 
254 Walker (1996), 7. 
255 L. Zedner, ‘Erring on the Side of Safety: Risk Assessment, Expert Knowledge, and the Criminal Court’, in 
D. Sullivan (Ed.) Seeking Security: Pre-empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Oxford, 2012), 223; 
Ashworth and Zedner (2014), 131. 
256 Zedner (2012), 223; Ashworth and Zedner (2014), 131-132. 
257 Ashworth and Zedner, ibid, 132. 
258 Ibid. 
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particular case.259 It has been suggested that, since the presumption of harmlessness does not 
relate to past offending, the sufficiency of non-criminal conduct for its rebuttal is open to 
argument,260 but that is not what is being suggested here. Nor does it appear to have been 
proposed elsewhere.261 The accounts of the presumption of harmlessness discussed here all 
require that convictions are the basis of a rebuttal.262  
The requirement for past offences of the kind we are concerned to prevent matters for two 
reasons. First, because it demonstrates a choice made by the offender to violate others: he has 
the opportunity to avoid being considered dangerous – and therefore to avoid indeterminate 
detention – by choosing to refrain from such offending;263 and second, because, as was argued 
in the previous chapter, PD imposed to prevent voluntary conduct is punishment and therefore 
only ever warranted when an offence has been committed. The presumption of harmlessness 
must be actively forfeited; it cannot be dispensed with on the grounds of suspicion alone.264 
The offender has forced us to make a decision as to whether to allow him the opportunity to 
continue presenting a threat to others, or to detain him: if we arrive at the conclusion that he 
can no longer be considered to be harmless, that is his fault, and it is reasonable to require him 
to bear the burden of uncertainty as to how he will conduct himself in the future.265 All these 
things considered, the following section sets out a conceptual model of PD that is ethically 
defensible, and will serve as the foundation for critical analysis of the procedural framework 
in the remainder of the thesis. 
3.5.1 AN ETHICALLY DEFENSIBLE MODEL OF PREVENTIVE 
DETENTION 
The analytical model which is proposed here is based on the discussion in chapters two and 
three. PD imposed to prevent repeated voluntary, and likely harmful criminal violation, is 
punishment and should therefore only be imposed following a conviction.  However, people 
have the right to be treated as rationally autonomous individuals; this entails extending them 
the opportunity to direct and modify their own conduct and, in turn, creates a general 
 
259 Walen (2011), 1233. 
260 Redmayne (2015), 268; Zedner (2012), 221. 
261 Though acquittals and unsubstantiated allegations are considered when an order for lifelong restriction is 
under consideration: see section 5.4.3. 
262 Redmayne (2015), 268; Duff (1998), 159 – 162; Walker (1972), 170; Floud Report, 44; Walen (2011), 1232. 
263 Redmayne (2015), 268; Duff (1998),155. 
264 Duff, ibid; Walker (1998), 7. 
265 Barnett (1996), 165; and the discussion at 2.7. 
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requirement that punishments should be proportionate. When indeterminate sentences are 
imposed, that requirement is not adhered to. This is only permissible in the context of a very 
small minority of offenders who threaten serious harm to others. They must be repeat offenders 
who have been convicted of a serious violent or sexual offence, though that need not be the 
index offence. An indeterminate sentence may be imposed in respect of less serious offences 
provided they indicate, taken alongside the ‘gold standard’ of ethically defensible risk 
assessment, an offender requires PD to prevent him from future serious violation. ‘Serious’ 
should be understood to refer to physical and psychological harm that will, or is likely to, result 
from the offender’s criminal conduct, and ought to be determined in the way that greater and 
lesser offences are determined in the criminal justice system generally, i.e., by the range of 
sentences they (aside from PD) would warrant.  
The role of individual risk assessment is to consider the degree of risk the offender presents, 
and if PD is necessary to manage it. If it is found that the offender is likely to choose to cause 
harm to others in the future absent an indeterminate sentence, then he can no longer claim the 
right to be presumed harmless, and society is entitled to defend itself from the threat he 
presents. There does, of course, remain uncertainty: we can never know what someone will or 
will not do in the future and, as was acknowledged above, most serious violent and sexual 
offenders do not repeat those offences. The decision to risk either detaining someone 
indefinitely unnecessarily, or of permitting harm to come to future victims is an unenviable 
one. It does remain the case that the best predictor of future violent offending is a history of 
violent offending, and therefore the requirement for repetition serves the purpose of mitigating 
that uncertainty somewhat.266 Grounding the right of societal self-defence on the forfeiture 
through criminal conduct of the presumption of harmlessness allows redistribution of the 
burden of uncertainty in favour of potential victims.  
The offender has chosen to perpetrate serious offences and has elected to run the risk that it 
will be considered likely he will do it again; potential victims have no choice in the matter and 
so, it is submitted, it is reasonable that the burden of the uncertainty falls on the person whose 
conduct has forced the decision. Such detention might be considered to be justified, or 
alternatively we might, as some theorists have suggested, take the view that fault of the offender 
excuses an erroneous finding of dangerousness; but, as discussed in chapter two the decision 
has been taken here to use the language of moral permissibility.267 This better reflects the nature 
 
266 Duff (1998), 141. 
267 See section 2.7.2. 
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of the decision as to whether or not to preventively detain: like the assessment of risk, it is less 
a matter of right and wrong, and more about establishing a principled approach to identifying 
the least morally objectionable of the options available. It is submitted that adopting a 
framework that views indeterminate sentencing as a form of societal self-defence, and to which 
the exercise of the offender’s free agency is central, accomplishes this so far as is possible.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER THREE 
This chapter has discussed the concepts of dangerousness and risk, and their development into 
modern concepts which describe the persons, harms, and violations that may be the subject of 
indeterminate sentencing. It was argued that the concept of the dangerous offender was, despite 
some suggestions to the contrary, possessed of some substance: it describes people whose 
repeated violations of the rights of others is the subject of concern to the public. Specifically, 
‘dangerous persons’ are now considered to be repeat perpetrators of serious violent and sexual 
offences, who are regarded as likely to continue to offend. Dangerousness is not, in itself a trait 
or characteristic of a person; instead it is a combination of personality and environmental 
circumstances which place an individual at high-risk of serious violent and sexual offending, 
and potential victims at risk of serious harm. A conviction for such an offence must be part of 
the offender’s criminal history before it is ethically permissible to consider PD. In addition, 
any offender for whom an indeterminate sentence is being contemplated should be subject to 
an individualised risk assessment that is capable both of providing an estimate of the likelihood 
of repeat serious offending, and of informing risk management strategies. Although the 
predictive element might be wrong, the risk assessment has value in that it may identify 
protective factors which suggest the offender’s risk can be managed adequately without PD, or 
form the basis of interventions which extend the offender’s opportunity to reduce the risk he 
presents while detained. Finally, the discussions in chapters two and three were drawn together 
to propose an analytical model in which indeterminate sentencing is regarded as an exercise of 
a right of societal self-defence. The right arises when the offender forfeits his right to be 
presumed harmless. Because his choices to harm others are the basis of that forfeiture, it is 
morally permissible to require him to carry the burden of any uncertainty about his future 
conduct. Finally, the issues surrounding dangerousness, risk, and PD are as complex as they 
are controversial, and no claim to have resolved that is made here. Instead the objective has 
been to construct a theoretical framework that is morally defensible and capable of supporting 
an analysis of the OLR which, as was said earlier, is Scotland’s only risk-based indeterminate 
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prison sentence.  The next chapter begins this process with a detailed account of the background 




4. THE DANGEROUS OFFENDER SENTENCING 
FRAMEWORK: BACKGROUND AND 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER FOUR 
The previous chapter discussed the development of the concepts of dangerousness and risk in 
the context of offending behaviour. It was argued that only those who have been convicted of 
a serious violent or sexual offence, or an attempted serious violent or sexual offence, are 
properly considered candidates for preventive detention. It must then be established, to the best 
of our present abilities, that the individual is liable to reoffend such that serious physical or 
psychological harm would be caused to members of the public if not prevented by detention. 
Before considering the detail of the law governing the imposition of sentences of preventive 
detention in Scotland, and the extent to which it complies with the requirements set out in the 
theoretical framework in chapters two and three, it is necessary to consider the background to 
the legislative reforms that brought it into being.  
Most of the primary provisions governing the imposition of sentences of imprisonment and 
detention are found in the 1995 Act. As regards the sentencing of dangerous offenders, the 
most significant amendments to the 1995 Act were made by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) 
Act 2003 (‘the CJ(S)A 2003’) which introduced the OLR. These provisions are discussed in 
detail in chapters five and six. Also in 2003, the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (the 1984 
Act) was largely replaced by the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 
(MHA 2003) with implications for the management of mentally disordered offenders. 
Although the OLR and the mental health disposals are heavily orientated towards the 
protection of the public they are, in theory at least, targeted at different offender groups. The 
primary difference between them is that the OLR is a sentence of imprisonment, and the 
primary mental health disposal for mentally disordered offenders requiring treatment – the 
CORO – is a sentence of detention in hospital for treatment of mental disorder under conditions 
of security in lieu of imprisonment. However, these orders are, it is contended, best 
conceptualised as part of the same preventive regime. As is discussed below, the OLR – though 
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functioning as a replacement for the discretionary life sentence (DLS) that preceded it1– was 
developed in order to fill a perceived gap in the 1995 Act’s forensic mental health provisions2 
as they applied to offenders with personality disorder. This “loophole” was brought to light by 
a high-profile challenge to the provisions which governed the release of patients subject to the 
restricted hospital orders which preceded, but were similar to, the CORO as it is now.3 This is 
why the CORO is an alternative to an OLR in certain circumstances.4  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to place the legislation in its political and public 
policy context so that the aims and objectives underpinning these orders may be identified and 
examined. Second, it permits the evolution of the OLR from the pre-existing framework which 
was largely concerned with the detention of mental disorder, to be demonstrated. This latter 
point is of some significance since the literature concerning the OLR is fairly small, and largely 
descriptive. Notable exceptions include the works of McSherry and Keyzer,5 Gailey et al.,6 and 
Darjee and Crichton.7 These evaluate the OLR against models of preventive detention for sex 
offenders in different jurisdictions; critique its operation over the first decade of its 
implementation; and compare it to the explicitly personality disorder-focused programme that 
was operating in England and Wales at the time of the OLR’s creation,8 respectively. At the 
time of writing, and as indicated in the introduction to the thesis, there has been no attempt to 
produce a detailed analytical account of the OLR in its own context alongside other disposals 
such as the extended sentence and the CORO. The starting point for this must be a consideration 
of the rationale for, and circumstances, of its creation. This, in turn, requires fairly substantial 
consideration of mental health law as it applied to people convicted of offences prior to the 
OLR’s coming into being.  
 
1 The DLS has not been a competent disposal since the OLR became available: s. 210G; McIntosh v HM 
Advocate 2016 S.C.L. 923.  
2 The provisions which permit the detention in hospital and/or treatment of an offender, or in some cases an 
offender who has been acquitted. These orders are made by the criminal courts rather than by way of a doctor’s 
application to the Mental Health Tribunal for Scotland. See section 4.2 below. 
3 Ruddle v The Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 G.W.D. 29 – 1395 (Sh. Ct.). This case is discussed in detail 
below.  
4 See section 6.4.2.B.  
5 McSherry and Keyzer (2015), 99 – 102. 
6 Gailey et al. (2017). 
7 Darjee and Crichton (2002). Although this relates to the proposals for the order rather than the order as 
implemented it represents the earliest critical literature on the OLR. 
8 The Dangerous Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) Programme, which later became enmeshed in the heavily 
criticised, and later abandoned, imprisonment for public protection (IPP) scheme. See, for example, P.E. 
Mullen, ‘Dangerous (and severe personality disorder) and in need of treatment’, (2007) 190:S49 British Journal 
of Psychiatry s3; Maden (2008); and P. Tyrer et al. ‘The successes and failures of the DSPD experiment: the 
assessment and management of severe personality disorder’, (2010) 50 Medicine, Science, and the Law 95.  
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This chapter describes the background to the creation of the OLR, giving detailed consideration 
to the substantial role of the Report of the MacLean Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual 
Offenders.9 Some discussion of the Millan Committee on the reform of the Mental Health 
(Scotland) Act 198410 is also undertaken, since certain of its recommendations pertained to the 
management of high-risk offenders. Part 4.2 considers the law as it stood prior to the substantial 
reforms that resulted in the legislative framework as it presently exists. Part 4.3 considers the 
challenges to the old law that triggered the reform process, whilst 4.4 describes the emergency 
legislation that served as a stop-gap measure until a more permanent solution to the problem 
could be proposed by the working groups commissioned to reform the law. The relevant 
recommendations of the MacLean and Millan Committees are outlined in section 4.5, and the 
reception of those reports is considered briefly in section 4.6. Finally, the chapter concludes in 
section 4.7 before the thesis turns to detailed consideration of the OLR sentencing framework 
as it presently stands in chapters five and six. 
4.2 THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Before 2003, the 1995 Act contained – as it does now – most of the key provisions on the 
sentencing of offenders,11 including those to be made subject to mental health disposals. Whilst 
the mental health orders themselves were made under the 1995 Act, most of the provisions 
regarding the effect of the mental health orders, and the roles, responsibilities, and requirements 
for discharging functions in relation to those orders, were found in the Mental Health 
(Scotland) Act 1984.12  There was no equivalent to the OLR at this stage. Although the High 
Court had the power to pass a discretionary life sentence (DLS) in cases for which there was 
no statutorily imposed maximum penalty, the DLS differed significantly from the OLR in terms 
of pre-sentence procedures and in its operation.13 There is little to be said of the DLS here 
except to note that, whilst it appears that in practice it was used for broadly the same offender 
 
9 R. MacLean, Report of the Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders (Edinburgh, 2000) 
10 B. Millan, New Directions: Report on the Review of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (Edinburgh, 2001) 
11 As amended, most notably for the purposes of the present discussion, by the Prisoners and Criminal 
Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993, and the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997, although these 
amendments are concerned more with release or discharge from custody than with the imposition of sentence.  
12 The Millan Committee (see below) considered whether this arrangement should continue, or whether all 
mental health orders should be contained within one Act or other. The Committee decided to continue the 
division between the Acts.  
13 Specifically, the need for a standardised risk assessment process to be followed, and the manner in which 
post-release supervision is intended to take place. See chapter 5 for a detailed consideration of these processes. 
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group as the OLR,14 its use was considered to be based on inadequate sentencing procedures,15 
and it was not thought to allow for an appropriately intensive level of management for the 
highest-risk offenders.16 For offenders with mental disorder requiring treatment, the 1995 Act 
made provision for a range of interim orders and final disposals that would see an offender 
detained – sometimes indefinitely – in hospital, and which could authorise treatment for mental 
disorder during the period of that detention. For the purposes of the present discussion, only 
the hospital order with restrictions (HORO) is of interest.  
The HORO was comprised of two orders: the hospital order (HO) which could stand alone; 
and the restriction order (RO) which could only be made with a HO.17 The HO was available 
under section 58 of the 1995 Act18 in respect of offenders convicted in the High Court or the 
sheriff court19 of an offence other than murder, punishable by imprisonment.20 The effect of 
the hospital order was that, rather than being sent to prison, the offender was admitted to 
hospital on much the same basis as if he were subject to the civil commitment provisions that 
would apply to a non-offender.21 Before making a  hospital order the court required to take 
account of the oral or written evidence of two medical practitioners approved to discharge 
duties under the 1984 Act.22 This evidence had to satisfy the court that the criteria for detention 
in section 17(1)23 of the 1984 Act were met.24 These criteria were that the offender was 
suffering from a mental disorder, the nature or degree of which made it appropriate for him to 
receive medical treatment for it in a hospital;25 that the treatment was necessary for the health 
or safety of the offender or for the protection of other people, and that it could not be provided 
if he were not detained under the Act.26  
Mental disorder was defined simply as ‘mental illness or mental handicap however caused or 
manifested’27 with no further definition of the terms mental illness or mental handicap offered. 
 
14 MacLean Report, 27, para. 4.10. 
15 Ibid, 28, para. 4.14. 
16 Ibid, 16, para. 3.1. 
17 The relationship between the HO and RO and the compulsion order (CO) and RO as it is now is virtually 
identical and will be discussed further later.  
18 References to section 58 of the 1995 Act refer to the version in force from September 1999 until March 2002 
unless otherwise specified.  
19 s. 58(1).  
20 s. 58(1)(a). 
21 1984 Act, s. 60 as in force from April 1996 until March 2002. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Version in force from January 1998 until October 2005. 
24 s. 58(1)(a)(i). 
25 1984 Act, s. 17(1)(a). 
26 s. 17(1)(b).  
27 1984 Act, s. 1(2). 
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The definition was amended by the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 
1999 to emphasise that mental illness was considered inclusive of personality disorder,28 
however detention of persons with certain types of personality disorder was possible prior to 
this amendment. Special provision already existed for those whose mental disorder was ‘a 
persistent one manifested only by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct’.29 
In these cases, the court required to be satisfied that medical treatment was available for the 
individual that would improve, or prevent deterioration of, his condition.30 This ‘treatability’ 
test pertained to what might be termed antisocial or dissocial personality disorder, or 
psychopathy31 and reflected a sense of therapeutic pessimism prevalent in Scotland at the 
time.32 The presumption was that individuals with this form of personality disorder could not 
be treated effectively,33 and therefore there was a need to establish that a particular offender 
represented an exception.34 Once satisfied that the criteria for detention under the 1984 Act 
were met, the court required also to be satisfied that the order was the most appropriate 
disposal. ‘Appropriateness’ was determined with reference to the nature of the offender’s 
mental disorder, his history, his character and the other options for disposal of the case.35 
Questions about the operation of the treatability and appropriateness tests applied at the point 
of detention, and their interaction with provisions governing discharge of a patient subject to a 
hospital order and a restriction order, would later give rise to the appeal which ultimately led 
to the introduction of the OLR. 36   
Ordinarily the hospital order would remain in effect for a period of six months, after which it 
would be renewable for 12 months at a time until the offender was discharged by his 
responsible medical officer (his psychiatrist), the Mental Welfare Commission, or by a sheriff 
following a successful appeal against the order.37 If, however, the offender was found to present 
 
28 1999 Act, s. 3. 
29 s. 17(1)(a)(i). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Reid v The Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 S.C. (H.L.) 17. 
32 See, for example L.D.G. Thomson, ‘Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997: relevant provisions for 
people with mental disorders’, (1999) 23 Psychiatric Bulletin 68, at 68 and 69; and R. Darjee et al. ‘Crime and 
Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997: a survey of psychiatrists’ views concerning the Scottish ‘hybrid order’’, 
(2000) 11(3) Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 608. 
33 R. Darjee et al. (2000).  
34 This situation could arise where an offender’s personality disorder is capable of giving rise to psychotic 
episodes of short duration; these episodes may then subside, or be successfully treated, whilst leaving an 
offender subject to psychiatric control. The hospital direction was introduced, in part, to address this difficulty – 
see the discussions below on Reid v The Secretary of State for Scotland, and the hospital direction. 
35 s. 58(1)(b) of the 1995 Act. 
36 Reid v The Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 S.C. (H.L.) 17.  
37 These arrangements were similar to those pertaining to civil commitment under Part V of the 1984 Act, 
although there was no right of discharge that could be exercised by the nearest relative.  
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a high-risk, and also made subject to a restriction order, the hospital order would continue 
without limit of time and only the Secretary of State could authorise the patient’s discharge, 
transfer or a period of leave.38 The restriction order made under section 5939 of the 1995 Act 
as it was prior to the substantial amendments to the legislative framework in 2003 differs little 
from the order available under section 59 as presently in force, and it is returned to briefly in  
section  6.5.2.B of the thesis. However, it should be noted at this stage that the restriction order 
was (and is) attached to the mental health disposal on the basis of risk of serious harm to the 
public;40 it has never existed as an order in its own right, and therefore if the criteria for 
detention under a hospital order (now a compulsion order) are no longer met, and the patient 
appeals successfully on this basis, the restriction order must also be revoked.41 This means that 
the patient must be discharged. In other words, the public protective function of the restriction 
order is dependent for its effect on the criteria for the relevant mental health order continuing 
to be met. This was established in the case of Reid v The Secretary of State for Scotland,42 
which is discussed in section 4.3 below. 
4.3 THE “LOOPHOLE” IN THE LAW 
The case of Reid concerned an appeal against refusal of an application under section 64 of the 
1984 Act for discharge from a HORO. Mr Reid was a patient at the State Hospital and had 
been detained there since the orders were imposed on him in 1967 following his conviction for 
culpable homicide. A succession of challenges followed this refusal, with the final appeal being 
heard in the House of Lords in 1998. At the point of his initial detention, Reid had been 
diagnosed as suffering from ‘mental handicap’ which satisfied the criteria for detention under 
the 1984 Act.43 During the course of his detention, however, it emerged that he was instead 
suffering from what the Act termed ‘a persistent [disorder] manifested only by abnormally 
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct’.44 Stated shortly, he was, as Lord Lloyd put it, a 
psychopath.45 This was critical since section 17 required that, in a case where the individual’s 
mental disorder was a personality disorder of the type from which Reid suffered, it had to be 
 
38 s. 59(1) of the 1995 Act; and s. 62(1)(b) of the 1984 Act (as in force from January 1998 until October 2005). 
39 As in force between January 1996 and March 2002. 
40 s. 59(1). 
41 s. 64(1). 
42 1999 S.C. (H.L.) 17. 
43 s. 17(1)(a)(i).  
44 Ibid, s. 17(1)(a)(ii). 
45 Reid, at 19. 
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the opinion of two appropriately qualified medical practitioners that treatment was available 
which could ameliorate its effects or prevent the patient’s deterioration.46 This was in addition 
to the general requirements that the mental disorder be of a nature and degree that rendered 
treatment in hospital appropriate47 and necessary for health or safety of the individual, or for 
the safety of other people.48 The difficulty was that the discharge provisions in section 64 did 
not mirror these.  
An application for discharge would result in a conditional discharge under section 64(2) where 
the sheriff was satisfied detention was either no longer appropriate,49 or no longer necessary50 
in the terms of section 17(1), but was not satisfied that recall to hospital for continued treatment 
would be unnecessary in the future.51 If the sheriff was satisfied as to the first and second 
grounds, and also satisfied that continued liability to recall was not appropriate, an absolute 
discharge would be granted.52 The sticking point was the apparent lack of an equivalent of the 
section 17 treatability criterion in section 64. The Court, however, found that the 
appropriateness test in section 64 by its nature must incorporate the treatability test since, in 
cases where treatability was at issue (i.e. cases in which the subject of the order had a 
personality disorder of the type defined in section 17), the question of treatability had to be 
considered by the judge before he could reach a determination about the appropriateness of 
making the order. Their Lordships, however, defined ‘treatment’ broadly such that the routine, 
and nature of the interaction which took place in the State Hospital between patients and staff, 
could be considered therapeutic if they led to a reduction in the symptoms of the disorder, such 
as violent and aggressive outbursts. If, however, no therapeutic benefit at all was evident, then 
the discharge was to be absolute rather than conditional, on the basis that there would be no 
purpose in recalling the offender to hospital since such a detention could not be considered 
appropriate.53 Reid was once again refused discharge based on the sheriff’s initial finding that 
the hospital environment was indeed controlling his symptoms. However, the impact of the 
decision was far reaching in that it rendered the detention of personality disordered offenders 
 
46 s. 17(1)(a)(ii) of the 1984 Act. 
47 s. 17(1)(a). 
48 s. 17(1)(b) of the 1984 Act.  
49 s. 64(1)(a) of the 1984 Act. 
50 s. 64(1)(b). 
51 s. 64(1)(c). 
52 s. 64(1). 
53 Reid, at 32. 
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of this type unlawful past the point that their disorder’s lack of amenability to treatment became 
apparent. 
The following year, Noel Ruddle – who had a personality disorder and who, like Reid, was 
detained in the State Hospital following a conviction for culpable homicide – applied for, and 
was granted, absolute discharge on the grounds that his condition was not treatable.54 The 
distinction between the two cases was that, whereas the sheriff found that the behaviour 
stemming from Mr Reid’s personality disorder was improved by his detention in a therapeutic 
environment,55 Mr Ruddle derived no discernible benefit from the structure and routine of the 
State Hospital at all.56 It was a high-profile case57 that prompted the Scottish Office to establish 
a working group on serious violent and sexual offenders,58 and the newly reconvened Scottish 
Parliament to pass emergency legislation to close the “loophole”. This legislation is discussed 
in section 4.4 below. 
4.4 THE EMERGENCY LEGISLATION 
The Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999 (‘the 1999 Act’) was the 
first piece of legislation to be passed by the new Scottish Parliament and was granted Royal 
Assent in September of that year. It amended section 64 of the 1984 Act to require that the 
sheriff, in considering a restricted patient’s application for discharge, refuse the application in 
any case where he was satisfied that the patient’s continued detention in hospital was necessary 
for the protection of the public from serious harm.59 Where the patient was found to present 
such a risk, there would be no need to consider questions of appropriateness or treatability as 
before.60 This public safety test was therefore to take precedence over other considerations 
when contemplating a restricted patient’s discharge. The Act attracted widespread criticism, 
 
54 Ruddle v The Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 G.W.D. 29 – 1395 (Sh. Ct.). 
55 Reid, at 33.  
56 Ruddle at para. 10.4 
57 See, for example: BBC News, ‘Legal loophole murderer freed’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/410054.stm). 
Published 2/8/1999. Accessed 17/11/2020; also The Journal Online – ‘The Ruddle Case: the lawyer’s view’ 
(http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/44-10/1001722.aspx#.VQSfFcZ9vdk). Published 1/10/1999. 
Accessed 17/11/2020. Here, Mr Ruddle’s solicitor describes the media interest and her treatment at the hands of 
the press in the wake of the case. The author of the article is unnamed, but is presumably Yvonne McKenna, 
who represented a series of patients detained in the State Hospital, including Noel Ruddle – see The Daily 
Record Online, ‘The Stalker of Hollywood’ (http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/the-stalker-of-
hollywood-984544). Published 23/7/2008. Accessed 17/11/2020.  
58 The MacLean Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders. See section 4.5 below. 
59 s. 1 of the 1999 Act. 
60 MHA 1984, s. 64(1A) inserted by the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999, s. 1(1).  
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with the Faculty of Advocates, the Law Society of Scotland, the Scottish Association for 
Mental Health, the State Hospitals Board, and the Royal College of Psychiatrists expressing 
concerns about the scope of the legislation.61 The consensus was that where the state was to 
detain a person solely on risk grounds, its coercive power should be exercised through the 
criminal justice system and not mental health legislation.62  
As well as being the first piece of legislation produced by the new Scottish Parliament, the 
1999 Act was also the first of its Acts to face legal challenge. In Anderson v the Scottish 
Ministers,63 the three appellants, who were patients at the State Hospital, argued that the Act 
was in violation of Article 5 of the ECHR, and was therefore outwith the Parliament’s 
competence. Article 5(1)(e) which provides for ‘the lawful detention of persons…of unsound 
mind…’ did not, they contended, encompass circumstances in which there was no intention to 
provide medical treatment and no expectation that medical treatment would be of benefit.64 
There were two key questions for the House of Lords. The first was whether the 1999 Act met 
the three requirements for the detention of mentally disordered individuals that had previously 
been laid down by the ECtHR in Winterwerp v The Netherlands,65 and restated in X v The 
United Kingdom:66 
[1] the individual concerned must be reliably shown to be of unsound mind, 
that is to say, a true mental disorder must be established before a competent 
authority on the basis of objective medical expertise; [2] the mental disorder 
must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; and [3] the 
validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a 
disorder.  
The second was whether, when read in conjunction with Article 18 which restricts the rights 
and freedoms provided for in the Convention to their intended purposes, Article 5(1)(e) was 
capable of permitting the detention of a person with a mental disorder in circumstances where 
there was no intention to provide medical treatment, and no expectation that such treatment 
 
61 B. Millan, New Directions: Report on the Review of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (Edinburgh, 
2001), 343, para. 13. (‘the Millan Report’.) 
62 Ibid, 342, para. 12.  
63 2001 S.L.T. 1331. 
64 Anderson v the Scottish Ministers, para. 28. 
65 (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 387. Here, a patient detained under Dutch mental health legislation alleged that his 
detention breached his rights under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. The facts are of little relevance to the 
present discussion, however in deciding the case the Court laid down the criteria which must be met in order for 
detention of ‘persons of unsound mind’ to comply with Article 5. Interestingly, the court declined to define 
‘unsound mind’, instead accepting that it was an evolving construct which would be redefined as medical 
knowledge developed. For a discussion of this see J. Bindman et al. ‘The Human Rights Act and mental health 
legislation’ (2003) 182:2 British Journal of Psychiatry 91.  
66 X v the United Kingdom (1981) 4 E.H.R.R. 188 at 43, restating Winterwerp at 39. 
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would be of benefit were it to be provided. Their Lordships answered both questions in the 
affirmative. Previously, the ECtHR had recognised protection of the public and protection of 
the individual patient as legitimate grounds for detention of persons with mental disorder.67 
The House of Lords therefore concluded that detention solely on the grounds of risk to the 
safety of the public was, where the Winterwerp criteria were met, compatible with Article 5.  
Although the 1999 Act was designed as a stop-gap measure until a more comprehensive 
legislative response to the management of high-risk offenders had been formulated, the 
judgment in Anderson remains of significance. In the wake of Reid and Ruddle, the Scottish 
Office had established a Committee, chaired by Lord MacLean, to review the law regarding 
the management of serious violent and sexual offenders and to make recommendations for 
future legislation.68 At the same time, a review of the MHA 1984 was taking place by a 
committee chaired by Bruce Millan.69 However, as their Lordships in Anderson recognised,70 
neither of the Committees was able to find a solution to the problem of restricted patients 
detained on a hospital order or compulsion order and discovered subsequently to be suffering 
from an untreatable personality disorder.71 An equivalent of the public safety test introduced 
by the 1999 Act has therefore been retained in section 182(3)(b)(ii) of the MHA 2003. 
Although no fix for that particular problem was found, the MacLean Committee laid the 
foundations of what was to become the OLR, designed to fill the vacuum in the public 
protective framework that had arisen in respect of offenders with a primary diagnosis of 
personality disorder. 
4.5 THE REPORTS OF THE MACLEAN AND MILLAN 
COMMITTEES 
The MacLean and Millan Committees, although differing significantly in their terms of 
reference, both contributed to the development of the current legislative framework for the 
detention of high-risk mentally disordered offenders. The Millan Committee’s remit was 
 
67 Guzzardi v Italy (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 333; Litwa v Poland (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 53, cited in Anderson at 30. 
68 The Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders which reported to the Scottish Parliament in 2000. 
69 Its report, New Directions was published in January 2001. 
70 Anderson, at para. 14.  
71 This reasons for this are not explicitly stated in the reports, however it is suggested that given that one of the 
key differences between the hospital order, the compulsion order which replaced it, and the hospital direction 
which (will be discussed later), is that the HO or CO is the sentence, simply passing retrospective legislation to 
permit their transfer to prison would violate Article 5, and possibly Article 7, of the ECHR. See New Directions 
at 347, para. 40 and the MacLean Report at page 77, para. 12.3. 
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widest, in that it was tasked with wholesale review of the 1984 Act, and part of that included 
consideration of the orders to which treatable mentally disordered offenders might be made 
subject. It also revisited the definition of mental disorder that the criminal courts would adopt 
for the purposes of sentencing. In terms of impact, however, the MacLean recommendations 
were of greater significance. That committee had a highly specialist remit, which was to 
formulate proposals for a long-term solution to replace the 1999 Act’s temporary fix. Although 
its proposals were not implemented in full, its report resulted in the creation of the OLR as part 
of an entirely new sentencing framework for high-risk offenders not suffering from treatable 
mental disorder.  
As previously mentioned, the MacLean Committee was established by the Scottish Office 
following the decisions in Reid and Ruddle. It was convened in March 1999, and was comprised 
of fourteen members including forensic psychiatrists and psychologists, a Chief Constable, the 
Parole Board Vice Chair, the Mental Welfare Commission’s Nursing Officer, a senior social 
worker, a prison governor, a sheriff, and a solicitor-advocate.72 Its function was to develop a 
comprehensive framework for the sentencing and management of offenders with personality 
disorders who presented a serious risk to the public, but its terms of reference included all 
serious violent and sexual offenders.73 More specifically, it was asked to address the 
supervision and treatment needs of this particular group of offenders and make 
recommendations as to how these needs could be met.74 The report was laid before Parliament 
in June 2000. This section of the chapter discusses its reasoning and key recommendations in 
respect of the introduction of the OLR and its risk management infrastructure. The footnote 
citations in section 4.5.1 relate to the report unless otherwise stated. 
4.5.1 THE SCOPE OF THE REPORT 
The Committee’s terms of reference were as follows. 75 
to consider experience in Scotland and elsewhere and to make proposals 
for the sentencing disposals for, and the future management and treatment 
of serious sexual and violent offenders who may present a continuing 
danger to the public, in particular: 
 
72 R. MacLean, Report of the Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders (Edinburgh, 2000), 89. (‘The 
MacLean Report’.) 
73 Ibid, 1. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid. 
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to consider whether the current legislative framework matches the present 
level of knowledge of the subject, provides the courts with an appropriate 
range of options and affords the general public adequate protection from 
these offenders; 
to compare practice, diagnosis and treatment with that elsewhere, to build 
on current expertise and research to inform the development of a medical 
protocol to respond to the needs of personality disordered offenders; 
to specify the services required by this group of offenders and the means 
of delivery; 
to consider the question of release/discharge into the community and 
service needs in the community for supervising those offenders. 
 
It will be recalled that the Committee defined high-risk offenders as ‘persons convicted on 
indictment of a violent or sexual offence, or exceptionally another category of crime, whose 
offence(s) or antecedents or personal characteristics indicate that they are likely to present 
particularly high risks to the safety of the public’.76 The Committee was clear that it was not 
concerned with achieving a measurable reduction in crime;77 it was concerned to produce 
proposals for the prevention of the most serious offences against persons which would be 
capable of identifying and responding to high-risk offenders’ needs and specific risk factors.78 
As was discussed earlier in the thesis, there is a tendency amongst those who oppose 
preventive detention in principle to reduce the moral dilemma inherent in any decision about 
whether to detain to an arithmetical one. The approach taken by the MacLean Committee was 
therefore, like that of the Floud Committee,79 one which recognised explicitly the value of 
committing public resources to the prevention of harm from offences with extremely low rates 
of occurrence, and the moral defensibility of such a system.  
There was some overlap between the work of the MacLean Committee and the Millan 
Committee – the latter of which was tasked, amongst other things, with making proposals on 
measures for the detention and treatment of high-risk offenders with mental disorders;80 –  and 
the Expert Panel on Sex Offending chaired by Lady Cosgrove which reported in 2001.81 The 
 
76 Page 4, recommendation 1. 
77 Paras. 1.13 – 1.15. 
78 Paras. 1.10 – 1.11. 
79 See the Floud Report, esp. ch. 1. 
80 See 4.5.2 below.  
81 Reducing the Risk: Improving the response to sex offending (Edinburgh, 2001), available at 
https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20180516003908/http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2001/06/9
284/File-1 Accessed 17/11/2020. 
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Cosgrove Report was largely concerned with the implementation of earlier recommendations 
made by the Social Work Services Inspectorate on the supervision of sex offenders in the 
community,82 but the progress report on the Expert Panel’s recommendations would later take 
account of the measures taken in the wake in of the MacLean Report.83 It is perhaps of some 
significance that, although the MacLean Committee acknowledged that the overwhelming 
majority of offenders with which it was concerned were male, and that it regarded the 
particular needs of women offenders with severe personality disorder as being outwith its 
purview, it nonetheless considered that it had produced proposals suitable for application 
regardless of the offender’s gender.84 The Committee’s recommendations on risk assessment 
did ultimately lead to the creation of a body which recognises differences in need and risk 
profile between male and female offenders, and which actively researches and validates tools 
for the risk assessment and risk management of women.  
4.5.2 THE RISK MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY 
The Report recommended that a new statutory body, to be known as the Risk Management 
Authority (RMA) be created. The RMA would be an independent body, responsible for its 
own budget, and which would report to the Scottish Ministers.85 The Committee had visited 
prison services in Scotland, England, and Canada, amongst other jurisdictions, and had noted  
that the fields of risk assessment and management were rapidly developing, but that there 
remained difficulties, despite the best intentions of practitioners, in devising inter-agency 
approaches which responded adequately to the needs of high-risk offenders.86 In particular, 
the Committee found that information sharing between the various Scottish services involved 
in offender-management was ineffective, and that integrative approaches were hampered by 
fundamental differences in risk-management methodologies between those services.87 The 
Committee concluded ‘that a significant weakness exists in our present arrangements in that 
there is no authority responsible for the overall risk management of particularly problematic 
 
82 Social Work Services Inspectorate, A Commitment to Protect: Supervising Sex Offenders. Proposals for more 
Effective Practice (London, 1997). 
83 See Scottish Executive, Reducing the Risk: Improving the Response to Sex Offending. Progress Report, 
October 2005. Available at https://www2.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/77843/0018946.pdf. Accessed 17/11/2020. 
84 Page 6, para. 1.21. This was in relation specifically to the high rates of self-harm identified amongst 
imprisoned women with personality disorders, but the Committee does not attempt to account for differences in 
risk factors and needs except to note that special services do exist for women in some places, though they did 
not visit them. See Annex 4, para. 65 of the report at 119. 
85 Page 19, rec. 6. 
86 Pages 16 – 17, paras. 3.2 – 3.4. 
87 Ibid, para. 3.4. 
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offenders and for bridging the incompatibilities that clearly exist between the many agencies 
that have to play a part if improved protection is to be offered to the public’.88 
The RMA would have oversight of the whole risk assessment and management process, and 
would be responsible for ensuring the protection of the public from high-risk offenders by the 
least restrictive means.89 Its remit would be broad, encompassing the commissioning of 
research, accreditation of risk assessment tools and processes, and of risk assessors; it would 
procure services from agencies that work with offenders; and, crucially, would be tasked with 
the production and review of individual risk management plans.90 Although agencies such as 
the Scottish Prison Service (SPS), or social work, would continue to have responsibility for 
delivering ‘core services’ to high-risk offenders,91 the RMA could use its own budget to procure 
specific services for offenders that are not routinely available in prisons or in the community, 
such as supervision at a level of intensity that local agencies’ resource constraints would 
ordinarily preclude.92 Policy and standard setting would be a key area of responsibility. 
Agencies were operating according to their own internal standards and processes, and as a result 
the protective service they offered was felt to be disjointed. This also meant that it was difficult 
for those agencies to capitalise on advances in risk assessment and risk management being made 
internationally:93 
At a policy level, two essential functions are not being performed. First, 
we reached the conclusion that funding of research and the introduction of 
new risk management techniques is not being shaped by a clear policy 
priority to lessen the risk presented by the group of high-risk offenders. 
Second, where benefit is being derived from developments that have taken 
place, it is unco-ordinated. Though, within their own frames of reference, 
the approach to risk assessment used within the health service, social work 
departments, and SPS has been informed by research, their approaches are 
different. Reports from psychiatrists, forensic psychologists or social 
workers to the courts or to the Parole Board are sometimes written from 
confusingly incompatible intellectual positions. They may use the same 
words with meanings different both from each other and from the 
meanings that those reading them would normally use. They are based on 
distinctive and not always compatible explanatory models…There is a 
clear need, if adequate protection is to be afforded to the public, for the 
assessment and management of the risks presented by very violent 
 
88 Page 17, para. 3.4. 
89 Ibid, rec. 5. 
90 Page 18, para. 3.10; for further discussion of the risk management plan as implemented see section 6.5.1 of 
the thesis. The RMA does fulfil an oversight and approval function in relation to the RMP but does not produce 
RMPs. 
91 Ibid, para. 3.11. 
92 Page 19, para. 3.11.2. 
93 Ibid, paras. 3.15 – 3.16.  
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offenders to be conducted within a shared framework of language and 
techniques. 
 
The RMA would be the agency tasked with co-ordinating approaches to risk management 
across all these agencies, building upon robust practices already in place,94 and directing 
changes to practice as supported by evidence from research undertaken in other jurisdictions, 
and that commissioned by the RMA itself. The Authority’s responsibilities would include the 
evaluation and approval of risk assessment tools which could be used in the initial pre-
sentencing risk assessment process,95 and throughout the life of the risk management plan, and 
also the training, assessment and accreditation of risk assessors.96 This is what the Committee 
termed the RMA’s ‘quality control’ function.97 Only risk assessors accredited by the Authority 
would be entitled to produce reports for use by the courts or the Parole Board, and only those 
tools which it approved would be able to be used in the production of the reports.98 This would 
address the disjointed practices the Committee identified by standardising risk assessment and 
reporting, and ensuring that risk information was communicated in a common language. 
The Committee identified what it considered to be two major operational deficiencies in relation 
to the sentences that were available in respect of serious violent and sexual offenders at that 
time. First, it took that view that those sentences were not really geared towards the 
management of lifelong risk. The distinction between the custodial and community components 
of these sentences was too sharp, with case management centred on a presumption of 
progressive relaxation of measures where the offender’s behaviour and compliance, rather than 
the risk they posed, was the primary consideration.99 Although risk assessment by relevant 
agencies was part of decision-making concerning the appropriate level of intervention in any 
given case, the Committee was of the view that robust risk assessment should be the primary 
determinant; it would also, they contended, reduce the ‘scale of the change in circumstance that 
the offender faces at any point’ in the transition from custody to the community.100  
 
94 Page 22, para. 3.23. 
95 Chapter 5 discusses these processes in depth. 
96 Page 22, recommendation 8. 
97 Page 21, para. 3.19. 
98 Ibid, para. 3.20. 
99 Page 23, para. 3.27. 
100 Ibid.  
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The second major operational problem the Committee identified was that there was a general 
lack of clarity as to which agencies were primarily responsible for the management of an 
offender at different stages of his sentence:101 
At differing times, the prison service and local authority social work 
departments, whose responsibilities extend beyond the group we are 
considering, take a lead responsibility. It is our view that their objectives 
are less focused on the issues that concerned us than we think they should 
be. The police, housing departments, health services, the employment 
service and, very often, voluntary agencies also impact the circumstances 
of the group and can offer services relevant to the risk they present. With 
the introduction of electric monitoring, in particular, private sector 
organisations may also contribute…The Parole Board exercises a co-
ordinating influence over these agencies. Its impact, however, is properly 
focused on release and recall decisions. It does not have authority to 
require action by any of these other agencies. 
The Committee considered a range of options, including approaches which would see a unified 
correctional service, like those in operation in Canada, which would take the lead for the 
duration of the sentence.102 However, the concern was that such an approach would have the 
effect of alienating the service from other social organisations.103 It would also have failed to 
address the problem of lack of special focus on high-risk offenders that had been identified. 
There was a need for a specialist agency for the management of this group of offenders; one 
that had oversight of, and responsibility for, the operation of the entire sentence.104 
Consideration was given to ascribing these functions to the Parole Board, but it was determined 
that it would not be appropriate for the body responsible for making decisions on release from 
custody also to possess ‘executive authority for managing restrictions on freedom’.105 The 
recommendation, then, was that the RMA would fulfil this role,106 and could do so in respect 




101 Ibid, para. 3.28 – 3.29. 
102 Ibid, para. 3.31. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Page 24, para. 3.33. 
105 Ibid, para. 3.34. 
106 Ibid; page 25, recommendation 9. 
107 Page 25, para. 3.39. 
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4.5.3 THE INADEQUACY OF AVAILABLE SENTENCES 
The starting point for the MacLean Committee in recommending the creation of a new sentence 
– to be called the OLR – was that risk reduction is a legitimate sentencing aim.108 Although 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation were also acknowledged as legitimate 
aims,109 it seems that the Committee took risk reduction to be an independent sentencing 
objective. This is of some interest given that the means of risk reduction was to be control over 
the offender in custody, or in the community, and attempts at altering the offender’s patterns of 
conduct;110 that does look like another way of saying deterrence, rehabilitation and 
incapacitation. Surely the societal benefits derived from deterrent, rehabilitative, and 
incapacitative sentences are preventive. Rather than as a restatement, it seems the Committee 
was engaging the theoretical distinction between prevention as an acceptable beneficial side-
effect of justified punishment, and punishment as being justified for prevention: the Committee 
adopted the latter philosophical position. On this basis, it reached the conclusion that it was 
legitimate to sentence serious violent and sexual offenders to longer terms of imprisonment on 
the grounds of the risk they presented, than they otherwise would have been.111  
The report also concluded that the imposition of disproportionate punishment would not be 
justified unless there were attempts to assist the offender to reduce the risk he presented.112 
However, the Committee did admit to a sense of therapeutic pessimism as regards interventions 
for the group of offenders who would be subject to the OLR113 – a sense that is quite consistent 
with psychiatric practices in Scotland in relation to the treatment of individuals with personality 
disorder.114 Those with mental illness were regarded more positively, it being more likely that 
the risk they posed could be ameliorated by medical treatment,115 but in all cases, since response 
to rehabilitative measures could not be determined with certainty, it was considered that the 
need for risk reduction should determine the manner in which a sentence progresses rather than 
 
108 Page 26, para. 4.2. 
109 Ibid, para. 4.1. 
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid, para. 4.3. 
112 Ibid; this is consistent with the legal position that indeterminate sentences must be accompanied by 
interventions designed to permit an offender to reduce his risk and demonstrate his suitability for release: see 
part 6.2.1.D of the thesis. 
113 Ibid, para. 4.4. 
114 See, for example, R. Darjee and J. Crichton, ‘Personality disorder and the law in Scotland: a historical 
perspective’, (2003) 14:2 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology 394, especially 406 – 409; R. Darjee 
et al., ‘Detention of Patients with Psychopathic Disorder in Scotland: “Canons Park” Called into Question by 
the House of Lords’, (1999) 10:3 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 649, 656; Darjee (2003), 12.  
115 Page 26, para. 4.4. 
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its length.116 It is not clear whether the length to which the report refers is the length of the 
whole sentence, or the punishment part of the sentence during which the offender would 
definitely remain in custody.117 Though, given that the Committee would ultimately conclude 
that high-risk offenders should be subject to a sentence that lasts the entirety of their lives, albeit 
potentially with a portion of that served in the community, it seems that it was considered that 
the need to manage risk should, in fact, inform the length of the sentence.  
In reaching the decision to recommend the creation of the OLR, the Committee considered six 
other options: (1) mandatory life sentences for specified offences other than murder;118 (2) the 
use of longer determinate sentences;119 (3) greater use of extended sentences;120 (4) changing 
the law relating to supervised release orders;121  (5) changing the law regarding sex offenders;122 
and (6) changing the law on stalking and harassment.123 Options five and six were considered 
properly within the remit of other working groups.124 It had been suggested that the Committee 
might choose to recommend that supervised release orders (SROs) be mandatory in all sexual 
and violent offences cases,125 but option four was ultimately discounted because SROs are 
available only in respect of short sentences126 (i.e. those of less than four years duration)127 and 
the Committee was concerned with the most serious offences which would be likely to attract 
longer sentences.128 The reasons that the remaining options were rejected in favour of 
recommending a new indeterminate sentence are instructive, and are worthy of some 
consideration.  
A. MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCES 
As is the case presently, at the time the report was prepared the only mandatory life sentence in 
Scotland was that which applied in cases of murder.129 Section 1 of the Crime and Punishment 
 
116 Ibid.  
117 This is discussed in greater detail at section 6.5.1.A. 
118 Pages 28 – 30. 
119 Page 30. 
120 Page 31. Extended sentences are discussed in further detail at section 5.2 of chapter 5. 
121 Pages 31 – 32. 
122 Pages 32 – 33. 
123 Page 33. 
124 Page 33; paras. 4.40 and 4.41. Lady Cosgrove’s Expert Panel on Sex Offenders was at that time considering 
the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and the Scottish Executive had published its 
Stalking and Harassment Consultation Paper in February 2000.  
125 Page 32, para. 4.36. 
126 Ibid, para. 4.37; Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 209(1). 
127 Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993, s. 27(1). 
128 Ibid. 
129 s. 205(1) of the 1995 Act.  
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(Scotland) Act 1997 provided that the 1995 Act be amended to institute automatic life sentences 
for offenders of at least 18 years of age, who had been convicted of a second serious violent or 
sexual offence.130 It was never brought into force, and was eventually repealed131 in accordance 
with the MacLean Committee’s recommendation that it should be.132 It had, however, been 
suggested to the Committee by the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS)133 
that bringing this section into force might be worthy of consideration.134 The Committee took 
the view that any public protective argument for increasing the use of mandatory life sentences 
was based on the presumptions that: (a) such sentences are a deterrent; and (b) that offenders 
who present a danger to the public on more than one occasion will continue to present a danger 
in the future.135 The Committee rejected the first presumption on the grounds that high-risk 
offenders are likely to be subject to long sentences in any case and so considered that any 
deterrent effect was more likely to be derived from increasing detection and conviction rates, 
rather than sentencing.136 As regards the second presumption, it was accepted that the powers 
of long-term – perhaps lifelong – imprisonment and lifelong recall to prison associated with 
mandatory life sentences may prevent serious offences being carried out.137 What concerned 
the Committee was the effect of designated offences serving as the trigger for preventive 
measures.138  It was considered to be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Individuals who 
posed a high-risk of serious violent and sexual offending may not fall within the scope of the 
legislation because they had not yet been convicted of a relevant offence for a second time.139 
It would also have the effect of bringing within the legislation’s ambit people whose risk of 
reoffending was low despite the offences of which they were convicted. The examples the 
report gives are cases where offences are separated by long periods of time, or by very different 
contexts, people whose offences were not especially serious but met the statutory criteria 
anyway, and those where there was significant mitigation.140 There was also a concern that 
 
130 Section 1 would have inserted s. 205A into the 1995 Act and added a Schedule 5A to it. Schedule 5A would 
have set out the ‘qualifying offences’ including culpable homicide, attempted murder, rape, attempted rape and 
certain aggravated assaults.  
131 By the CJ(S)A 2003, s. 19(3).  
132 Page 30, rec. 10. 
133 ACPOS, along with the eight regional police forces and the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency 
(SCDEA), no longer exists having been subsumed into the national force, Police Scotland, on 1st April 2013. 
See the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, s. 6; and the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 
(Commencement No. 4, Transitory and Transitional Provisions) Order 2013/51 (Scottish SI), art. 2.  
134 Page 28, para. 4.15. 
135 Ibid, para. 4.16. 
136 Page 29, para. 4.17. 
137 Ibid, para. 4.18. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid, para. 4.19. 
140 Ibid, para. 4.20.  
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ways of disapplying or circumventing the provisions, or reducing their impact on the offender, 
would be found. One of the examples given of such a measure was the defence of diminished 
responsibility resulting in a conviction for culpable homicide rather than murder.141  The 
Committee concluded:142 
While it is understandable that some sections of the public would be content 
for such offenders to receive life sentences ‘to be on the safe side’, in our 
view this approach has two major flaws. It is potentially unfair to the offender, 
who may receive a more severe sentence than another offender who has 
committed a more severe offence or offences, but who does not meet the 
statutory test. Just as importantly…[it] is a waste of money and scarce 
professional skills to imprison and keep under supervision offenders who do 
not require that level of custody and control…In short, we believe that in non-
murder cases the mandatory life sentence is a blunt instrument. It does not 
address the key aim, which is to control more effectively those who present 
the highest level of risk. 
Since extension of the mandatory life sentence was not felt to be an appropriate means of 
managing risk in the target group, the Committee recommended that section 1 of the 1997 Act 
be repealed.143  
B. LONGER DETERMINATE SENTENCES 
The setting of mandatory minimum determinate sentences for certain offences was considered 
to be inappropriate for the same reasons as the mandatory life approach.144 It could also 
potentially leave a gap in public protection. Regardless of how long someone is imprisoned, if 
a sentence is determinate, there will come a period where he will be released, and there will 
come a point where the licence, along with the conditions attached to it, will come to an end.145 
The view taken by the Committee was that the result of such an approach would be that people 
who did not require intensive risk-management would be caught by the provisions, and people 
who still presented a high risk would be liberated without supervision.146 In reaching its 
decisions, the Committee considered the approach to high-risk offenders taken in certain states 
in the U.S. They found that extremely long determinate sentences were commonplace but had 
had been deemed to be inadequate; the result was the introduction of ‘sexually violent predator’ 
schemes which permitted the continued detention of such an offender at the end of his prison 
 
141 Ibid, para. 4.22. 
142 Ibid, paras. 4.21 – 4.23. 
143 Page 30, para. 4.23; rec. 10.  
144 Ibid, para. 4.25. 
145 Ibid, para. 4.26. 
146 Ibid. 
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term.147 In some states, determinate sentences which exceeded the natural life expectancy of 
the offender were employed, but the thing that these approaches were found to have in common 
was that they consisted mainly of incapacitation without any substantial attempt at risk 
reduction.148 A final possibility that was considered, but rejected, was increasing the proportion 
of the sentence served in custody. Increasing the time spent in custody means reducing the time 
available to community services to engage with the offender at a point where risk management 
and integration becomes most important.149  
C. EXTENDED SENTENCES 
At the time of the report, extended sentences, provided for in section 210A of the 1995 Act, 
were still relatively new having been introduced by section 86 of the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998. Extended sentences are a form of determinate sentence comprised of a period spent in 
custody and extended licenced period in the community. They are discussed further in section 
6.4.2.A of chapter six. Extended sentences were intended to go some way to address the 
problem of managing offenders who would continue to present a risk to the public at the end of 
their sentence.150 The Committee did not seek to determine the frequency of section 210A’s 
use, but did consider that the lack of a robust framework for determining the appropriateness 
of its application in individual cases was problematic, and suggested this would be likely to 
limit its use.151 No substantial recommendation to alter the extended sentence’s use was made; 
instead the Committee took the view that it would serve as an ‘important bridge’ between 
standard determinate sentences and the OLR that was being proposed.152 It was, however, 
recommended that the available duration of the licence for violent offences was increased from 
five years to ten.153 This recommendation was accepted154 and the section 210A extended 
sentence remains an option in cases where the statutory risk criteria that must be satisfied in 
order for an OLR to be made, are not met. The extended sentence is discussed in more detail in 
chapter five.155 
 
147 Ibid, para. 4.27; for further information on SVP, see J. Petrila, ‘Sexually Violent Predator Laws: Going Back 
to a Time Better Forgotten’, in McSherry and Keyzer (eds.) (2011), 63. 
148 Ibid, para. 4.27 – 4.28. 
149 Ibid, para. 4.29. 
150 Page 31, para. 4.30. 
151 Ibid, para. 4.32. 
152 Ibid, para. 4.34. 
153 Ibid, para. 4.34; rec. 11.  
154 s. 210A(3)(b) as amended by the Violent Offenders (Scotland) Order 2003/48 (Scottish SI), art. 2.   
155 See section 6.5.2.A. 
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4.5.4 THE INADEQUACY OF RISK-BASED SENTENCING 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The Committee concluded that the sentences that were available at the time were inadequate 
for the purpose of protecting the public from high-risk offenders.156   
[We] have come to the view that while for many such offenders the present 
range is satisfactory, for a small number of others the current sentencing 
provisions are deficient since they do not require the courts to impose on 
exceptional individuals an exceptional sentence which both marks the gravity 
of what they have done and provides an appropriate level of public protection, 
having regard to the risk that such individuals pose.  
What was needed was the power to control these individuals for the rest of their lives, initially 
in custody, but with the possibility of progressing to community supervision once it was safe 
to allow them to do so.157 This is what necessitated the introduction of the OLR. To support 
this level of risk management, it would be necessary to drastically improve risk data gathering 
and sharing. Sources of risk information identified in the MacLean report include prior 
convictions laid before the court before sentencing,158 psychiatric reports,159 and social enquiry 
reports (SERs) produced by local authority social work departments.160 It was the view of the 
Committee that the role of the Crown at sentencing was too restricted. A centralised database 
should be developed in which the Crown Office would retain information which might assist 
in identifying high-risk offenders who might be appropriate candidates for the OLR.161 This 
would include information derived from police reports and precognitions, as well as reports 
from judges or sheriffs that had sentenced the offender before.162 The prosecutor would then, 
based on this information in part, be able to ‘flag’ potentially high-risk offenders in advance of 
sentencing being imposed so that they may be subjected to comprehensive risk evaluation.163 
This assessment would be a statutory pre-requisite in cases where an OLR was to be 
imposed.164 All this information was to be compiled and communicated as part of the 
mandatory risk assessment that would need to be carried out.  The Committee noted certain 
 
156 Page 34, para. 5.1. Emphasis in original.  
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160 Ibid, para. 5.6 
161 Page 37, paras. 5.17 – 5.18; page 38, rec. 14. 
162 Page 38, para. 5.19 
163 Page 36, para. 5.12. 
164 Page 41, para. 6.6; rec. 18. This is discussed in detail in chapter 5.  
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difficulties associated with SERs including inconsistencies in their production;165 the lack of a 
requirement that one be obtained before passing sentence except in cases where the offender is 
under 21 years of age166 or where he is receiving a custodial sentence for the first time;167 and 
that SERs produced prior to conviction are regarded as sufficient for these purposes. The 
problem with the use of pre-conviction reports in this context is that they will not detail the 
offender’s attitude to the offence including, for example, whether remorse has been 
expressed.168  However, the Committee took the view that sentencing considerations should 
not be restricted to offender behaviour that had resulted in present or previous convictions. 
One of the more controversial proposals169 was that unprosecuted allegations and acquittals 
should be taken into consideration by the judge when deciding whether to make an OLR.170 
Although it was acknowledged that relying on allegations could be unfair,171 it was considered 
that the predictive value of such information outweighed potential unfairness provided that the 
information was restricted to conduct admitted by the offender, or established by evidence led 
by the prosecutor.172 Likewise, the Committee considered that it would be wrong to take into 
account previous allegations that have had resulted in acquittal, but it made a distinction 
between the relevant charges and the conduct that was the subject of those charges. The view 
was that such information should be taken account of on the same terms as allegations.173 This 
was considered to be legitimate since the purpose of gathering the information was to inform 
judgements about risk, and it seems that the Committee considered that it could be beneficial 
for the offender if he was prepared to acknowledge past offences were indicative of risk which 
manifested in his present offence.174  
 
 
165 Page 35, paras. 5.6 and 5.9 
166 s. 207(4) of the 1995 Act 
167 s. 204(2A)(a) of the 1995 Act 
168 Page 35, para. 5.7 
169 See, for example, Gailey et al. (2017), 115; it was also identified as such by the Committee itself in the 
report – see page 38, para. 5.23 
170 Pages 38 and 39 
171 Page 38, para. 5.23 
172 Ibid. As discussed later, it was recommended that the prosecutor require to prove on the balance of 
probability that the Committee’s proposed statutory risk-based criteria are met before an OLR is imposed. For 
detailed discussion of the use of allegation information in OLR sentencing, see section 5.4.3. 
173 Page 39, para. 5.25 
174 Ibid, para. 5.26 
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4.5.5 IMPOSING THE NEW SENTENCE 
The OLR was to be available in respect of offenders convicted on indictment of ‘(a) an offence 
of violence, (b) a sexual offence, or (c) any other offence which is closely related to, or reflects 
an offender’s propensity for violent, sexual or life-endangering offending’.175 The Committee 
recommended against restricting the OLR only to cases where the conviction was for a serious 
violent or serious sexual offence because it wanted the focus to be on offenders rather than 
offences.176 It was considered that the requirement for conviction on indictment was sufficient 
to ensure that the trigger offence was sufficiently serious.177  
An OLR would be available only in cases where the High Court was satisfied 
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the offender presents a 
substantial and continuing risk to the safety of the public such as requires his 
lifelong restriction. If the Court is so satisfied, it must make the order.178 
As mentioned above, a comprehensive risk assessment would be the means of establishing 
whether these criteria were met. Ordinarily, this risk assessment would be ordered on the 
motion of the Crown, where prior notice of the intention to seek one upon conviction has been 
given to the accused.179 The risk assessment order itself would only be available where the 
Court considers that there are ‘reasonable grounds for believing that the offender may present 
a substantial and continuing risk to the public’.180 In cases where the Court was satisfied on the 
basis of the risk assessment report that the criteria for imposing the OLR were met, it would be 
required to make that order. Where the test was not satisfied, the Court would be entitled to 
impose any other sentence apart from a discretionary life sentence181 which, the Committee 
recommended, should be abolished.182 It would be open to the accused to appeal the making 
of an OLR, and to the Crown to appeal the refusal to make an OLR;183 however there would 
be no appeal against the decision to order a risk assessment for the purposes of assessing the 
appropriateness of the final disposal.184 
 
175 Page 40, rec. 16 
176 Ibid, para. 6.2. 
177 Ibid, para. 6.1. 
178 Ibid, rec. 16. 
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own instance: rec. 20. 
180 Page 41, para. 6.7; rec. 19. 
181 Page 44, para. 6.17; rec. 25. 
182 Ibid, para. 6.18. 
183 Page 45, para. 6.19; rec. 26. 
184 Page 42, rec. 20. 
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4.5.6 OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 
It will be recalled that the starting point for the reform process that the MacLean Committee 
was engaged in was a gap in the legal framework for the detention of high-risk mentally 
disordered offenders, and specifically those with a personality disorder. Part of the 
Committee’s remit was to ‘build on current expertise and research to inform the development 
of a medical protocol to respond to the needs of personality disordered offenders’.185 However, 
in stark contrast to the approach being pursued at the time in England and Wales,186 the 
Committee was not in favour of preventively detaining persons on the basis of personality 
disorder.187 Nor, having regard to evidence provided by the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
amongst others, was it particularly optimistic about the ability of available therapeutic 
interventions to manage the risks associated with more severely disordered individuals.188 
Indeed, it pointed to some evidence that treatment of people with more severe disorders had 
led to an increase in reoffending.189 The Committee’s only recommendation on personality 
disordered offenders in general, then, was that the Scottish Executive take steps to develop a 
strategy to prevent those in the population at risk from developing personality disorders in the 
first place.190 
In relation to personality disordered offenders who had remained in detention at the State 
Hospital as a result of the 1999 Act’s public safety test, the report merely recommended that 
measures taken to demonstrate the continued need for detention should meet the standards of 
risk assessment that had been set out in relation to the OLR.191 The Committee had tried to find 
some sort of solution to these patients’ predicament, but had come to the conclusion that there 
was no recommendation it could properly make.192 Suggestions offered included transfer from 
high-security forensic services to lower security facilities using civil commitment 
provisions,193 or legislating to allow for the retrospective imposition of sentences of 
imprisonment on people on hospital orders who had since been determined to be untreatable.194 
The former was rejected on the grounds of safety: to transfer high-risk patients to less specialist 
 
185 Page 63, para. 10.1. 
186 The ‘dangerous severe personality disorder’ (DSPD) programme mentioned above. 
187 Page 69, para. 10.36. 
188 Page 67, paras. 10.21 – 10.26. 
189 Page 68, para. 10.26.  
190 Page 76, rec. 76. 
191 Page 77, rec. 51. 
192 Ibid, para. 12.3. 
193 Ibid, para. 12.4. 
194 Page 78, para. 12.6. 
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units would be detrimental to other patients195 and reduce scope for risk management 
generally.196 The suggestion that offenders who were – at the time – appropriately given 
hospital disposals be re-sentenced was rejected for quite obvious reasons. The retrospective 
imposition of a prison sentence is plainly unjust, especially given that the people concerned 
would most likely have spent a significant period of time in detention.197 Since no solution 
could be found for the very group of offenders whose circumstances had necessitated the 
Committee’s work, recommendations were instead made to prevent people becoming “stuck” 
on hospital orders at the point of sentencing. 
Despite the centrality of mental disorder to the problem it was asked to address, the Committee 
took the view that no significant procedural distinction ought to be made between high-risk 
offenders with mental disorders, and high-risk offenders without.198 The exception to this is 
perhaps that the view was taken that, in cases where a treatable mental disorder was suspected, 
an interim hospital order would be appropriate.199 This would enable the same sort of risk 
assessment to be undertaken as the Committee had proposed whilst permitting medical staff to 
evaluate the offender’s suitability for hospital treatment.200 The Committee noted that, whilst 
it expected that the number of high-risk offenders that suffer from a mental disorder that 
necessitates hospital treatment will be rather small,201 it is likely that such cases as do arise will 
be complex, probably involving a combination of mental illness and personality disorder.202 In 
these cases the complexity of the mental disorder is likely to be a factor in the assessment of 
an offender as high-risk.203 It was also acknowledged that there may be cases where the 
presence of mental disorder, whilst requiring treatment in hospital, is not causally connected 
to the offending behaviour, meaning that treatment of the disorder would not necessarily reduce 
risk posed.204 In these circumstances a (primary) hospital disposal could be problematic, 
because it would mean the indefinite hospital detention of people who could not be treated, and 
the discharge of patients whose mental health had recovered, but whose risk had not been 
appropriately reduced: the difficulty that had ultimately led to the Committee being convened.  
The Committee’s proposal, therefore, was that where an individual with a mental disorder that 
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was thought to be treatable also met the criteria for the imposition of an OLR, the only 
competent disposal would be the OLR combined with a HD.205 This applied equally to persons 
with a diagnosis of mental illness, and those with a diagnosis of personality disorder. The 
hospital direction is discussed further in section 6.4.1.D of the thesis, but the advantage of this 
approach is that the disposal is primarily a sentence of imprisonment; the hospital direction 
authorises detention in hospital at the commencement of the sentence, and if it subsequently 
transpires that hospitalisation is inappropriate, or the offender recovers satisfactorily, they will 
be returned to prison for the remainder of the sentence. Although the Committee’s remit 
explicitly included high-risk offenders with mental disorder, and four of the report’s twelve 
chapters are dedicated to proposals concerning the sentencing and management of people 
within that group,206 a comprehensive review of the MHA 1984 was taking place at the same 
time. The MacLean Committee decided that the best approach would be to feed into that 
process, sharing its findings and recommendations as they emerged, the hope being that a 
consensus could be built across the working groups.207 There was, however, some 
disagreement between the Committees about the appropriate use of hospital disposals, and 
before progressing, it is worth mentioning the aspects of the Millan report that addressed 
mentally disordered offenders and how they interacted with the MacLean recommendations. 
4.5.7 THE MILLAN COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
In response to mounting consensus across patient, carer, and professional groups that the 
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 was outdated and in need of reform,208 the Minister for 
Health in the Scottish Office established a committee chaired by Bruce Millan.209 It included 
doctors, lawyers, nurses, psychologists, and representatives of patients/service users and 
carers,210 and was tasked with the wholesale review of the legislation. The Millan Committee’s 
report – New Directions: Report on the Review of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 – ran 
to more than 500 pages and included 411 detailed recommendations for reform and it remains 
the most comprehensive review of Scots mental health law ever undertaken.211 Since the vast 
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majority of people subject to the powers of the Mental Health Acts are subject to civil 
commitment provisions,212 the bulk of the report addresses those measures. This chapter is, 
however, only concerned with those parts of the report that deal with criminal justice disposals. 
It is worth noting at this stage that the Committee was in favour of moving all the relevant 
provisions from the 1995 Act to the new Mental Health Act,213 though ultimately it stopped 
short of recommending that this be done, in recognition that the 1995 Act contains the majority 
of primary provisions on sentencing.214 Unless otherwise stated, footnote references here are 
to the New Directions report. 
A. MENTAL DISORDER 
The starting point for consideration of the proper scope of the new Act was the definition of 
mental disorder as it appeared in the 1984 Act. It was defined as ‘mental illness (including 
personality disorder) or mental handicap however caused or manifested’.215 Despite some 
opposition which viewed the terminology of mental disorder as offensive and stigmatising,216 
the Committee resolved that the term be retained as a broad descriptor of a condition that is 
necessary, but not sufficient for the Act to apply.217 It also maintained continuity with other 
areas of legislation which use the term.218 Mental disorder would continue to include mental 
illness and personality disorder, but with its third component more appropriately termed 
learning disability.219 ‘Mental illness’ was to be inclusive of psychotic, (non-psychotic) 
affective disorders, eating disorders, some neurological conditions, and the manifestations of 
acquired brain injury.220 Personality disorder as a classification of mental disorder attracts some 
degree of controversy. The Committee recognised this.221 It also recognised that treatability is 
a matter of some disagreement,222 and that there was a substantial body of opinion that its 
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inclusion as a distinct category of disorder mental health legislation was inappropriate or 
unnecessary.223  
The 1984 Act’s approach to personality disorder was somewhat confusing in that the 1999 Act 
had included personality disorder as a particular category of mental disorder to which the 1984 
Act applied, but its relationship to the treatability test in section 17(1) was uncertain. It 
appeared to the Committee that any personality disorder was capable of bringing a patient 
under the auspices of the Act where the ‘appropriateness’ and ‘necessity’ criteria were satisfied, 
but that where that personality disorder was ‘a persistent one manifested only by abnormally 
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct’ the treatability test also applied.224 Interestingly, 
the Committee’s decision to include a distinct category of personality disorder was contrary to 
the opinion of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the British Medical Association, the British 
Psychological Society, the British Association of Social Workers, and the State Hospitals 
Board that it was unnecessary.225 In addition: 226 
Several people argued that [personality disorder] was commonly used, not as 
a positive diagnosis, but as an exclusionary label: a means of removing people 
from the concern of mental health professionals. Others criticised the term 
itself, as one which was deeply stigmatising and unhelpful to the service user. 
The Committee considered all of these objections, however it noted that the standard diagnostic 
manuals such as ICD-10 and DSM-IV227 accepted personality disorder as a clinical construct. 
The use of personality disorder as a diagnosis of exclusion was considered a reason for its 
retention as a category of mental disorder in new legislation on the grounds that people affected 
had the same right to access appropriate services as others.228 The Committee’s major concern, 
though, was with difficulties in diagnosis. As was mentioned earlier, in practice it is not always 
easy to distinguish personality disorder from mental illness, which is why cases have arisen in 
which patients who initially had a primary diagnosis of personality disorder had subsequently 
been diagnosed with mental illness instead.229 If it was not made explicit that personality 
disorder fell within the scope of the Act, the Committee was concerned that people who could 
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benefit from treatment would be denied it.230 Thus, personality disorder was retained as a 
distinct category of mental disorder in the Millan proposals.231 
B. RISK 
It was recommended that ‘a significant risk of harm to the health or safety or welfare of the 
person for whom compulsion is sought, or a significant risk of harm to other persons’ be one 
of the requirements for compulsory measures.232 Only one of these conditions would need to 
be satisfied, and it did not represent much of a departure from the provisions of the 1984 Act.233 
Crucially, the risk criterion would not be capable of overriding the requirement for significant 
impairment of judgement or its likelihood,234 meaning that it would not be possible to detain a 
patient who was clearly possessed of insight into his condition, and his need for treatment, even 
if they posed an imminent risk to themselves or to another person. As regards assessment of 
risk, the Millan Committee pointed to the MacLean recommendations on risk assessment, but 
took the view that the kind of detailed, specialist assessment it proposed for high-risk offenders 
was neither necessary or appropriate for the majority of patients.235 The Millan report did 
however note that MacLean’s emphasis on strengthening risk assessment practices might have 
benefits for risk practice more broadly.236 
C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORDERS 
In respect of the interim hospital order – which would become the interim compulsion order 
(ICO)237 – the only significant proposal was that its use be restricted to cases in which a 
restricted hospital order or hospital direction was under consideration, but that it would not be 
confined to instances where placement in the State Hospital was thought necessary.238 This was 
reflective of the proliferation of medium-secure units since the 1984 Act was brought into force; 
they would be capable of managing the risk posed by many restricted patients.239 The Millan 
Committee agreed with the MacLean Committee’s view that the IHO be renewable every 90 
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days up to a maximum of one year, rather than every 28 days.240 Confining the IHO to cases 
where a restriction order was in contemplation was designed to limit its use to serious cases, 
and in so doing reduce scope for the detention of individuals who had committed more minor 
offences to be detained in hospital for up to one year prior to final disposal.241 
Hospital orders (HOs) without restrictions should, as before, mirror the criteria for civil 
commitment; this which would include the proposed ‘soft incapacity’ test the Committee 
recommended for inclusion in those orders.242 Although this is not explained further by the 
report, save to note that there were concerns that the inclusion of such criteria in forensic cases 
would see patients more appropriately placed in hospital sent to prison because they retained 
decision-making ability,243 it was presumably the intention that competent offenders with 
mental disorders would simply be sent to prison. HOs would not normally be used for offenders 
with a primary diagnosis of personality disorder,244 but would continue to be available 
consistent with the report’s general recommendations for compulsory measures. The hospital 
direction (HD) would normally be the disposal of choice in these cases.245 Although not 
addressed by the report, despite its acceptance that sharp distinctions may be difficult to draw, 
it could be considered that the Committee was adopting the provision that offenders with 
personality disorders were more deserving of punishment than those with mental illnesses that 
were deemed more appropriately remitted to hospital for the duration of their sentence.246 
Finally, the input of a specialist social worker would be required when the decision on whether 
or not to make a HO was being made;247 beyond this very little change to the legislation on HOs 
without restrictions was made. 
The hospital direction, as it will be recalled, has the effect of remitting an offender sentenced 
to imprisonment to hospital for as long as the criteria for detention under the MHA are met; if 
they are no longer satisfied the offender will be returned to prison for the remainder of his 
sentence. The HD is similar to a HO with restrictions, and the Scottish Ministers were originally 
responsible for authorising transfers back to prison, or leaves of absence.248 The Committee 
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noted that HDs were very infrequently used,249 and might even be underused,250 though the 
Scottish Association for Mental Health at consultation indicated that it opposed the use of the 
HD on the grounds it conflated treatment and punishment.251 The Committee recommended, 
however, that the HD’s availability be retained, but its criteria be altered to include either weak 
or absent connection between the mental disorder and the offence, or between the mental 
disorder and any ongoing risk such that the risk would not be significantly reduced by 
treatment.252 
D. HIGH-RISK PATIENTS 
The Millan Committee gave consideration to the recommendations of the MacLean Committee 
in relation to mentally disordered high-risk offenders. It agreed that the Risk Management 
Authority, if established as proposed by the MacLean Committee, should assume responsibility 
for authorising leaves of absence for, and transfers of, restricted patients in the place of the 
Scottish Ministers.253 The RMA would have oversight of the patient’s treatment plan which 
would operate as a risk management plan.254 However, it did not agree that the only competent 
disposal for offenders meeting the criteria for both the OLR and a hospital order should be the 
OLR combined with a hospital direction.255 Its reasoning was that, although the MacLean 
Committee envisaged that many high-risk offenders who suffered from mental disorders would 
have complex mental health problems, the Millan Committee considered that the hospital order 
with restrictions should be available as a matter of medical and judicial discretion should a case 
of a high-risk offender with a fairly straightforward mental illness, causally connected to the 
risk they pose, arise.256 
As regards authorising the discharge of restricted patients, the Committee recommended that 
this power be removed from the Scottish Ministers and instead be exercised by the Parole Board 
sitting as a Restricted Patients Review Tribunal.257 This recommendation was not accepted, and 
decisions about discharge are instead taken by the Mental Health Tribunal for Scotland.258 The 
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Millan Committee made its recommendation on the assumption that the entry and exit criteria 
for offenders placed on hospital orders would be the same.259 This would mean that risk alone 
would no longer justify the continued detention of untreatable offenders subject to hospital 
orders with restrictions. As is discussed later,260 this ought not to present a risk management 
problem for those subject to hospital directions: they may simply be remitted to prison. It does 
potentially pose more of a difficulty in cases where, as the Millan report recommended, there 
could be, high-risk offenders are made subject to a hospital order with restrictions and 
subsequently discovered to be untreatable; or it is found a mental disorder from which they 
have sufficiently recovered was not, in fact, causally connected to the risk presented. The effect 
of this would have been to return the law to its pre-1999 position. This is not directly addressed 
in the report, however, the Committee did pre-empt the possibility that this outcome would be 
avoided by the retention of the public safety test, and so it was recommended that conditional 
discharge should be an option for patients affected.261 This recommendation was ultimately 
adopted, and so indefinite detention with no therapeutic intent remains a possible outcome for 
those who are placed on a compulsion order with restrictions (as the order is now known).262 
4.6 RECEPTION OF THE REPORTS 
The MacLean report attracted relatively little academic attention, as did the recommendations 
made in respect of the criminal justice provisions by the Millan report. However, such 
engagement as there was viewed the proposals favourably. Leading forensic psychiatrist Rajan 
Darjee said of the MacLean recommendations that ‘[the] Scottish proposals are clearly 
concerned with offences and offending, and see the responsibility for public protection from 
high-risk offenders lying with the criminal justice system’.263 He also approved of the inclusion 
of an impaired judgement criterion, viewing it as a powerful safeguard for patient autonomy, 
as well as for those too unwell to take treatment decisions.264 Most of the Millan Committee’s 
recommendations were accepted by the Scottish Executive, and formed the basis of the Mental 
Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, but there were some alterations of 
significance. For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is sufficient to note that the report was 
 
259 Page 345, para. 30. 
260 See 6.4.1.D. 
261 Page 348, rec. 28.5. 
262 MHA 2003, s. 193(2)(b).  
263 R. Darjee, ‘The Reports of the Millan and MacLean Committees: new proposals for mental health legislation 
for high-risk offenders in Scotland’, (2003) 14:1 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology 7, 12. 
264 Ibid, 21 -22. 
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generally well received by the Scottish Executive. The same is true of the MacLean 
recommendations, which were substantially implemented in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) 
Act 2003.  
Although the implementation is dealt with later, it is perhaps useful to note that forensic 
psychiatric opinion on the MacLean recommendations appears to have been based substantially 
on a comparison with the approach to offenders with ‘severe’ personality disorders being 
piloted at the time in England and Wales. Known as the Dangerous and Severe Personality 
Disorder (DSPD) Programme, which involved ‘third-way institutions between secure 
psychiatric hospitals and prisons’.265 Later, it would become associated with the infamous 
imprisonment for public protection (IPP) sentences which would see offenders with personality 
disorders detained indefinitely on DSPD units.266 Like IPP itself, the DSPD programme was 
almost universally despised.267 Much of the opposition from health professionals was derived 
from the sense that it violated medical ethics by using doctors to detain patients for the 
protection of the public, without any reasonable prospect of that patient deriving benefit from 
the detention.268 That being so, from a medical standpoint, the proposals for the OLR would 
seem preferable because the OLR places high-risk offenders with mental disorders in the 
custody of the Prison Service: there is no medical ethical consideration, because only offenders 
who are thought to benefit from treatment will become the responsibility of psychiatrists. It is 
possible that because, at least initially, the MacLean and Millan proposals attracted the attention 
of psychiatrists who were entirely appropriately viewing them through a medical ethical prism, 
the OLR in particular escaped some of the criticism levelled at DSPD/IPP. Since the OLR’s 
inception in 2005, it has slowly begun to attract criminological and legal scholarship,  but there 
remains a clear need for more critical engagement from academics across disciplines. 
 
265 R. Darjee and J.H.M. Crichton, ‘The MacLean Committee: Scotland’s answer to the ‘dangerous people with 
severe personality disorder’ proposals?’, (2002) 26 Psychiatric Bulletin 6. 
266 See, for example, L. McRae, ‘Severe personality disorder, treatment engagement and the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2020: what you need to know’, (2016) 27:4 Journal of Forensic 
Psychiatry and Psychology 476. Essentially, people sentenced to IPP could be placed in the DSPD programme. 
267 See, for example, Darjee and Crichton (2002); A. Feeney, ‘Dangerous severe personality disorder’, (2003) 9 
Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 349; J.C. Beck, ‘Dangerous Severe Personality Disorder: The Controversy 
Continues’, (2010) 28 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 277; and P.E. Mullen, ‘Dangerous people with severe 
personality disorder: British proposals for managing them are glaringly wrong – and unethical’, (1999) 319 
British Medical Journal 1146. But see A. Maden, ‘Dangerous and severe personality disorder: antecedents and 
origins’, (2007) 190 (suppl. 49) British Journal of Psychiatry s. 8 for a rare, or perhaps unique, assessment of 
the programme which identifies some perceived strengths of the approach.  
268 See ibid. 
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4.7 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER FOUR 
This chapter has described the history and development of Scotland’s dangerous offender 
sentencing framework. The OLR, Scotland’s flagship sentence of preventive detention, evolved 
from a need to fill a gap which emerged in the criminal justice provisions of the Mental Health 
(Scotland) Act 1984. At the same time as the working group which proposed the OLR was 
operating, a review of the Mental Health Act was taking place. The two reviews made proposals 
for the management of high-risk offenders, with those of the MacLean Committee being the 
more significant. The MacLean recommendations resulted in the creation of the OLR: a new 
sentence which emphasised risk rather than mental disorder, which perhaps helped the OLR 
escape the kind of criticism that was targeted at the alternative and overtly personality disorder-
focused approach taken in England and Wales. The next two chapters discuss the OLR and the 




5. THE STATUTORY RISK FRAMEWORK 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The previous chapter set out the background to the OLR’s creation, and the proposals that were 
made by the Committee tasked with reviewing the law relating to the sentencing of serious 
violent and sexual offenders. This chapter is the first of two that consider the law relating to 
the OLR in detail. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive account of the statutory risk 
framework which governs the OLR’s operation. In particular, it sets out the procedures that 
must be followed before an OLR may be imposed. The OLR is, as was said earlier, an 
indeterminate sentence that operates, in many respects, like a life sentence. Its most 
distinguishing feature, however, is the requirement for a standardised risk assessment – the 
most robust available in the Scottish criminal justice system – which plays a central role in 
assisting the judge’s determination as to whether the criteria for making the OLR are met. 
These criteria receive detailed treatment in chapter six, but it is important that the pre-
sentencing process is given substantial consideration for three reasons. First, because it sets the 
OLR apart from other sentences; second, because despite its complexity and centrality to the 
OLR’s operation it has received very little attention in the literature – indeed, the account 
presented here is believed to be the most comprehensive of its kind, and is intended to go some 
way towards filling that gap; and third, because although there is some critical discussion here, 
setting out the framework in this way helps to lay the groundwork for analysis of the OLR as 
a whole in chapter six.  
A year after the MacLean Committee laid its report before the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish 
Executive published its White Paper on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders1 (hereafter the 
SVSO White Paper) intimating its intention to give effect to the majority of the Committee’s 
recommendations, including the creation of the OLR. This was achieved by the Criminal 
Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 which, among other things, inserted sections 210B to 210H into 
the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. The OLR itself is made under section 210F, and 
it is available in respect of certain offences2 the proceedings in respect of which commenced 
 
1 Scottish Executive, Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders White Paper (Edinburgh, 2001). Available at: 
https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20170701074158/http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2001/06/9
262/File-1 Accessed 17/2/2020.  
2 See 5.2 below. 
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on or after 20th June 2006.3 It will be recalled that the purpose of the OLR’s creation was to 
capture ‘exceptional’ offenders who present a serious risk to the public, and to manage that 
risk. The OLR, as an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, is clearly a punishment4 but it 
is principally a means of preventing serious future offending. For this reason, the decision 
whether to impose an OLR rests more on the offender’s risk profile than it does on the 
offence(s) of which he has been convicted. This is – as was said – what sets it apart from other 
sentences,5 and much of the statutory risk framework introduced by the 2003 Act is concerned 
with the criteria that must be satisfied if an OLR is to be made, and the manner in which this 
must be established.   
Section 5.2 considers the first of two orders that may be made by the court where it considers 
the criteria for making an OLR may be met: the risk assessment order (RAO). The second order 
– the interim compulsion order (ICO) with assessment of risk – can be made in cases where a 
mental health disposal, such as a CORO or hospital direction,6 is under consideration alongside 
an OLR. The ICO is discussed in section 5.3. The risk assessment report (RAR) is considered 
in detail in section 5.4. Particular attention is paid to use of allegation information in the report,7  
and the opinion on risk which is central to the judge’s determination as to whether the criteria 
for making an OLR are met.8 The chapter then concludes in section 5.5 before imposition of 
sentence is discussed in chapter six.  
All references to statutory provisions pertain to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
unless otherwise stated.  
5.2 THE RISK ASSESSMENT ORDER  
The OLR is a sentence in which the emphasis is on the offender, rather than the offence of 
which he is convicted. Rather than a list of offences like that upon which use of the extended 
sentence is based9 the OLR’s use is constrained by the ‘risk criteria’ which are set out in section 
210E. The risk criteria are considered later in detail,10 however they require the court to be 
 
3 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (Commencement No. 9) Order 2006/332 (SSI), art. 2(1) and (2).  
4 McCluskey v HM Advocate 2013 J.C. 107 at 18. 
5 Though there is some overlap with the extended sentence and the compulsion order, especially when combined 
with a restriction order. This is returned to briefly in chapter 6 of the thesis. 
6 See sections 6.4.1.D and 6.4.2.B. 
7 See 5.4.3. 
8 See 5.4.4. 
9 See s. 210A(10). Though this list is of some relevance as ‘sexual offence’ and ‘violent offence’ for the 
purposes of the OLR are as defined in that provision. See 5.2 below. 
10 See section 6.3. 
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satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities,11 there is a likelihood that the offender – if at 
liberty – will ‘seriously endanger the lives, or physical or psychological well-being, of 
members of the public at large’.12 If the court is satisfied the criteria are met, the OLR must be 
made – there is no discretion.13 This is in keeping with the recommendations of the MacLean 
Committee that the OLR be created to manage the risks presented by ‘exceptional offenders’,14 
and that an offence-based approach be rejected.15 Because of this focus on the individual 
offender and the risk he presents, the legislation requires that – before the court reaches a 
determination as to whether the risk criteria are met – a comprehensive standardised risk 
assessment be undertaken by a RMA-accredited risk assessor. The opinion of the assessor as 
to the level of risk the offender poses will have significant weight in the judge’s determination 
as to whether the risk criteria are met.16 It is this statutory pre-sentencing risk framework that 
sets the OLR apart from other indeterminate custodial sentences such as the mandatory life and 
discretionary life sentences in Scotland, and imprisonment for public protection in England 
and Wales, and its operation is crucial to limiting the OLR’s use. The risk assessment process 
is initiated in one of two ways: by the making of a risk assessment order, or an ICO with 
assessment of risk. The risk assessment order (RAO) is made under s. 210B of the 1995 Act, 
and the ICO with assessment of risk is made under sections 53 and 210D. This section considers 
the RAO, and section 5.3 considers the ICO.  
The risk assessment order is available in cases where an offender is to be sentenced in the High 
Court of Justiciary17 for a sexual offence;18 a violent offence19 other than murder;20 an offence 
which endangers life;21 or ‘an offence the nature of which, or the circumstances of the 
commission of which, are such that it appears to the court that the person has a propensity to 
commit [a sexual or violent offence, or an offence which endangers life]’.22 For the purposes 
of the provision, ‘violent offence’ and ‘sexual offence’ are as defined in section 210A(10),23 
 
11 s. 210F(1). 
12 s. 210E. 
13 s. 210F(1). Unless it is open to the court to make a compulsion order, in which case it may decide to make an 
OLR or a compulsion order. This is returned to later.  
14 MacLean Report, 34, para. 5.1.  
15 Ibid, 29, para. 4.17. See also 4.5.3.A. 
16 See section 6.3 of the thesis.  
17 s. 210B(1). 
18 s. 210B(1)(a)(i). 
19 s. 210B(1)(a)(ii). 
20 s. 210B(1). 
21 s. 210B(1)(a)(iii). 
22 s. 210B(1)(b). 
23 This provision contains an exhaustive list of statutory and common law sexual offences including rape, incest, 
offences of possessing, taking and distributing indecent images of children, and a residual offence category for 
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but the remaining categories – especially the last – are very broad in scope indeed. The question 
of whether the risk criteria may be met can be considered on the motion of the prosecutor, or 
by the court at its own instance24 and there is no appeal against the making of – or refusal to 
make – a RAO.25 Over the period 2019/20, the High Court made 21 RAOs.26 The MacLean 
Committee envisaged that the residual offence category would only be engaged, and that the 
court would only consider the risk criteria at its own instance, in exceptional circumstances;27 
and the Scottish Executive initially agreed.28 No such qualification appears in the legislation, 
however. 
The effect of the RAO is that the offender is remanded in custody for the purpose of allowing 
an accredited risk assessor to prepare a report ‘as to what risk his being at liberty presents to 
the safety of the public at large’.29 Section 210B(4) provides that the case will then be adjourned 
‘for a period not exceeding ninety days’, but in practice no adjournment will be shorter than 
this.30 The court may grant one further extension of up to a further 90 days on cause shown.31 
Beyond this, if there are exceptional circumstances outwith the assessor’s control which mean 
that the report cannot be completed within that timescale, the court may grant a further 
extension, the duration being that which it considers appropriate.32  
5.2.1 SCOPE 
The application of section 210B is somewhat constrained by section 210E since the court must 
consider that the risk criteria may be met if a RAO is to be made, but if it does consider the 
criteria may be met it must make a RAO.33 The only clear exceptions to the requirement to 
make a RAO are where an ICO is made by virtue of s. 210D(1),34 and where the offender is 
 
offences not specified in subsection ten, but where the court considers there was a ‘significant sexual aspect to 
the offender’s behaviour’. In contrast, a violent offence is simply defined as an offence, which is not a sexual 
offence as defined in section 210A(10), and which infers personal violence. 
24 s. 210B(2). 
25 s. 210B(6). 
26 Risk Management Authority, Annual Report and Accounts 2019/20 (Paisley, 2020), 38. 
27 MacLean Report, 4, rec. 1; and 42, rec. 20. 
28 SVSO White Paper, 47 and 52. 
29 s. 210B(3). 
30 Risk Management Authority, Standards and Guidelines: Risk Assessment Report Writing (Paisley, 2018), 6, 
para. 16 (hereafter ‘RAR Standards’). 
31 s. 210B(5). 
32 Ibid. 
33 s. 210B(2). 
34 s. 210B(2)(a). ‘By virtue of’ is the language of the statute: s. 210D(1) requires that the ICO is made where the 
criteria for an ICO are met, but the ICO itself is made under s. 53. See 5.3 below.  
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already subject to an OLR previously imposed.35 It is, however, worth saying something of the 
legislation’s interaction with offences, the penalties for which are fixed by legislation. In 
Henderson v HM Advocate,36 the appellant had been convicted of possessing a firearm without 
holding a valid firearms certificate in contravention of section 1 of the Firearms Act 1968. The 
maximum period of imprisonment applicable to that offence when charged on indictment is 
five years, or seven years if aggravated.37 The appellant’s criminal record was ‘extensive’, 
including several convictions for violence. 38 He had also previously served a sentence of two 
years’ imprisonment for a prior aggravated violation of section 1. The judge raised, at his own 
instance, the possibility that the risk criteria were met. Counsel for the appellant argued that it 
was not open to the court to make a RAO because the offence did not fall into one of the 
categories, and that an OLR would be incompetent because the maximum sentence had been 
fixed by U.K. parliamentary legislation, the subject matter of which was reserved.39 These 
submissions were rejected, and the judge made a RAO. He subsequently imposed an OLR with 
a punishment part of 1 year and 8 months.40  
An appeal was lodged, and submissions were again made that neither the RAO nor the OLR 
were competent. This being so, it was argued, the 1995 Act could not be read as having 
extended the OLR to the firearms offence because it would be outwith the Scottish Parliament’s 
competence to ‘override’ the sentence.41 The advocate depute agreed that the OLR had not 
been competently imposed and invited the court to substitute a determinate sentence.42 He 
declined to express a view as to whether the OLR might be competent where a sentence was 
limited by statute in an area of devolved competence, and the court reserved its opinion on the 
matter:43 this point was addressed in a subsequent decision,44 and it is returned to later. The 
court held that the OLR was not competent, quashed it, and substituted a determinate sentence 
of 3 years and 4 months.45  
Henderson is authority that an OLR cannot be made where the relevant offence is subject to a 
reserved statutory maximum penalty lower than life imprisonment. It does not discuss the 
 
35 s. 210B(2)(b). 
36 2011 J.C. 96. 
37 1968 Act, sch. 6, part 1, para. 1. 
38 Henderson, at 3. 
39 Ibid, at 4. 
40 Ibid, at 5. 
41 Ibid, at 6. 
42 Ibid, at 7. 
43 Ibid, at 11.  
44 McCluskey v HM Advocate 2013 J.C. 107, at 18. 
45 Henderson, at 13. 
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competence of the RAO in those circumstances.46 The decision does, however, invite some 
consideration of the relationship between the RAO and the OLR. Making an OLR requires that 
a RAO or an ICO with assessment of risk be made first;47 therefore, if the criteria for making 
the RAO are not met, the criteria for making an OLR cannot be met. Section 210B does not 
mention the OLR. This is because the legislation has been drafted so that consideration of 
whether the risk criteria may be met, and later in the process consideration of whether they are 
met, serves as a proxy for the question of whether an OLR is the appropriate disposal: the RAO 
is the OLR’s gatekeeper; not the other way around.  So, if an offender falls to be sentenced for 
an offence of the type specified in section 210B(1)(a), and the court considers the risk criteria 
may be met, the RAO must be made;48 if, having considered the RAR and other reports before 
it, the court finds that the risk criteria are met, then an OLR must be imposed.49 The only 
exclusion from the requirement to make a RAO (or a section 210D order), is where the offender 
is already subject to an OLR; the only offence that is excluded from the auspices of 210B is 
murder. This lack of discretion is a core feature of the OLR’s framework designed to 
standardise approaches taken to sentencing high-risk serious violent and sexual offenders.  
Essentially, the legislation operates on the premise that in cases where the section 210E risk 
criteria are met an OLR is necessary, though the application is limited to some degree by the 
offence categories. This approach leaves open the possibility that an offender might meet the 
criteria that requires the making of a RAO, and subsequently the criteria that mandates the 
imposition of an OLR, but in circumstances where the OLR is not competent. Henderson may 
be such a case, but no consideration was given to whether the offence was properly considered 
to fall under section 210B(1), or whether the risk criteria are met because the case was decided 
on the basis that the OLR exceeded the statutory penalty and had to be quashed. It would be 
absurd if a court were compelled to make an order which is a procedural step towards a final 
disposal which itself could not be imposed. This means that either statutory sentencing limits 
have to be read into the section 210B as an exception, or that the provision requires amendment. 
 
46 It seems that Lord Uist, who made the RAO in respect of Henderson, considered that the offence, when 
combined with his history of violent offending, indicated that he had a propensity to commit a serious violent 
offence in the future. The question of whether this really was a relevant offence was raised by the appellant but 
never explored in the judgment, the appeal having been decided on the basis that the OLR was incompetent and 
required to be quashed. One of the arguments advanced by the appellant was that the criteria for making a RAO 
were not met, and therefore it had not been open to the judge to make a RAO in the first place – see para. 6 of 
the judgement. 
47 The ICO is discussed in the next section of the chapter, however, it should be noted that the making of an ICO 
with assessment of risk requires that the criteria for a RAO are also met.  
48 s. 210B(2). 
49 s. 210F(1). 
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Section 53, for example, under which the ICO is imposed, uses the formulation ‘convicted…of 
an offence punishable by imprisonment (other than an offence the sentence for which is fixed 
by law)’50 to delineate its scope. If that sort of approach were to be taken, it would additionally 
offer Parliament the opportunity to consider whether its intention really is, as determined in 
McCluskey v HM Advocate,51 that the OLR extend to cases where a maximum sentence over 
which power is devolved is set by statute.  
5.2.2 APPEALS AND THE RISK ASSESSMENT ORDER  
As has been said, section 210B(6) expressly prohibits appeal against the making of, or refusal 
to make, a RAO. McSherry and Keyzer have said that this raises ‘issues of fairness’ to the 
offender subject to the order,52 but elaborate no further. Lord Carloway, in his judgment in 
Ferguson v HM Advocate,53 does discuss the reasons that the RAO cannot be appealed and 
appears to consider the provision relatively unproblematic.54 
The rationale behind [section 210B(6)] is straightforward. The RAO may, 
or may not, result in an OLR. It is simply a necessary procedural step on 
the way towards determining whether the risk criteria are met. It involves 
the court obtaining certain statutorily prescribed information but, that 
apart, the process is little different from any adjournment in order to 
achieve clarity on a particular matter affecting sentence. Even if the statute 
had not expressly excluded an appeal, it is highly doubtful whether a party 
could competently have challenged the making (or refusal) of a RAO.  
His Lordship subsequently raised the – rather remote – possibility of challenge by way of bill 
of advocation, though noting that this would require ‘exceptional circumstances’ to arise.55 It 
is also perhaps worth considering the lack of discretion built into the OLR’s sentencing 
framework. One of its key purposes was, it will be recalled, to address the discretionary nature 
of life sentencing in non-murder cases.56 The provisions were structured so that if a judge 
considered the risk criteria may be met he had no option but to make the RAO; conversely, if 
he did not consider the risk criteria met he could not make a RAO. The inclusion of sub-section 
6 might have been intended to ensure that a judge’s decision to trigger the risk assessment 
process could not be undermined. 
 
50 s. 53(1)(a). 
51 2013 J.C. 107. 
52 McSherry and Keyzer (2009), 101. 
53 2014 S.L.T. 431. 
54 Ibid, at 85 . 
55 Ibid. 
56 See the discussion in chapter 4 at 4.5.4. 
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The situation in cases which begin in the sheriff court is similar,57 although a RAO cannot be 
made in the sheriff court. The CJ(S)A 2003 amended section 195(1) to require the sheriff to 
remit any case where he considers the risk criteria may be met to the High Court of Justiciary.58 
Like a judge considering making a RAO, the sheriff has no discretion in whether to remit the 
case if he considers the risk criteria may be met. There is no appeal against the decision of the 
sheriff to remit the case, or not59 although the Crown may appeal if it considers the sentence 
imposed unduly lenient.60 In HM Advocate v McCuaig61 the sheriff, having considered a 
criminal justice social work report (CJSWR) and the reports of two forensic psychologists, 
passed an extended sentence on an offender convicted of 20 offences, including the taking, 
distribution, or showing of indecent images of children, and possession of extreme 
pornographic images.62 The Crown subsequently appealed, arguing that the extended sentence 
was unduly lenient because the sheriff ought to have taken the view that the risk criteria may 
have been met and remitted the case so that a RAO could be considered. The advocate depute 
acknowledged that his submission was ‘most unusual’.63 The court was, however, satisfied that 
the sheriff had carefully considered the reports before her and that the extended sentence was 
a disposal that she could reasonably have considered appropriate.64 Of significance was that 
the sheriff had relied upon reports of highly experienced psychologists and neither had 
explicitly said that the OLR was necessary, or that the respondent posed a ‘very high’ risk, and 
that the prosecutor at first instance had not at any stage intimated that he considered that the 
risk criteria may be met.  Also deemed to be of relevance was that the RAO is not appealable 
and therefore, even if the sheriff had the power to make one herself, her decision not to do so 
could not have been appealed.65 This last point is of some interest. 
The advocate depute’s argument was that the extended sentence was unduly lenient because 
the sheriff should have concluded that the risk criteria were met; if this were so, a RAO ought 
to have been made and this, in turn, would have required her to remit the case to the High Court 
for sentencing. Despite the court’s observation that the refusal to make a RAO is not appealable 
 
57 There is no data available on the number of cases remitted to the High Court for sentencing specifically on the 
grounds the sheriff considers the risk criteria are met, but it does happen. See, for example, Johnstone v HM 
Advocate 2012 J.C. 79; M v HM Advocate 2012 S.L.T. 147; O’Leary v HM Advocate 2014 S.C.C.R. 422; 
McKinlay v HM Advocate [2019] H.C.J.A.C. 15.  
58 s. 195(1) as amended by the CJ(S)A 2003, sch. 1, para. 2(5)(a).  
59 McGhee v HM Advocate 2006 S.C.C.R. 712, at 6. 
60 s. 108(1)(a). 
61 [2018] H.C.J.A.C. 55. 
62 Ibid, at 3. 
63 Ibid, at 28. 
64 Which could not, therefore, be considered unduly lenient: HM Advocate v Bell 1995 S.C.C.R. 244, 250 D. 
65 McCuaig, at 36. 
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– and the principle that the decision as to whether to remit a case for sentencing is not one with 
which the High Court should interfere66 – their Lordships engaged in in-depth enquiry into the 
basis of the sheriff’s decision not to remit the case for sentence. They consulted the sheriff’s 
report, the CJSWR, and the psychologist’s report. They drew out the sheriff’s reasons for 
having arrived at the decision that the extended sentence was the appropriate disposal. They 
noted that she had relied upon the psychologists’ reports more heavily than the CJSWR and 
concluded that she was ‘plainly correct to do so’.67  
McCuaig stands out because the argument is explicitly that a RAO should have been made. 
But any prosecution appeal against the making of an extended sentence (as opposed to the 
length of that sentence) is an argument that an OLR was the appropriate disposal: this is so 
regardless of whether an ‘unusual’ argument of the sort advanced in this case is made. If an 
OLR is to be made, then a RAO must first be made. It is true that, however phrased, this is an 
appeal against the sentence imposed rather than an appeal against the refusal to remit the case 
for sentencing, but the court has demonstrated great reluctance to revisit the question of the 
appropriateness of a RAO when raised on behalf of the offender. For example, Henderson, 
discussed above, where the court ignored the appellant’s submissions that the criteria for 
making the RAO were not met, addressing the OLR instead, and O’Leary v HM Advocate,68 
considered in section 5.4.3 below. In that case a compatibility issue was raised, arguing that 
section 210B violated the offender’s article 6 rights. The court was clear that the procedure 
could not be used to quash a RAO.69 Simply put, where appellant counsel has sought to explore 
avenues of challenging the decision to make a RAO, the courts have rather robustly closed 
them down; but the availability of a Crown appeal against an extended sentence would seem 
to entail something that is tantamount to an appeal against the refusal to make a RAO. HM 
Advocate v McCuaig would seem to be an example of it, albeit an unsuccessful one.  
If this interpretation is correct, it would seem that offenders in respect of whom a RAO is made 
are disadvantaged by the lack of provision for appeal against the RAO. Notwithstanding the 
point made in Ferguson about procedural steps not generally being subject to appeal, ICOs 
may be appealed in the same way as a sentence.70 The RAO and ICO are of roughly the same 
 
66 McGhee, at 6. 
67 McCuaig, at 39. 
68 2014 S.C.C.R. 421. 
69 Ibid, at 25. 
70 s. 60. 
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duration – 90 days and 12 weeks respectively – so it cannot be a matter of lack of time.71 Given 
that the function of the RAO is to enable a depth of enquiry into an offender and his 
circumstances that is not possible without it, and that the product of that enquiry – the RAR – 
may have consequences for the offender in terms of risk management and progression 
regardless of whether an OLR is imposed,72 it is not clear at all that the RAO is akin to any 
other adjournment. At the very least, there is no obvious reason as to why there should not be 
an appeal against its making, especially given that a decision that a RAO is not appropriate 
appears to be open to challenge, albeit somewhat tangentially.  
5.3 THE INTERIM COMPULSION ORDER WITH 
ASSESSMENT OF RISK 
The alternative to the RAO is the ICO with assessment of risk. It should be noted that although 
the relevant section heading in the 1995 Act is ‘Interim hospital order and assessment of risk’, 
the order that is made is in fact an ICO.73 The IHO is the order that was available prior to the 
introduction of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 and the creation 
of the ICO.74 The making of an order under section 210D triggers the formal risk assessment 
process and, like the RAO, requires that an RMA-accredited risk assessor prepare a report,75 
but the ICO itself is made under section 53 of the 1995 Act. Not all assessors accredited for 
RAO assessments will be accredited for the purposes of section 210D. Those who wish section 
210D accreditation must have at least three years’ experience working in a forensic mental 
health setting.76 An ICO with risk assessment is appropriate in cases where the court is 
considering a sentence of imprisonment – which might be an OLR – and is also contemplating 
the possibility of a hospital disposal, such as a compulsion order with restriction order (CORO), 
 
71 Though as discussed later, the ICO may, subject to renewal, last as long as one year. 
72 See 5.4 for detailed discussion of the RAR. 
73 s. 210D(1). 
74 See the discussion at 4.5.2.D in chapter four. The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 was the 7th Act passed 
by the Scottish Parliament that year; the MHA 2003 was the 13th. Rather than the MHA 2003 amending the 
1995 Act directly, it amended the CJ(S)A 2003, which in turn amended s. 210D when the MHA 2003 came into 
force. Whatever the reason for approaching it in this manner, the substance of the provision was changed whilst 
its title was not. 
75 s. 210D(2). 
76 Risk Management Authority, Accreditation of Risk Assessors: Information for Applicants (Paisley, undated), 
3. 
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or a hospital direction (HD). Both the CORO and the HD are discussed briefly as alternatives 
to the OLR in chapter six.  
It is worth noting at this point that there are two separate provisions under which an ICO can 
be made. Section 53 ICOs are made in respect of convicted persons, but an ICO can be made 
under section 57(2)(bb) where someone is acquitted by reason of the special defence set out 
section 51A of the 1995 Act,77 or following an examination of facts where he has been found 
unfit for trial.78 Only those made under section 53 are of interest since we are concerned with 
disposals upon conviction, and the section 210D order can only be made alongside a section 
53 ICO since it is part of a sentencing process. The ICO can be made in the sheriff court or the 
High Court,79 but the section 210D order, like the RAO, can only be made in the High Court;80 
all ICOs which might result in an OLR will therefore be made in the High Court.  
An ICO is available where the offender has been convicted of an offence punishable by 
imprisonment, other than an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law.81 The judge must 
be satisfied on the written or oral evidence of two medical practitioners that: (1) the offender 
has a mental disorder;82 (2) there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is likely medical 
treatment is available that will prevent the mental disorder worsening,83 or alleviate any of the 
symptoms or effects of the disorder;84 (3) it is likely that if such treatment were not provided 
that there would be a significant risk to the health, safety or welfare of the offender,85 or to the 
safety of any other person;86 and (4) that the making of the order is necessary.87 ‘Necessary’ is 
not defined by the legislation; however it may not be necessary to make an ICO where the 
offender has already been subject to a period of assessment or treatment before trial, for 
example, on an assessment order88or treatment order.89 This is because the purpose of the ICO 
 
77 When successfully pled, this defence results in acquittal on the basis that the individual was not criminally 
responsible for their conduct by reason of mental disorder. 
78 The “acquittal ICO” should not be confused with the temporary compulsion order which is available under 
section 54(1)(c) following a finding of unfitness for trial and pending an examination of facts. A temporary 
compulsion order may be followed by an ICO when the examination of facts is concluded, provided other 
relevant criteria are met. 
79 s. 53(1)(a). 
80 s. 210D(1). 
81 s. 53(1), although this criterion is clearly satisfied in any case in which an OLR would be a competent 
disposal. 
82 s. 53(2)(a)(i). 
83 s. 53(5)(a)(i). 
84 s. 53(5)(a)(ii). 
85 s. 53(5)(b)(i). 
86 s. 53(5)(b)(ii). 
87 s. 53(5)(c). 
88 Made under s. 52D on the application of the prosecutor. 
89 Made under s. 52M on the application of the prosecutor. 
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is to enable prolonged assessment of the offender’s mental health and care needs, including 
clarification of his diagnosis, the nature of the relationship (if any) between his offence and the 
mental disorder, the risk the offender may pose and whether this may be mitigated by treatment 
for the mental disorder.90  
Offenders subject to an ICO are detained in hospital for 12 weeks initially,91 but the order can 
be renewed provided the total of the initial period and the extensions does not exceed 12 
months.92 The ICO engages part 16 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 
2003, meaning that it authorises the giving of compulsory medical treatment to the patient. In 
contrast to the civil compulsion provisions of the 2003 Act, no account is taken of the 
offender’s ability or capacity to consent to or refuse treatment.93 People subject to an ICO have 
restricted patient status, meaning that the consent of the Scottish Ministers must be obtained 
before any temporary suspension of the order’s conditions is granted.94 
The OLR, it will be recalled, has its origins in judicial decisions about the preventive detention 
of high-risk offenders detained in hospital who could not be treated.95 Although section 210D 
quite obviously cannot prevent error in diagnosis and in the consequent determination that 
someone ought to be subject to detention in hospital, rather than imprisonment, it does permit 
the sentencing judge to assess the suitability of both a compulsion order and an OLR at the 
same time. One of the options in such circumstances is a hybrid disposal: that is, where – 
following the making of orders under sections 53 and 210D – an offender is found to satisfy 
the criteria for both the OLR and the compulsion order, the court may make a hospital direction 
in addition to the OLR.96 The criteria for making a hospital direction (HD) are outlined later,97 
but the HD’s effect is that an offender subject to it begins his sentence in hospital and remains 
there until his mental health improves sufficiently that his continued detention in hospital is 
unnecessary, or it is established that – as in Reid and Ruddle98 – he does not, in fact, suffer 
 
90 MHA 2003 Code, vol. 3, 102, para. 3. 
91 s. 53(8A)(b). 
92 s. 53B(5). 
93 Persons may only be detained and/or treated under the 2003 Act’s non-criminal justice provisions if their 
ability to take decisions about treatment for their mental disorder is significantly impaired by that mental 
disorder. See s. 36(4)(a), s. 44(4)(b), and s. 57(3)(d) of the MHA 2003. There is no analogue of this test in any 
of the criminal justice mental health orders.  
94 s. 224 of the MHA 2003. 
95 See sections 4.3 and 4.4 of chapter four. 
96 s. 210F(1) and s. 59A(2). 
97 See section 6.4.1.D. 
98 Reid v The Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 S.C. (H.L.) 17; Ruddle v The Secretary of State for Scotland 
1999 G.W.D. 29 – 1395 (Sh. Ct.); see section 4.3 of the thesis.  
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from a mental disorder which is amenable to treatment. In either case the offender is transferred 
back to prison to serve his sentence in the normal way.99 If the judge only made an ICO, then 
no risk assessment report would be submitted under section 210C of the 1995 Act and an OLR 
would not be a competent disposal; if only a RAO was made, the appropriateness of a hospital 
order associated with restrictions would not be adequately explored.100 Unlike the RAO, the 
imposition of the ICO under section 53 may be appealed;101 this matters because the ICO 
permits compulsory treatment.102 The Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland (MWC) – the 
body which has oversight of the operation of the MHA 2003 and the mental health provisions 
of the 1995 Act – reports that 15 ICOs were made in 2018–2019.103 There is no indication of 
how many of these were associated with a section 210D order in either the MWC statistical 
reports or the RMA’s annual reports.104 This is regrettable since such data would be useful for 
charting the pathways that high-risk offenders follow from conviction to sentence. 
5.4 THE RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT 
Strictly speaking, a RAR is a report prepared and submitted under section 210C in respect of 
an offender subject to a RAO. In section 210D(2) the report is simply described as ‘a report as 
to the risk the convicted person’s being at liberty presents to the safety of the public at large’.105 
This is the same as the definition given of ‘risk assessment report’ in section 210B(3), and both 
reports require to be prepared by accredited risk assessors in accordance with the RMA’s 
Standards and Guidelines for Risk Assessment Report Writing (hereafter ‘the RAR 
 
99 The normal operation of the OLR is discussed at section 6.4 of the thesis. 
100 Though a CO/CORO could be competent following an RAO alone where the court is satisfied it would not 
have been appropriate to make an ICO in the circumstances: see s. 59(2A). The making of a CO/CORO without 
first having made an ICO is considered extremely bad practice, however. See the MHA 2003 Code vol. 3, 103, 
para. 7. It should, however, be emphasised that if at the point the court reaches the determination that the risk 
criteria might be met, it is also aware that it may make an ICO it must make an ICO with assessment of risk 
under ss. 53 and 210D. 
101 s. 60. It should be noted that the 1995 Act contains duplicates of sections 59A, 60, 60A and 60B. Those 
which contain the relevant provisions are found under the ‘Hospital Directions’ heading.  
102 s. 53(8)(c). 
103 Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, Mental Health Act Monitoring Report 2018–19 (Edinburgh, 
2019), 47, table 6.3.1. 
104 Any attempt to extrapolate from the data that is available would be ineffective. Though there are far fewer 
COROs made than OLRs each year (in 2018–19 there were 7), some ICOs may lead to a compulsion order 
without restrictions; others may lead to a hospital direction, and still others might result in a prison sentence. 
Additionally, some RAOs carry over from one year to another meaning that it is not possible simply to subtract 
the number of risk assessment reports from the number of RAOs.  
105 See also s. 210D(3): ‘…shall apply in respect of any such report as it does in respect of a risk assessment 
report.’ 
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Standards’).106 In its documentation, the RMA refers to both reports as RARs107 and the 
literature makes no distinction between them.108 For reasons of convenience this convention is 
adopted here. There are, however, some differences in the provisions relating to the section 
210C RAR and the section 210D report. These will be highlighted as they arise.  
It is important to note two things at this point. First, that the RAR Standards must be read in 
the context of the Framework for Risk Assessment, Management and Evaluation (FRAME),109 
and the Standards and Guidelines for Risk Management, rather than taken in insolation,110 as 
the objective is to promote an integrated approach to risk assessment and risk management of 
which the RAR is one part. Second, assessors – and others that have functions in relation to the 
assessment of risk, including those engaged to undertake defence reports in OLR cases111 – 
have a statutory obligation to ‘have regard to’ the guidance;112 but this does not amount to a 
requirement to follow the procedures therein to the letter in all cases. Instead assessors must 
show that they have given the guidelines ‘explicit and express consideration’,113 the 
expectation being that the guidance is adhered to unless there are compelling reasons why it 
cannot be or should not be. In such a case, assessors must offer a ‘reasoned explanation’ as to 
why they have deviated from the guidance – this is what the RMA terms the requirement to 
‘comply or explain’.114 
5.4.1 STRUCTURED PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT  
The RAR serves two main functions. It assists the sentencing judge in his determination as to 
whether the risk criteria are met,115 and it helps to inform risk management planning whether 
or not the offender is ultimately made subject to an OLR.116 Compiling an RAR is an intensive 
process and can take up to 120 hours.117Assessors undertaking RARs are required to employ a 
 
106 CJ(S)A 2003, s. 5(2); 1995 Act, s. 210B(3)(a) and s. 210D(2); RAR Standards, 4, para. 2. 
107 Ibid; RMA Risk Assessment Report Template ‘Declaration of Competence’ (Document available by 
download at https://www.rma.scot/standards-guidelines/risk-assessment/ Accessed 25th March 2020). 
108 See, for example, Darjee and Russell (2011) 220 – 226; Fyfe and Gailey (2011), 206 and 214; and McSherry 
and Keyzer (2009), 65. 
109 Risk Management Authority Framework for Risk Assessment, Management, and Evaluation: FRAME 
(Paisley, 2011). FRAME is an ongoing inter-agency collaborative project which builds upon Scotland’s Multi-
Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA).  
110 RAR Standards, 9, para. 28. 
111 Ibid, 5, para. 7. Defence reports are discussed later.  
112 CJ(S)A 2003, s. 5(2). 
113 RAR Standards, 5, para. 8. 
114 Ibid.  
115 s. 210F(1)(a) and (b). 
116 RAR Standards, 31, para. 53. 
117 Darjee and Russell (2011), 221. 
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structured professional judgement approach,118 which must be supported by a wide variety of 
evidence obtained from a range of different sources. This is what FRAME calls a ‘scrutiny of 
risk’119 approach, which is appropriate in the most ‘complex and concerning’ cases.120 Such an 
approach entails a ‘detailed and individualised understanding of the onset, maintenance and 
occurrence of sexual and/or violent offending over time, and the likelihood of further such 
behaviour in the future. This then informs the production of a detailed and individualised risk 
management plan.’121 Sources of information may include CJSWRs, psychological reports, 
Parole Board reports, medical records, educational and employment records, and previously 
completed risk assessment reports.122 The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
(COPFS) will provide a report on the prosecution evidence and any relevant statements that 
they have.123 It is also expected that assessors will conduct interviews with the offender, and 
relevant others124 such as the offender’s family and friends, victims, and professionals that have 
had contact with the offender.125  
As is characteristic of SPJ, the process involves the use of one or more risk assessment 
instruments. In the earlier years of the OLR’s operation, the guidance was more prescriptive 
than it is currently. The Standards and Guidelines for Risk Assessment published in 2006 and 
revised in 2013 mandated the application of tools approved by the RMA for use i.e. those 
included in RATED.126 Actuarial risk assessment instruments (ARAIs) could be used, but only 
where a SPJ tool was also used; it was permissible to use only one instrument, but that had to 
be a SPJ instrument.127 Assessors considered this to be overly-constraining, however,128 and 
the current RAR Standards simply require that assessors select ‘empirically supported’ tools 
appropriate to the individual case.129 The choice of instrument of course depends on the 
offender’s characteristics and the nature of the risk to be assessed as well as the assessor’s 
familiarity and experience with the instruments.130 The RMA’s Risk Assessment Tools 
 
118 See 3.4.2 of chapter 3.  
119 FRAME, 55. 
120 RAR Standards, 9, para. 28. 
121 Ibid. This is in contrast to lower ‘tier’ approaches in less complex/demanding cases. See FRAME, 51–55. 
122 RAR Standards, 16, para. 33. 
123 Ibid, 15, para. 31. 
124 Ibid, para. 34. 
125 Ibid, para. 33. 
126 Risk Management Authority, Standards and Guidelines for Risk Assessment (Paisley, 2013), 16. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Darjee and Russell (2011), 221. 
129 RAR Standards, 17, para. 38. 
130 Ibid.  
 148 
Evaluation Directory (RATED)131 groups risk tools according to applicability, sets out the 
evidence supporting their use, gives information on the strengths and limitations of each 
instrument, and specifies the training and experience that an assessor must have in order to use 
the tool properly.132 The Directory includes both actuarial and SPJ tools that have been 
validated for use on different populations and the RMA encourages an approach to assessment 
that involves both, but emphasises professional judgement. 133 If the nature of the offending at 
issue is such that no tool is of relevance, the assessor should consult the scientific and clinical 
literature in order to develop a ‘defensible’ approach to the assessment.134 
The reason for this emphasis is that the RAR is not simply the product of a predictive exercise, 
though that is a part of it. The RMA’s model is one in which risk assessment is viewed as part 
of risk management, and therefore one of the key purposes of the RAR is to inform risk 
management planning whether or not the offender is ultimately made subject to an OLR.135 
This requires far more insight into the offender and his offences than could be garnered from 
statistically derived probabilities, though these may contribute to it.136 SPJ tools address 
specific categories of offending,137 e.g. violent offending, sexual offending, intimate partner 
violence/stalking, and they are more appropriate to the development of a ‘narrative risk 
formulation’.138  
Formulation in this context is both a way of conceptualising risk and of communicating it.139 
Such an approach aims to contextualise the information that has been gathered during the risk 
 
131 RATED (http://www.rma.scot/research/rated/). One of the strengths of the Directory is that it is a fully online 
unprotected resource and so available to anyone who wishes to access it, but it consists of a large number of 
PDFs under sub-headings rather than a single document. Most of these files do not have page numbers, which is 
why they are omitted from some references.  
132 RATED; and RAR Standards, 17, para. 39. 
133 RATED: Introduction (https://www.rma.scot/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/RATED_Introduction_1_Background-to-RATED_September-2019.pdf)  
134 Darjee and Russell (2011), 223. 
135 RAR Standards, 31, para. 53. 
136 For example, the Level of Service Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI). It is one of the validated tools 
included under RATED’s ‘General Risk’ heading and is designed to help services providers identify and plan 
interventions that are appropriate to the needs of the offender. It includes 43 items under eight headings and 
produces a score which places the offender on a five-point risk scale which runs from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’ 
risk. The score can be adjusted based on the assessor’s judgement. The LS/CMI is discussed again later in the 
context of offender characteristics, but for a more detailed discussion of the role of clinical judgement in the 
tool’s application see J.P. Guay and G. Parent, ‘Broken Legs, Clinical Overrides, and Recidivism Risk: An 
Analysis of Decisions to Adjust Risk Levels with the LS/CMI’ (2017) 45:1 Criminal Justice and Behaviour 82.  
137 RATED: Introduction. Though there are some ARAIs of this type too e.g. the Static-2002R which is a tool 
for assessing risk of sexual offending. See: https://www.rma.scot/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/RATED_Static-
2002R_August-2019_Hyperlink-Version.pdf  
138 RAR Standards, 20, para. 41. 
139 S. Hart et al., ‘Forensic case formulation’, (2011) 10:2 International Journal of Mental Health 118, 119. 
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assessment process and the conclusions that the assessor has drawn from it. The narrative risk 
formulation presents an analysis of the nature, frequency, and severity of offending before and 
including the index offence.140 The objective to is explain why offending occurs, and what the 
early warning signs of repeat offending might be, so that opportunities to intervene may be 
identified. The RAR also addresses the individual’s engagement and compliance with risk 
management measures previously, and their motivation to engage at the time of the 
assessment.141 This has significance for the risk classification, as well as the determination 
about whether measures short of an OLR may be sufficient. 
A key part of the formulation is the development of future risk scenarios to assist the court in 
determining whether the risk criteria are met, and to assist in risk management planning. Future 
risk scenarios are hypothetical situations in which the interaction of the characteristics of the 
offender and the circumstances in which he finds himself are likely, in the examiner’s 
judgement, to produce offending behaviour of a particular nature.142 Assessors are expected to 
be explicit about the limitations of such an exercise in terms of the difficulties of projecting the 
likelihood of particular conduct over the long-term,143 and the need to revise the scenarios over 
time as circumstances change and new information becomes available.144  
The RMA encourages assessors to consider ‘victim-related issues and impact’ in compiling the 
RAR.145 This includes directly involving victims, where possible, in order to obtain information 
from them on the way the offending behaviour has affected them. The risk formulation should 
include suggestions as to how victims might be kept safe. The Standards and Guidelines direct 
assessors to a range of resources to ensure any engagement with victims, and use of the 
information they provide, is lawful and reflects best practices.146 Where direct victim 
engagement is not appropriate, it may be possible for assessors to gain some insight into their 
experiences via other agencies who may have dealt with them, for example, domestic abuse 
advocacy or support services.147  
 
140 RAR Standards, 20, para. 41. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid, 21, para. 43. 
143 Ibid, 25, para. 49. 
144 Ibid, 21, para. 43. 
145 Ibid, 8, para. 26. 
146 These include the Victims’ Code for Scotland, and the Standards of Service for Victims and Witnesses See 9, 
para. 28. 
147 Ibid, 9, para. 27. 
 150 
5.4.2 OFFENDER ENGAGEMENT 
One of the most valuable sources of information on which to base the assessment is the offender, 
and the RAR Standards place a great deal of importance on offender engagement. The 2013 
guidance specified that the assessor should meet the offender in person at least three times 
across several weeks, and that total contact time should be at least 6 hours.148 As with choice 
of risk tools, however, the present guidelines accord the assessor more discretion: ‘[the] 
assessor should ensure an appropriate number of interviews with the individual and these should 
be spread over several occasions, spanning several weeks’.149 In addition to the face-to-face 
contact time during which the assessment takes place, there must be a ‘feedback session’.150 
The feedback session occurs after the assessment has been completed, but before the RAR has 
been submitted. It provides an opportunity for the assessor to go through the report with the 
offender, and for the offender to comment on it and may result in amendments being made 
before the RAR is finalised.151 
Assessors are expected to make every reasonable attempt to encourage the offender to 
engage,152 but where the offender refuses the assessor should document this and set out the 
effect of this on the evaluation of risk.153 Darjee and Russell – both RMA accredited risk 
assessors154 – acknowledge the ethical difficulty in proceeding without the offender’s consent, 
but point out that the criminal justice system could not function if assessments could not be 
carried out in the absence of consent.155 They suggest that the most ethical course of action 
where co-operation is refused is (1) to make multiple attempts to see the offender; (2) to ensure 
the offender understands the purpose of the assessment and how it will be used, and that it will 
go ahead with or without his participation; (3) to obtain as much information from other sources 
as is possible; (4) to establish whether any reliable conclusions can be drawn in the absence of 
the offender’s co-operation; and (5) to ensure that limitations that arise as a result are clearly 
set out in the RAR.156  
 
148 RAR Standards 19. 
149 Ibid, 16, para. 34. 
150 Ibid, 35, para. 61. 
151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid, 33, para. 53. 
153 Ibid, 34, para. 54. 
154 At the time the cited work was published; both have since left the register of accredited assessors. The 
register is available on the RMA’s website: https://www.rma.scot/order-for-lifelong-
restriction/accreditation/assessors-register/  
155 Darjee and Russell (2011), 224. 
156 Ibid.  
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In McKinlay v HM Advocate,157 the appellant, whilst in prison for a series of aggravated 
assaults, was convicted of a further assault to severe injury upon a fellow prisoner by throwing 
boiling water into his face and eyes, having gone to the victim’s cell specifically for that 
purpose. The assessor had interviewed the offender on only one occasion because the offender 
had thereafter refused to meet with him; four attempts had been made by the assessor. He had 
also refused to co-operate with two assessors who had been engaged to produce defence 
reports. The appellant’s history included rape and multiple serious assaults, some committed 
while in prison; he had been segregated on several occasions for the protection of the other 
prisoners. The RAR classified him as high-risk, the assessor having reached the conclusion that 
he met the criteria for psychopathy despite only having been able to carry out a partial 
assessment on the PCL-R.158 An OLR was imposed with a punishment part of 2 years and 3 
months. An appeal against sentence was lodged on the grounds inter alia that the RAR was 
‘almost entirely based on a paper exercise’ since the assessor had only met with the appellant 
for one-and-a-half hours.159 The court held that the assessor had relied upon sufficient 
information drawn from other sources and had been able to use a variety of risk tools to enable 
him to give an informed opinion.160 The appeal was refused.  
Where there are concerns about the initial RAR, an appeal court can order another – in one 
case this approach was taken in an appeal that was lodged when an offender was five years into 
an OLR with a punishment part of six years.161 It is still, however, unclear as to what would 
happen in cases where the non-participation of the offender severely undermines the report. 
Reliance upon multiple sources of information, as is required, will reduce the likelihood of the 
RAR being undermined in such a way, but there are instances where alternative sources might 
be limited. For example, OLRs can be imposed, and have been imposed, on offenders with no 
previous convictions of any kind.162 This complicates the assessment because it is harder to 
 
157 [2019] H.C.J.A.C. 15. 
158 The Psychopathy Checklist – Revised. It is an assessment tool used for detecting traits of psychopathy and 
has both clinical and research applications. See https://www.rma.scot/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/RATED_PCL-R_August-2019_Hyperlink-Version.pdf Accessed 3/12/2020. 
159 Ibid, para. 38. 
160 See also Kinloch v HM Advocate 2016 J.C. 78 where the offender’s refusal to continue meeting with the 
assessor and refusal to allow him to interview his family members meant that there were some gaps in the 
information upon which the RAR was based. The court declined to consider whether a RAR was defective for 
failure to follow RMA guidelines, because the appeal was allowed on other grounds. This does suggest that 
courts may enter into such enquiry where it is material to the case even where offender non-engagement is a 
factor. 
161 Byrne v HM Advocate 2016 S.C.L. 998. The risk classification, however, remained the same.  
162 See, for example, Johnstone v HM Advocate 2012 J.C. 79; M v HM Advocate 2012 S.L.T. 147; and Laird v 
HM Advocate 2016 S.C.L. 62. Gailey et al. (2011) found that around 14% of those subject to OLRs were first-
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assess the likelihood the offender will engage with rehabilitation, and the probability of its 
success in reducing the risk he poses.163   
It is possible, therefore, that at the point of sentencing the RAO/ICO process may be the only 
opportunity the offender has had to demonstrate the extent of his willingness to co-operate. 
Further, according to Darjee and Russell, refusals of co-operation generally arise from 
‘personality pathology’ rather than any external source of influence such as a solicitor 
discouraging participation.164 It is not clear from the context of the statement whether they 
mean simply that the presence of certain personality traits or disorders can explain non-
participation, or whether they are suggesting that it is legitimate to infer the presence of such 
traits from the refusal to co-operate. However, given that the offender’s willingness to engage 
in rehabilitation/treatment, and the likelihood of its success are key considerations for the 
assessor and the court,165 the potential for serious detriment to the offender from refusing to 
engage is clear. Whilst the point that Darjee and Russell make about the necessary reliance of 
the criminal justice system upon involuntary processes is well made, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that, at the point the risk assessment is undertaken, it may be all but impossible for 
the offender to protect his own interests. If he engages with the assessment, he may supply 
information which indicates a higher risk classification is appropriate; if he does not engage, 
his non-engagement may be taken to indicate that a higher risk classification is appropriate.  
5.4.3 RELIANCE UPON ALLEGATION INFORMATION 
Reliance upon many different types of information drawn from a range of sources is intended 
to ensure that the assessment is as complete as it can be. The MacLean Committee 
recommended that assessors be able to consider unproven allegations as part of the risk 
assessment,166 and the Scottish Executive agreed on the basis that it would ‘maximise the 
accuracy’ of the RAR.167 Assessors are thus empowered by section 210C(1) to take into 
 
time offenders and about 1 in 3 had never been imprisoned, but no more recent data on this is available. See 
125. 
163 Laird v HM Advocate 2016 S.C.L. 62, para. 12. 
164 Darjee and Russell (2011), 223. 
165 RAR Standards, 21, para. 4; Liddell v HM Advocate 2013 S.C.L. 846, paras. 53; Ferguson v HM Advocate 
2014 S.L.T. 431, para. 34, 35, 53, and 54. It can be especially difficult to assess this where the offender has no 
previous convictions, so it might be that engagement with the assessor is the best indicator available. See Laird 
v HM Advocate 2016 S.C.L. 62, paras. 8 and 12. 
166 MacLean Report, rec. 15. 
167 SVSO White Paper, 25, para. 21. 
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account allegations of criminality. This includes conduct that was never prosecuted as well as 
conduct that resulted in charges of which the individual was acquitted.168 
Some of this information might be included in a CJSWR. For example, according to the 
national guidance,169 information relating to children’s hearings that the offender was the 
subject of at some stage,170  sexual offences prevention orders (SOPOs)171 and information 
about how the offender had conducted himself during previous sentences172 should, where 
applicable, be included. It is also permissible for the social worker to make reference to 
outstanding/pending charges and warrants.173 The scope of section 210C(1) is, however, much 
broader and is one of the most controversial elements of the OLR’s framework.174 
Being able to take allegation information into account is helpful in establishing whether the 
offence of which the individual has been convicted is an isolated incident or whether it is part 
of a pattern of behaviour;175 it is also helpful in planning risk management interventions.176 
Fyfe and Gailey offer the following hypothetical scenario to demonstrate the utility of reliance 
upon allegation information.177 
An individual is before the court for a breach of the peace and assault 
during a drunken fight with his wife that was broken up by the police. His 
wife suffered only minor injuries and he pleads guilty and expresses 
remorse. On this evidence alone, he might not be considered a candidate 
for the order for lifelong restriction…However, imagine that this man has 
several convictions and allegations of violence and sexual violence against 
partners, some of which have put previous partners in the hospital. Further, 
there are two convictions for stabbing men against whom he has a 
vendetta. Previous court orders have ranged from an early probation order 
to a prison career of several lengthy sentences with extended periods of 
post-release supervision. When his behaviour in prison and on supervision 
in the community is considered, there is evidence of discipline problems 
in prison, not engaging with professionals, not participating in 
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programmes, and further offences resulting in recall to prison. These 
additional factors may be given weight by the sentencing judge. 
It is worth noting at this stage that there are at least two cases in which an OLR has been 
imposed following conviction for breach of the peace.178 It should also be pointed out that an 
offender must be considered to be a ‘candidate’ for the OLR at the point that the RAO/ICO is 
made; this means that there must be reason for the court to consider that the risk criteria might 
be met before it has access to information not ordinarily included in the CJSWR and any other 
reports it has before it at that stage.179 
Not all RARs will include allegation information, but it is likely that most do. Fyfe and Gailey 
examined 60 RARs – that being the total number of RARs completed at the time of the study180 
– and found that 40 of those reports made reference to allegation information.181 Where a RAR 
does include allegation information, assessors are required to take certain measures to ensure 
the status of the information, and the manner in which it is being relied upon, is clear. The 
assessor must list each allegation individually;182 detail any evidence that supports the 
allegation;183 and explain the impact of the allegation on the assessor’s opinion as to the risk 
the offender presents.184 In most of the RARs examined by Fyfe and Gailey the allegation 
information had been used solely to aid in risk management; fewer than 15 relied upon the 
allegations alongside convictions to make out a pattern of behaviour.185  
McSherry and Keyzer have, however, argued that reliance on allegation information should be 
impermissible for two reasons. First, they consider that reliance on allegation information 
undermines the presumption of innocence.186 They argue that taking allegations into account 
entails an assumption that the civil standard of proof is met; this is problematic because no 
enquiry of this kind is undertaken when someone is acquitted in criminal proceedings. 
Consideration of allegation information is therefore not appropriate where it might result in a 
more onerous sentence being imposed. As is discussed later, however, the test for the 
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imposition of an OLR is that, on the balance of probabilities, the risk criteria are met.187 This 
involves consideration of a number of sources of which the RAR is one, albeit one of the most 
significant. The question of whether the risk criteria are met is one for the judge, not the 
assessor,188 and the judge may choose to disregard allegations referred to in the report if he 
does not find them to be credible, and can proceed on the basis of the remainder of the report 
and other evidence available to him.189  
The steps that can be taken by an offender to challenge a RAR with which he does not agree 
are discussed below, but it is worth noting at this stage that an offender subject to a RAO has 
the right to obtain his own RAR,190 and that, where the conclusions or other contents of the 
report are contested, an evidential hearing may be held before the sentencing diet.191 The 
second objection that McSherry and Keyzer raise is that if allegations contained in a RAR are 
to be challenged, alleged victims, who may be vulnerable, may be called to give evidence.192 
This is a concern that was apparently shared by the police and COPFS, at least in the earlier 
years of the OLR’s operation, and which resulted in those agencies being reluctant to provide 
assessors with allegation information in some cases.193 To date, it does not appear that any such 
case has arisen, but it has been anticipated and certain safeguards are provided for.194 These 
are discussed further in part E below. The Scottish Executive considered that the availability 
of a defence RAR and the provision for an evidential hearing amounted to adequate procedural 
protections and was keen to emphasise that allegation information was only being used to aid 
risk assessment after the point the conviction was obtained.195 
The extent to which courts may rely upon allegation information in the decision as to whether 
the risk criteria have been met has not, as yet, been established. In O’Leary v HM Advocate,196 
the minuter sought to have a RAO quashed on the basis that section 210C was incompatible 
with article 6 of the ECHR. The circumstances of the case are somewhat unusual. Thomas 
O’Leary was convicted on indictment in the sheriff court of 8 offences including assaulting 
two previous partners to their severe injury and the danger of their lives. He had previously 
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been convicted of assaults upon women and men, and had received custodial sentences, 
including an extended sentence with a custodial element of just under 5 years.197 The sheriff, 
having obtained a CJSWR and psychiatric reports, considered that the risk criteria may be met 
and remitted the case to the High Court for sentencing. At some point after the RAO was made, 
the mother of one of the complainers in the case sent the judge a letter and a newspaper cutting 
which concerned the suicide of one of the offenders’ former girlfriends when he was in 
prison.198 The judge forwarded the letter to the assessor, and the incident was noted in the RAR 
alongside other allegation information including police intelligence. The assessor’s reliance 
upon the allegations was addressed in the report’s ‘Limitations’ section.199 
[I]n the report it has not been necessary for the assessor to draw on these 
allegations in making his conclusions. 
If all the allegations are not taken into account, one would still have to 
conclude that there is a high likelihood of the offender committing further 
serious violent offences…if all the allegations are taken into account, then 
the main effect is to provide some potential additional information about 
[the offender’s] general pattern of behaviour. 
Therefore, allegation evidence has little significance in the assessor’s 
determination, the police intelligence in particular is therefore omitted 
from the assessor’s consideration of risk level and the likelihood of harm 
to others in [the offender’s] case. 
The letter itself was considered only in the context of the impact of the offender’s conduct on 
the victim.200 The defence subsequently lodged a minute intimating intention to raise a 
compatibility issue, and the judge declined jurisdiction because his decision to forward the 
letter to the assessor was the reason for the minute. When the case called again before another 
judge, that judge referred the case for determination by a bench of three judges.201 On behalf 
of the minuter, it was argued that consideration of unproven allegations by the assessor and the 
court violated the right to a fair trial. Further, if the court makes decisions on the basis of the 
assessor’s opinion, where the opinion assumes that the individual concerned is guilty of 
criminal behaviour he has not been convicted of, the individual’s right to be presumed innocent 
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will be violated. Thus, it was argued, the process initiated by the making of the RAO was 
incompatible with the minuter’s article 6(1) and (2) rights.202  
There were three difficulties for the minuter. First, if the assessor’s consideration of allegation 
information was to violate his article 6 rights, it would have to be established that the assessor 
was a public authority as defined by section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998.203 This meant 
it would have to be shown that the assessor’s functions were ‘functions of a public nature’. The 
court found that the assessor was not a public authority. 204 
A risk assessor is not an employee of the court nor is he necessarily employed 
by any central or local government department or agency. He is a private 
individual who, once duly accredited, engages in this type of work, for profit. 
His is not under any duty to accept the court’s appointment in a particular 
case. Whether he does so or not will, no doubt, depend upon his other 
commitments. The important point is that the assessor is engaged by way of 
public law contract between the risk assessor and the court (or, more 
accurately, the Scottish Court Service)…The mere fact that the court, or any 
other public authority solicits an opinion from a person of skill does not 
convert that person into a public authority.  
Second, it was necessary to prove that the minuter was, or would be, a victim of the assessor’s 
inclusion of the allegation information in the report.205 This would have required the minuter 
to demonstrate that the assessor’s opinion had been based on unfounded allegations, and that 
those allegations would have been taken into consideration by the court. The assessor had been 
clear in the RAR that he had not relied upon the allegation information. Even if the assessor 
had relied upon it, section 210C sets out a procedure to enable the offender to challenge the 
RAR;206 that process had not been followed, the decision having been taken to raise the 
compatibility issue instead. The minuter was not, therefore, a victim.207  
Finally, where a compatibility issue is raised, it must be connected to a ‘practical remedy’.208 
Initially, the minuter sought only a declarator of incompatibility, but later counsel stipulated 
that he wished the RAO to be quashed.209 The RAR had, however, been completed at the time 
the proceedings were initiated and the sentencing judge was bound by section 210F(1)(a) to 
have regard to its terms: there was no way of preventing the allegations being taken into 
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account by the assessor, because he had already done so. Thus, the declarator could not have 
the required practical effect. In addition, the court held that section 210B(6)’s prohibition on 
appealing the making of, or refusal to make, a RAO meant that the RAO could not be 
quashed.210   
This latter point is of some significance since their Lordships appear to have regarded the 
minuter’s recourse to compatibility procedure as an attempt to get around section 210B(6) and 
effectively appeal the RAO. They pointed to alternative avenues that could or should have been 
taken. Had the minuter wanted the aspects of the RAR concerning allegation information to be 
disregarded by the sentencing judge, the correct course of action would have been for the 
offender to avail himself of the statutory mechanisms for challenging a RAR;211 if an OLR was 
nevertheless imposed, he could have appealed against the sentence.212 If his contention was 
that an unfair trial had resulted from the consideration of the allegation information, then a plea 
in bar of sentence would have been the appropriate procedural step.213 Having failed to obtain 
the declarator sought, the minuter was subsequently made subject to an OLR with a punishment 
part of 5 years.214 One of the other consequences of the approach that was taken, in terms of 
attempting to address the use of allegation information from the standpoint of compatibility, 
and of directing the complaint solely towards the conduct of the assessor, was that their 
Lordships did not have to consider the extent to which the court may take account of allegation 
information and expressly reserved its judgment on the matter. This was not, the court said, the 
issue in the reference.215  
The extent to which allegation information may properly be taken into account is, of course, 
entirely the issue so far as concerns about the use of allegation information go. Therefore, it is 
a matter of some regret and some frustration that what – at the time of writing – remains the 
leading case on reliance upon allegations in OLR sentencing does not address the degree to 
which they may be relied upon. Two things are, however, clear from O’Leary. The first is the 
extent to which the framework depends on section 210C(5) and (7) to ensure procedural 
fairness; these are the right of the offender to obtain his own RAR, and the right to an evidential 
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hearing on matters relating to the RAR.216 As is discussed below, the right to obtain a defence 
RAR is only extended to those subject to a RAO – there is no such entitlement for those subject 
to an ICO. The second is that there is force in counsel for the minuter’s argument that judges 
making a RAO ‘set in train a sequence of events that [cannot] be stopped’.217 The making of 
the RAO cannot be appealed. The completion of the RAR cannot be prevented, nor can the 
sentencing judge’s taking account of it. If the court, having taken account of it, considers that 
the risk criteria are met, the OLR must be imposed. The only option at that point is an appeal 
against sentence. It is therefore essential that the criteria for making such an order in the first 
place are robust. This is returned to later.218  
5.4.4 OPINION ON RISK 
The RAR must include an ‘opinion on risk’.219 An important part of this is assigning the 
offender a risk classification of ‘high’, ‘medium’, or ‘low’.220 There are standardised descriptors 
for each of these labels and the report must demonstrate, with reference to the narrative risk 
formulation, how the elements of these descriptors are satisfied.221 Table 5.1 sets out the risk 
definitions in full. These definitions have changed over time. In the last set of standards and 
guidelines, the meaning of ‘high risk’ was: 222 
 [An] offender [who] presents an ongoing risk of committing an offence 
causing serious harm. The identified scenarios involve pervasive risk and 
there are few if any protective factors to mitigate that risk. The offender 
requires long-term risk management, including supervision, and where the 
offender has the capacity to respond, ongoing treatment.’  
A ‘medium risk’ classification signified that the offender was ‘capable of causing serious harm’ 
but that there were enough protective factors to mitigate that risk, including a willingness to 
engage in risk management interventions.223 Low risk offenders were (and are) unlikely to cause 
serious harm in the future, even if they had done so in the past.224 When compared with current 
definitions, it is immediately apparent that they far more closely reflect the language of section 
210E. The inclusion of the terminology of ‘enduring propensity’ in the criteria for high risk and 
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‘propensity’ in medium-risk classification is significant, especially as regards to the latter where 
it replaces the expression ‘capable of causing serious harm’. This is a much more stringent 
test,225 and one that reflects conceptualisations of dangerousness as a property of an 
individual.226  




The nature, seriousness and pattern of this individual’s behaviour indicate an enduring 
propensity to seriously endanger the lives, physical or psychological well-being of the 
public at large.  
The individual has problematic, persistent, and pervasive characteristics that are 
relevant to risk and which are not likely to be amenable to change, or the potential for 
change with time and/or intervention is significantly limited. Without changes in these 
characteristics the individual will continue to pose a risk of serious harm:  
• There are few protective factors to counterbalance these characteristics  
• Concerted long-term measures are indicated to manage the risk, including 
restriction, monitoring, supervision, and where the individual has the capacity 
to respond, intervention  
• The nature of the difficulties with which the individual presents are such that 
intervention is unlikely to mitigate the need for long-term monitoring and 
supervision.  
In the absence of identified measures, the individual is likely to continue to 
seriously endanger the lives, or physical or psychological well-being of the 
public at large.  
Medium  
The nature, seriousness and pattern of this individual’s behaviour indicate a 
propensity to seriously endanger the lives, physical or psychological well-being of the 
public at large.  
The individual may have characteristics that are problematic, persistent and/or 
pervasive but:  
• There is reason to believe that they may be amenable to change or are 
manageable with appropriate measures  
• There is some evidence of protective factors  
• The individual has the capacity and willingness to engage in appropriate 
intervention  
• They may be sufficiently amenable to supervision, or  
• There are other characteristics that indicate that measures short of lifelong 
restriction maybe sufficient to minimise the risk of serious harm to others  
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Low  
The nature, seriousness and pattern of this individual’s behaviour suggests a capacity 
to seriously endanger the lives, physical or psychological well-being of the public at 
large, but there is no apparent long-term or persistent motivation or propensity to do 
so.  
The individual may have caused serious harm to others in the past, but:  
• It is unlikely that they will cause further serious harm  
• There is clear evidence of protective factors which will mitigate such risk  
• They are likely to respond to intervention  
• They are amenable to supervision  
• They do not require long-term restrictions in order to minimise the risk of 
serious harm to others  
While the individual may have, or had, characteristics that are problematic and/or 
persistent and/or pervasive, they can be adequately addressed by existing or available 
services or measures.  
Table 5.1227 
There is overlap between the medium and high-risk categories. The most important 
determinant of which rating someone is given is the extent to which the risk of serious harm 
can be managed in that particular case.228 Assessors therefore require familiarity with the 
range of interventions that are available in prisons or, if applicable, mental health facilities,229 
so that they can provide an informed opinion on the likely impact on risk. The OLR sits at the 
top of the hierarchy of the prison sentences, and it should only be used when no other sentence 
is adequate to manage the risk the offender presents – the assessor has a role to play in 
restricting its use by indicating where he considers risk can be managed by less restrictive 
means.230   
It is important to note that, while the assessor will have the risk criteria in mind, section 210E 
sets out the test that the judge must apply; the decision as to whether or not the criteria are met 
and, consequently, whether an OLR is to be imposed, is for the judge alone: the assessor does 
not decide the ‘ultimate legal issue’.231 The classification given is, however, closely bound up 
in that determination. It is also important to stress that, notwithstanding ‘if at liberty’ in the 
risk criteria, no offender who is the subject of a RAO will receive a non-custodial sentence. 
Neither the assessor nor the judge will have in mind the risk presented if the offender were to 
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be released at the end of the RAO straight into the community;232 rather it is the impact of 
interventions at the end of an alternative sentence that is under consideration. 
5.4.5 CHALLENGING A RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT 
 
As noted previously, offenders who object to the contents of the RAR are entitled to challenge 
it. Section 210C(5) provides that an offender subject to a RAO may instruct the preparation of 
a RAR on his own behalf. The Standards and Guidelines for Risk Assessment Report Writing 
also apply to the preparation of these defence reports.233 This right does not extend to people 
subject to an ICO with assessment of risk.234 There is no obvious reason why this should be. It 
is not mentioned in the White Paper, and nothing contained in the MacLean Report could be 
construed as providing an explanation for it. It is possible that it was a legislative oversight, 
but it is not simply a matter of one provision in section 210B not being transposed into section 
210D. The provision relates to the RAR itself in section 210C and section 210D is clear that 
all section 210C provisions apply to those on an ICO with assessment of risk with the exception 
of those that relate to the defence report.235 A second potential explanation is that it may have 
been considered unnecessary because the ICO can be appealed, whereas the RAO cannot. This 
is slightly more plausible, but the difficulty with it is that section 53 may be appealed, but the 
RAR is authorised by section 210D. In short, a successful appeal against the ICO does not 
prevent the construction of RAR.  
On the face of it, it appears that mentally ill offenders are being placed in a potentially less 
favourable position as regards challenging the RAR, though this might be mitigated by the 
requirement that defence reports are also prepared by accredited assessors in the manner 
prescribed by the RMA. The consistency of approach may reduce likelihood of significant 
divergences of opinion which may not be particularly helpful for an offender where he wishes 
to challenge the recommendations of a report pointing towards the need for intensive risk 
management over the long-term.236 Courts must also consider other reports laid before them,237 
such as forensic psychiatric and psychological reports that do not conform to the standards of 
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the RAR and which were never intended to. There is nothing to prevent a judge from preferring 
the opinions in those other reports over the RAR: the RAR is just one of the sources of 
information that he has to consider, albeit an important one.238 In Laird v HM Advocate,239 the 
sentencing judge had accepted the opinion of a psychiatrist instructed to prepare a report on 
behalf of the appellant, that the RAR had underestimated the risk he posed. The appeal court 
held that the judge was entitled to do so: it was sufficient that he had considered the RAR as 
part of the evidence presented to him.240 It may be, therefore, that there is little practical 
disadvantage.  
Nevertheless, the legislation has been drafted to give the RAR centrality. The RAO and RAR 
were brought into being because the options for assessing risk otherwise available were 
considered to be inadequate. The RAR is far more comprehensive than, for example, a 
CJSWR,241 and the need to ensure that the process was robust was great enough to warrant the 
creation of a body to research, and to accredit persons and methods for the purposes of 
undertaking, that assessment. Simply put, the whole point of the RAR is that it can fulfil a 
function that none of the alternative assessments can or, at the very least, that it can fulfil it 
better. The RAR is therefore – rightly – accorded a somewhat special status in the process, and 
particular attention must be paid to it by sentencing judges.242 In the absence of any apparent 
justification for the discrepancy, it would seem appropriate to extend the right to obtain a 
defence report to those subject to section 210D.  
Section 210C(7) provides that an evidential hearing may be held where an offender objects to 
the content or findings of the RAR.243 This applies both to offenders subject to a RAO, and 
those subject to a ICO. In cases where there is a defence report, the assessors may meet to try 
to find agreement on areas of minor divergence of opinion; this may, in some instances, be 
sufficient to avert the need for a hearing.244 Where the offender wishes a hearing to be held, a 
note of objection to the RAR is lodged,245 setting out the objections and the grounds for them.246 
Both the offender and the prosecutor will be entitled to produce and examine witnesses in 
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relation to the content or findings of the RAR to which the offender objects,247 and the content 
and findings of the defence report, if there is one.248 As was touched upon earlier, it is possible 
for complainers and victims of alleged criminal conduct to be called to give evidence at the 
hearing, though it does not appear that this has happened as of yet. If it does happen, section 
210EA249 provides that witnesses who used special measures in order to give evidence at trial 
in the original proceedings may also utilise those measures for the giving of evidence during 
the section 210C(7) hearing.250 At the conclusion of the evidential hearing, the case proceeds 
to sentence. 
5.5 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER FIVE 
This chapter has critically discussed the process that must be followed where an OLR is under 
consideration as a final disposal. Where an offender is convicted of a sexual, violent, or life-
endangering offence other than murder, or an offence the nature or circumstances of which are 
such that it appears to the court that the offender has a propensity to commit any such offence, 
and where the court considers on the motion of the prosecutor, or at its own instance, that the 
risk criteria set out in section 210E may be met, the judge must make a RAO. The only 
exceptions to this are where the offender is already subject to an OLR, and where he also meets 
the criteria for the making of an ICO. In the latter case the court must make an ICO with 
assessment of risk instead of the RAO. The making of a RAO or ICO results in a 
comprehensive risk assessment being undertaken, the product of which is a report as to the risk 
an offender would present if at liberty. This assessment is carried out by an assessor accredited 
for these purposes by the RMA, a body which performs certain critical functions in relation to 
the OLR and to risk assessment and management of offenders, including setting the standards 
and guidelines according to which the RAR must be constructed. The risk framework in which 
the OLR is embedded clearly demonstrates its status as a preventive sentence that is geared 
towards mitigating the risk of serious harm to the public. The next chapter considers the OLR 
itself, including the criteria for its imposition, and its operation. Some discussion of alternative 
disposals where the criteria for making an OLR are not met is undertaken. The OLR and its 
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6. THE ORDER FOR LIFELONG RESTRICTION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 6 
So far, this thesis has considered the ethical implications of preventive detention and the 
appropriate scope of such sentences. The legal and policy background to the creation of the 
OLR has been discussed, and the procedural framework governing the steps which must be 
taken before it can be imposed has been set out in detail. This chapter carries forward that 
discussion from the point of sentencing. The OLR, it will be recalled, is an indeterminate 
sentence made under section 210F(1) of the 1995 Act, and is available where three conditions 
are met: (1) the offender is to be sentenced in the High Court of Justiciary;1 (2) the offender 
has been convicted of a sexual offence,2  a violent offence,3 an offence which endangers life,4 
or of an offence which suggests to the court that the offender has a propensity to commit an 
offence falling within those other categories;5 and (3) the risk criteria set out in section 210E 
of the 1995 Act are found by the court to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities.6 Where 
conditions (1) and (2) are met, and the court considers that (3) may be met, it must make one 
of the interim orders discussed in the last chapter, but usually it will be a RAO.7 When the court 
finds that the risk criteria are met, an OLR must be made:8 there is, on the face of it, no 
discretion.9  
The purpose of this chapter is to subject the OLR to detailed descriptive and analytical 
treatment. In particular, the statutory risk criteria have yet to be subject to in-depth academic 
critique; a key objective of this chapter is to address that gap.  The chapter proceeds as follows. 
Section 6.2 considers the human rights implications as they apply specifically to the OLR, with 
the emphasis on article 5 of the European Convention, article 6 having been addressed in 
chapter five in the context of the RAO.10 Some attention is also given to the Council of 
 
1 s. 210B(1). 
2 s. 210B(1)(a)(i). 
3 s. 210B(1)(a)(ii). 
4 s. 210B(1)(a)(iii). 
5 s. 210B(b). 
6 s. 210F(d). 
7 s. 210B(2). 
8 Unless a CORO is made or the offender is already subject to an OLR. This is discussed later.  
9 Though the process by which judges choose between available sentences is somewhat more complex than the 
legislation would suggest. See 6.3.3. 
10 See section 5.4.3 
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Europe’s Recommendation to Member States on Dangerous Offenders. The statutory risk 
criteria which are central to the OLR’s operation are considered in detail at section 6.3. Section 
6.4 goes on to consider the structure of the OLR, and its status as an indeterminate sentence is 
discussed. Alternative disposals to the OLR and their relationship to it are explored in section 
6.5. Before the chapter concludes, section 6.6 returns to the principles derived from the more 
theoretical discussions that took place in chapters two and three, and the OLR is evaluated 
against this framework.  
6.2 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OLR 
The core characteristic of indeterminate sentences for dangerousness is that they permit 
detention or imprisonment for longer than would be justified on the basis of the index offence 
alone. The exercise of such a power by the state plainly raises human rights considerations. 
There is a fairly substantial body of literature which addresses the human rights implications 
of preventive detention across a number of different jurisdictions.11 As might be expected, little 
of this material is concerned directly with the OLR, but it has been addressed to some extent 
by Gailey et al.12 and by Lord Carloway in his address to the International Society for the 
 
11 See, for example, G. Merkel, ‘Incompatible Contrasts? – Preventive Detention in Germany and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, (2010) 11:9 German Law Journal 1046; E.S. Janus, ‘Preventive detention of sex 
offenders: The American experience versus international human rights norms’, (2013) 31:3 Behavioural 
Sciences and the Law 328; G. Michaelsen, ‘From Strasburg with Love’ – Preventive Detention before the 
Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights’, (2012) 12:1 Human Rights Law Review 
148; B. McSherry, Managing Fear: The Law and Ethics of Preventive Detention and Risk Assessment (New 
York, 2014), Part III; P. Keyzer, ‘The “Preventive Detention” of Serious Sex Offenders: Further Considerations 
of the International Human Rights Dimensions’, (2009) 16:2 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 262; S. 
Alexander et al. ‘M v Germany: The European Court of Human Rights Takes a Critical Look at Preventive 
Detention’, (2012) 29 Journal of International and Competition Law 605; P. Keyzer, ‘The United Nations 
Human Rights Committee’s views about the legitimate parameters of the preventive detention of serious sex 
offenders’, (2010) 34:5 Criminal Law Journal 238; V. Stern, ‘Preventive Detention’, in P. Keyzer (ed.) 
Preventive Detention: Asking the Fundamental Questions (Cambridge, 2013); C. Slobogin, ‘Preventive 
Detention in Europe, the United States, and Australia’, in P. Keyzer (ed.) Preventive Detention (Cambridge, 
2013); K. Gledhill, ‘Preventive Detention in England and Wales: a Review under the Human Rights 
Framework’, in P. Keyzer (ed.) Preventive Detention (Cambridge, 2013); B. Gogarty et al. ‘The Rehabilitation 
of Preventive Detention’, in P. Keyzer (ed.) Preventive Detention (Cambridge, 2013); K. Drenkhahn et al. 
‘What’s in a name? Preventive Detention in Germany in the shadow of European human rights law’, (2012) 
Criminal Law Review 167; B. McSherry and P. Keyzer, Sex Offenders and Preventive Detention: Politics, 
Policy and Practice (Sydney, 2009); and I. Fyfe and Y. Gailey, ‘The Scottish Approach to High-Risk 
Offenders: Early Answers or Further Questions’ in B. McSherry and P. Keyzer (eds.) Dangerous People: 
Policy, Prediction, and Practice (New York, 2011). 
12 Y. Gailey et al. ‘An Exceptional Sentence’: Exploring the Implementation of the Order for Lifelong 
Restriction’, in K. McCartan and H. Kemshall (eds.) Contemporary Sex Offender Risk Management, Volume I 
(London, 2017). 
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Reform of Criminal Law.13 These are returned to later. There has been some fairly substantial 
treatment of articles 5 and 6 in OLR case law.  
6.2.1 ARTICLE 5 OF THE ECHR 
Article 5 of the ECHR sets out an exhaustive list of circumstances in which deprivation of 
liberty may be justified in terms of the Convention. For the purposes of the OLR, sub-paragraph 
(a) is of most relevance, though (e) is also set out below as it is touched upon later. Article 5(1) 
provides that:  
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall 
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:  
 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent 
court...  
 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading 
of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug 
addicts or vagrants... 
The leading case on article 5 and its application to the order for lifelong restriction is Johnstone 
v HM Advocate.14 The appellant was a first-time offender. He was being treated by a clinical 
psychologist – Dr AB – with whom he became obsessed. He covertly took a photograph of her 
with his phone during one of their appointments. Subsequently, a package containing two 
brooches and a note was hand-delivered through the letterbox of AB’s home. The appellant 
was suspected and, having discussed the matter with a senior colleague, it was decided that AB 
would end contact with Mr Johnstone. In an attempt to avoid raising suspicion the appellant 
was told that, because of the package, she was ending contact with all of her patients.  
Some days later, the windscreen wipers and wing mirrors were removed from the complainer’s 
vehicle, which was parked at her place of work. When the police interviewed the appellant, he 
denied having been on the hospital grounds. There was insufficient evidence to charge him at 
that stage, and he was warned to stay away from AB. Subsequently, mental health nurses 
 
13 Lord Carloway, ‘The Lifelong Restriction of Serious Offenders and the Role of Risk Assessment in Scotland’, 
Paper presented to the 27th International Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal 





14 2012 J.C. 79. 
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visiting the appellant at home discovered that he had a photograph of the complainer as his 
computer background. Later that same day, the wipers and mirrors were again removed from 
AB’s car. All this left the complainer extremely distressed. The police attended the appellant’s 
home where they discovered six wiper blades and four wing mirrors in his open hall cupboard. 
At this point Johnstone was detained and, when searched, was found to be in possession of a 
key to AB’s home. He also had several cannisters of pepper spray ‘adapted for its discharge’ 
in his residence.15 His computer held 1,112 images of AB, her home, and her car. The appellant 
had written comments of a sexual nature on some of the images.  
Johnstone pled to guilty to an offence under the Firearms Act 1968 in respect of the cannisters 
of pepper spray, and to one charge of breach of the peace in respect of his conduct regarding 
AB. Although the appellant had no previous convictions, the sheriff considered that the risk 
criteria may be met, and the case was remitted to the High Court for sentencing. The RAR 
classified the appellant as high risk. The defence report originally ascribed medium risk to the 
appellant, but this was revised upward to high risk when the report’s author received 
information that indecent images of children had also been found on the appellant’s computer. 
A psychologist’s report also concluded he presented a high risk, there being particular concern 
that he would stalk and harass female professional caregivers.16 An OLR with a punishment 
part of 18 months was made.  
An appeal against sentence was lodged in which it was argued, inter alia, that OLRs violated 
ECHR article 5(1) because they are ‘tantamount to a form of preventive detention’.17 It was 
further argued that, even if the sentence itself was permissible in terms of article 5 generally, 
the appellant’s article 5 rights had been violated by the Lord Advocate’s ‘resistance’ to the 
appeal against sentence.18 The reason for this, it was contended, was that the law governing the 
operation of the OLR was not ‘sufficiently accessible, precise, and foreseeable in its 
application:’19 simply put, the appellant could not have known that his offence could result in 
an indeterminate sentence. Refusing the appeal, the Court set out the four established 
requirements that the OLR must satisfy in order to comply with article 5(1)(a): 
A. The imposition of detention must be causally connected to a conviction; 
 
15 Ibid, at para. 4. 
16 Ibid, at para. 6. 
17 Johnstone, at 11. 
18 Ibid, at para. 20. 
19 M v Germany, at 90; Johnstone, at 20. 
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B. The detention must be authorised by national law; 
C. Continued detention is only lawful for as long the conditions that necessitated its 
intervention obtain; and  
D. Opportunities for rehabilitation, education, and training must be offered to assist the 
individual subject to the detention to reduce his risk.  
These are now considered in turn.  
A.  DETENTION MUST BE CAUSALLY CONNECTED TO A CONVICTION FOR AN 
OFFENCE 
First, in order for the detention to be compatible with article 5(1), there must be ‘a sufficient 
connection between the conviction for a specific criminal offence and the order for detention’.20 
In the European Court of Human rights (ECtHR) case of M v Germany,21 the applicant had 
been made subject to an indeterminate period of preventive detention following on from a 
prison sentence in Germany which, at that time, operated a ‘dual track’ system. Offenders 
considered to be dangerous could be imprisoned for a specified period (the punishment track) 
before being moved onto preventive detention (the preventive/corrective track) in a different 
part of the prison in which the conditions of detention were more favourable.22 At the time he 
was sentenced, the applicant was found to suffer from a severe mental disorder. The maximum 
period of preventive detention he could be subject to was capped at 10 years by German law 
since this was the first time he had been subject to such an order. However, by the time his 
application came before the ECtHR, he had been in detention for 19 years. The case history is 
complex but, following re-conviction for offences carried out while in prison, a further order 
was made that his confinement be continued for an indeterminate period. This followed the 
enactment of a purportedly retrospective provision that permitted indeterminate detention of 
those subject to it for the first time. The questions for the court concerned the compatibility of 
that detention with articles 5(1) and 7(1). For the purposes of the present discussion only article 
 
20 Johnstone, at 21; M v Germany (2010) 51 E.H.R.R. 41, at 87 – 88. See also Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium 
(1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 443, at 39. 
21 (2010) 51 E.H.R.R. 41. For more detailed consideration of M see K. Drenkhahn et al. ‘What’s in a name? 
Preventive Detention in Germany in the shadow of European human rights law’, (2012) Criminal Law Review 
167. 
22 Ibid, at 41. 
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5 is of interest since the OLR is a single prison sentence and questions concerning the 
retrospective imposition of preventive detention do not arise.23  
In determining whether M’s detention was permissible in terms of article 5(1)(a), the Court 
emphasised that the word ‘after’ in that provision does not mean ‘subsequent to’; it requires 
that the detention arise from the conviction: 24 
 In short, there must be a sufficient causal connection between the conviction 
and the deprivation of liberty at issue. However, with the passage of time, the 
link between the initial conviction and a further deprivation of liberty 
gradually becomes less strong. The causal link required by subpara. (a) might 
eventually be broken if a position were reached in which a decision not to 
release or to re-detain was based on grounds that were inconsistent with the 
objectives of the initial decision (by a sentencing court) or on an assessment 
that was unreasonable in terms of those objectives. In those circumstances, a 
detention that was lawful at the outset would be transformed into a 
deprivation of liberty that was arbitrary and, hence, incompatible with art. 5. 
M’s initial placement in preventive detention had been justified in terms of subparagraph (a), 
but the link had been broken at the point of its extension and it was no longer permissible under 
that provision. The court also found that M’s continued detention could not be justified under 
subparagraph (e) since, at the time the extension order was made, he was no longer considered 
to be suffering from a mental disorder. ‘Unsound mind’ was not, however, advanced as a 
justification for the detention and so it received little treatment save for the court to note that 
detention of some offenders might be permissible on that basis.25  
The court in Johnstone accepted that the OLR was a form of preventive detention,26 it was 
clear that the OLR, as a sentence imposed upon conviction, was causally connected to that 
conviction. The OLR itself was therefore found to be capable of complying with article 5 
provided all other conditions were met. Additionally, several experts had agreed that the 
appellant presented a high risk of perpetrating similar offences in the future. Thus, the 
imposition of the OLR was causally connected to conviction in that particular case. The criteria 
for making an OLR, and its structure as a single prison sentence imposed upon conviction, 
mean that subparagraph (e) will not serve as a basis for its imposition. It might, however, be of 
relevance in cases where the OLR is combined with another order, such as a hospital direction 
 
23 McSherry and Keyzer (2009), 66. 
24 Ibid, at 88. 
25 Ibid, at 103. 
26 Johnstone, at 20. 
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to the extent of the detention in hospital where transfer to prison is under consideration. This 
is discussed briefly below in the context of alternative disposals and ancillary orders.27 
B. DETENTION MUST BE LAWFUL 
The second condition is that it is necessary, but not sufficient, that the detention conform to the 
substantive and procedural rules of national law.28 This, as was explained in M, does not simply 
mean that there must be rules which (purport to) authorise detention, but also sets a standard 
for the ‘quality of law’: 29 
‘Quality of law’ in this sense implies that where a national law authorises the 
deprivation of liberty it must be sufficiently accessible, precise and 
foreseeable in its application, in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness. The 
standard of ‘lawfulness’ set by the Convention thus requires that all law be 
sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate advice 
– to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail. 
Surprisingly given the facts, little is said of this requirement in Johnstone. The reason for this 
seems to be that the court considered it adequately dealt with in the context of another ground 
of appeal, which was that an amendment to the 1995 Act meant that section 210F failed for lack 
of clarity.30 It had been argued by the appellant that the wording of the amending legislation 
meant that ‘shall’ in the section providing that – where the criteria are met – the judge ‘shall’ 
make an OLR had been deleted rendering the provision nonsensical. The court held that this 
was clearly not the intention, that ‘shall’ had not been deleted,31 and the appellant’s argument 
in respect of clarity therefore failed.  
The difficulty with this is that, of the four criteria for ECHR compatibility laid out in Johnstone, 
this second requirement would seem to be the most problematic. The appellant was a first-time 
offender. It was not, to be clear, that he lacked a history of violent or sexual offending; he had 
no previous convictions of any kind. As was discussed in the last chapter, a very wide range of 
conduct is capable of coming within the auspices of section 210B, and therefore triggering the 
risk assessment process.  Typically, however, there will have been a very serious index offence, 
 
27 Section 6.5.2.B; see also the discussion at 4.4 on the background to the OLR’s development.  
28 M, at 90. 
29 Ibid. 
30 The amendment by s. 14 of the Management of Offenders etc. (Scotland) Act 2005 was intended to amend s. 
210F to enable the Court to choose between an OLR and a compulsion order and an OLR where an offender met 
the criteria for both. 
31 See Johnstone, at 13 – 17. 
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or a pattern of offending behaviour of which the index offence is a part. This is returned to in 
the next section of the chapter when risk criteria are considered in detail. Although not the only 
reported case in which an OLR was imposed on a first-time offender, Johnstone is something 
of an outlier in that there was no physical contact or attempt to make physical contact with the 
victim.  
In M v HM Advocate,32 which bears the greatest resemblance in terms of the lack of physical 
contact, the appellant33 – a medical doctor – stopped his vehicle next to two children aged 10 
and 11, asked if he could touch their legs, and attempted to entice them into his vehicle. The 
girls refused. The appellant returned to the place where he had met the children several more 
times in the days after, prompting someone who lived nearby to contact the police. The 
appellant admitted that his intention had been to groom the girls for the purposes of sexually 
abusing them and volunteered that he had previously engaged in the online grooming of 
children. He described himself to the criminal justice social worker as a ‘recovering 
paedophile’.34 A RAO was made and an OLR imposed, although the punishment part was 
reduced on appeal.  
The appeal court in Johnstone acknowledged that – in terms of offences that might attract an 
OLR – the conduct ‘was not at the highest level’.35 This does not in any way diminish the 
impact upon the victim, but the case does appear to differ from others. The OLR is a ‘sentence 
of last resort’,36 that was intended for ‘exceptional offenders’;37 other sentences remain 
available in respect of offenders who do not require such intensive risk management for an 
indefinite period.38 It does not seem reasonable to conclude that the appellant ought to have 
foreseen the possibility that an OLR might be imposed. Nevertheless, the court in Johnstone 
did not consider the ‘lawfulness’ requirement worthy of substantial treatment. 
 
 
32 2012 S.L.T. 147. 
33 C.f. Laird v HM Advocate 2016 S.C.L. 62 in which there was no prior offending history, but the OLR was 
imposed in virtue of repeated rapes and sexual assaults of multiple victims all charged on the same indictment.  
34 Ibid, at 2. 
35 Johnstone, at 23. 
36 McFadyen v HM Advocate 2011 S.C.C.R 759, at 13. 
37 MacLean Report, 34, para. 5.1. See also the discussion at section 4.5.4 of this thesis.  
38 Although the relationship between consideration of the adequacy of these sentences and the risk criteria is not 
entirely settled. This is discussed later. 
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C. CONTINUED DETENTION IS ONLY PERMISSIBLE AS LONG AS THE REASONS 
FOR ITS IMPOSITION REMAIN 
The third condition is that, as well as a causal connection between conviction and detention, 
there must be a causal relationship between the purpose of detention and the detention itself.39 
The court approached this requirement by analogy with imprisonment for public protection 
(IPP), which shared many of the OLR’s characteristics but differed in certain crucial respects.40 
In the case of sentences such as the OLR and IPP, the purpose is the protection of the public.41 
An individual’s preventive detention may be compatible with article 5(1)(a) at the outset, but 
the requisite link could be severed if subsequent decisions regarding release or return to custody 
were to be taken based upon considerations other than those on which the initial decision to 
impose the detention was made.42 Simply put, since the purpose of the OLR (or, as the case 
may be, IPP) is public protection, the detention remains permissible only as long as it is 
necessary to achieve that objective.43 The court held that this requirement was satisfied in 
relation to the OLR by the right of periodic review by the Parole Board after punishment part 
expiry44 as it is in relation to IPP after the tariff expiry.45 
D. ACCESS TO TRAINING AND REHABILITATION OPPORTUNITIES 
The final condition is that, if detention is to remain compatible with article 5, the state must 
ensure access to courses and rehabilitation designed to help to the offender mitigate his risk to 
the extent he is able.46 This requirement implicitly recognises that, in at least some cases, risk 
mitigation to the extent that release is feasible is not always attainable. Nevertheless, it places 
a positive obligation upon the relevant authorities to provide courses and treatment appropriate 
in the individual case. One of the objectives of this is to permit the offender to demonstrate his 
suitability for parole.47 This can be problematic from a resourcing perspective and was one of 
 
39 Johnstone, at 22.  
40 For a thorough account of IPP in England and Wales and its impact upon those subject to it, see J. Jacobson 
and M. Hough, Unjust Deserts: Imprisonment for Public Protection (London, 2010). IPP is touched upon again 
later.  
41 Johnstone, at 22; R (James) v United Kingdom [2010] 1 A.C. 553, at 12 
42 R (James), at 12. It was this requirement in relation to the hospital order with restriction order that led to the 
creation of the OLR though, as will be discussed later, the OLR has not solved the problem. See sections 4.2 
and 4.3 of this thesis. 
43 R (James), at 12; Johnstone, at 22. 
44 Johnstone, at 22. 
45 R (James), at 12. 
46 Johnstone, at 23; R (James), at 26 and 112. 
47 Johnstone, ibid.  
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the significant difficulties that led to IPP’s demise.48 Such a difficulty does not yet appear to 
have arisen in respect of OLR prisoners,49 but it is clearly something that requires to be kept 
under consideration by the Scottish Ministers. Regardless, no suggestion was made in 
Johnstone that this was an issue for the appellant.  
Having set out the four conditions, the court went on to conclude that the OLR was capable of 
article 5(1) compatibility provided these criteria were satisfied which, it said, they were in the 
appellant’s case.50  Of interest, however, are the court’s remarks regarding the risk as it falls to 
be assessed by the Parole Board and the seriousness of the index offence.51  
We observe in a case of this nature, where the events giving rise to the 
sentence are not at the most serious level, it is particularly important that the 
prison authorities and the Parole Board should carefully monitor the level of 
risk that the appellant actually poses...While the offence giving rise to the 
sentence was not at the highest level, it was nevertheless plainly serious, 
especially in its effect on the victim. This was made clear by the trial judge, 
who observed in his report that he was more than satisfied that the crime had 
a very serious impact on the complainer and that it would be wrong to 
minimise the seriousness. Moreover, a number of experts all ultimately 
concurred in the view that the appellant was at high risk of committing similar 
offences in the future. 
The OLR is a risk-focused sentence imposed, not on the basis of the index offence alone, but 
on the characteristics of the offender and other indicators of risk such as prior offences. Careful 
assessment of risk level by the Parole Board – and other appropriate persons throughout the 
sentence52 – is therefore important in every case, regardless of offence severity. Further, the 
implication seems to be that the sentencing judge, with the appeal court’s approval, considered 
that disposing of the case otherwise than by an OLR would amount to a trivialisation of the 
impact of the offence upon the victim. That would seem to mischaracterise the sentence. 
Certainly, risk assessors do consider victim impact, but it does not necessarily affect the risk 
classification.53 Where it is of particular relevance is in the assessment of the gravity of the 
offence and, therefore, the severity of the punishment it ought to attract. The latter is, of course, 
a part of the OLR, reflected in its punishment part. The case report does not give any detail on 
 
48 Lord Carloway (2014). 
49 But see Daly v Scottish Ministers 2016 Rep. L. R. 38; Beattie v Scottish Ministers [2016] C.S.O.H 57; G v 
Scottish Ministers [2017] S.C.O.H. 10; and Haggerty v Scottish Ministers [2017] C.S.O.H. 61 where it was 
argued that a failure to assess for, and to provide courses of rehabilitation in respect of OLR prisoners had 
occurred. The petitions failed, but the cases are touched upon later.  
50 Johnstone, at 23. 
51 Ibid, at 23 – 24. 
52 See sections 6.5.1.A and 6.5.1.B below.  
53 See, for example, O’Leary which is discussed in detail at section 5.4.3. 
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how the impact of the offence upon the complainer was used by the risk assessor, but it would 
be quite wrong to suggest a decision about whether to make an OLR could be appropriately 
based on victim impact divorced from the context of risk classification and formulation. In any 
case the legislative framework is clear that an OLR may be imposed only where the risk criteria 
are met and indeed must be imposed where they are met. The next section of the chapter 
considers the risk criteria in detail; however, it is worth saying something of the Council of 
Europe’s Recommendation on dangerous offenders before proceeding as it provides an 
additional means of assessing the operation of the OLR from a human rights perspective. 
6.2.2 THE RECOMMENDATION ON DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 
The Recommendation on Dangerous Offenders was adopted by the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers on 19th February 2014.54 Like other instruments of its type, the 
Recommendation is not binding upon member states; instead it provides a policy framework 
that states can implement over and above that which is necessary to comply with the ECHR.55 
It is therefore, as Gailey et al. have said, a useful tool for the evaluation of the OLR in human 
rights terms.56 For the purposes of the instrument, a dangerous offender is someone aged 18 
years or older57 ‘who has been convicted of a very serious sexual or very serious violent crime 
against persons and who presents a high likelihood of re-offending with further very serious 
sexual or very serious crimes against persons’.58 Violent offending means the actual or 
threatened use of ‘intentional physical force’ and may entail physical, sexual, or psychological 
harm, or the deprivation of liberty.59 Sexual offending is not defined. The Recommendations 
apply both to detention and monitoring in the community.60 Gailey et al. are critical of the 
instrument’s use of the terminology of dangerousness but, as they point out, its definition sets 
a very high threshold.61  
 
54 Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Dangerous 
Offenders. Full text available at: https://pjp-
eu.coe.int/documents/41781569/42171329/CMRec+%282014%29+3+concerning+dangerous+offenders.pdf/cec
8c7c4-9d72-41a7-acf2-ee64d0c960cb  
55 Rec/CM(2014)3 preamble.  
56 Gailey et al. (2017), 117. 
57 Rec/CM(2014)3, para. 2.a; Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states on the European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures, para. 21.1. Adopted 5th 
November 2008 Full text available at: https://www.unicef.org/tdad/councilofeuropejjrec08(1).pdf  
58 Ibid, para. 1.a. 
59 Ibid, para. 1.b. 
60 Ibid, para. 1.g and h.  
61 Gailey et al. (2017), 117. 
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The issue of terminology was addressed at section 3.3.1, where reasons were given for adopting 
the language of dangerousness as a shorthand for the group of offenders with whom this thesis 
is concerned. Whatever one’s views on the word, there are difficulties in ascribing a risk-based 
categorisation that applies to all of those who are, or who might be, made subject to an OLR. 
As will be discussed, the OLR is not restricted to offenders assessed as being at high risk of 
offending as defined by the RMA;62 nor do they require to have been convicted of a serious 
violent or serious sexual offence at any time.63 On that basis, suggested alternatives along the 
lines of ‘high-risk serious violent or sexual offender’ are problematic. Of course, one is at 
liberty to argue that only those who can fairly be labelled as such should be made subject to an 
OLR, but it would remain the case that – as the law currently stands – it is descriptively false. 
In any case, risk is defined in the instrument as ‘the high likelihood of a further very serious 
sexual or very serious violent offence against persons’,64 and it is incorporated into the 
definition of the dangerous offender. Offenders are, on this account, properly subject to 
preventive detention only if they have already perpetrated a very serious violent or sexual 
offence, and they are assessed as being at high risk of perpetrating another. Whether one 
accepts this or not, it is apparent that the OLR’s scope is much broader.  
Gailey et al. also observe that the OLR’s net is wider in terms of offender age. Youth sentencing 
is a highly specialised area of academic enquiry and is therefore outwith the ambit of this thesis. 
It is, however, worth noting that no age restrictions apply to the OLR. This is consistent with 
the recommendations of the MacLean Committee.65 The Scottish Executive in the SVSO White 
Paper made clear its expectation that it would be ‘extremely unlikely’ that anyone younger than 
21 would be considered for an OLR owing to the kind of offending required for its imposition.66 
Nevertheless, it considered that the ‘interests of public safety’ required that the OLR be 
available for an offender of any age that met the criteria.67 As of 12th October 2020, 22 people 
under the age of 21 years had had RAOs made in respect of them, and 15 of those were then 
sentenced to an OLR.68 These have included offenders as young as 15.69  
 
62 See the discussion at 5.4.4 and Table 5.1 for detailed consideration of risk classifications. 
63 In fact, they do not require a conviction for violent or sexual offending of any degree. See the discussion of 
RAOs at section 5.2.  
64 CM/Rec(2014)3, para. 1.c. 
65 MacLean Report, 34, para. 5.1. 
66 SVSO White Paper, 22, para. 7. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Only 12 of those were still under the age of 21 at the date of sentence. Source: RMA unpublished data.  
69 Fyfe and Gailey (2011), 211. It is not clear whether that case resulted in the imposition of an OLR.  
 178 
Aside from general scope, however, the framework supplied by the Recommendation and that 
associated with the OLR are very similar indeed. In terms of risk assessment, the 
Recommendation emphasises the need for an ‘evidence-based, structured [approach], 
incorporating validated tools and professional decision-making’ by persons who have in-depth 
knowledge of risk assessment methodologies, and are explicit about their limitations when 
reporting.70 Risk assessments should be conducted with the dual aims of ensuring that the 
measures taken for risk management are the least restrictive – i.e. that they are proportionate 
to the risk – and of informing an individualised sentence, tailored to the management of risk 
presented by that particular offender. 71 The risk assessment should not, the instrument says, be 
used to determine what sentence should be imposed, although it ‘may be used constructively 
to indicate the need for interventions’.72 
 This is entirely compatible with the RMA’s structured professional approach to risk 
assessment and risk reporting. As regards determination of sentence, there is no delegation of 
the sentencing function to the risk assessor.73 The judge alone is responsible for passing 
sentence, and an OLR may be made in cases where the offender is found to be either high or 
medium risk.74 Its imposition is therefore not determined by the risk classification selected by 
the assessor. However, if the judge accepts a classification of low risk, an OLR should not be 
made.75 On that basis it might be that the RAR may effectively determine when an OLR is not 
made – in which case there are a number of options available76 – but that would seem to be 
entirely consistent with the Recommendation’s principle of risk-proportionality. 
The remainder of the Recommendation deals with ongoing risk management and the treatment 
and conditions that dangerous offenders are detained in. It recognises that deprivation of 
liberty, whether justified on the ground of prevention or not, is punishment in itself,77 and 
emphasises proportionality between level of risk and the measures taken to mitigate it.78 
Treatment should be construed as including psychological and social care,79 and should be 
 
70 CM/Rec(2014)3, para. 28. 
71 Ibid, para. 29 
72 Ibid. 
73 O’Leary 2014 S.C.C.R. 422, at. 22; Ferguson, at 104; Liddell, at 75. 
74 M v HM Advocate, at 12; Ferguson, at 107. 
75 Ferguson, at 108. Though the RMA has amended the risk criteria since the opinion was delivered, the low-
risk descriptor still requires that the offender be assessed as manageable ‘without long-term restrictions’. See 
table 5.1 in chapter 5.  
76 This is discussed at 6.4.2.  
77 CM/Rec(2014)3, para. 40 
78 Ibid, para. 41. 
79 Ibid, para. 43. 
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available to any offender who needs it.80 Such treatment should not be viewed as purely a risk 
management intervention: 81 
The purpose of the treatment of dangerous offenders should be such as to 
sustain their health and self-respect and, so far as the length of the sentence 
permits, to develop their sense of responsibility and encourage those attitudes 
and skills that will help them to lead law-abiding and self-supporting lives. 
Finally, the instrument recommends specialist training and supervision, emphasises the need 
for resourcing, and multi-agency co-operation.82 It also includes a recommendation that states 
make provision for specialist research on tools for assessing risks and needs of dangerous 
offenders.83 As Gailey et al. say, there is a ‘striking consistency’ between the Recommendation 
and the Scottish framework. They do, however, harbour concerns about the OLR’s scope.84 
This is largely determined by the criteria set out in section 210B of the 1995 Act, and the risk 
criteria set out in section 210E.  
6.3 THE RISK CRITERIA 
The risk criteria set out in section 210E are central to the OLR’s operation. An OLR may only 
be imposed – and must be imposed – in cases where the court finds those criteria are, on the 
balance of probabilities, met.85 Section 210E provides that: 
For the purposes of sections 195(1), 210B(2), 210D(1) and 210F(1) and 
(3) of this Act, the risk criteria are that the nature of, or the circumstances 
of the commission of, the offence of which the convicted persons has been 
found guilty either in themselves or as part of a pattern of behaviour are 
such as to demonstrate that there is a likelihood that he, if at liberty, will 
seriously endanger the lives, or physical, or psychological well-being, of 
members of the public at large.  
The cross-references refer to the sheriff’s duty to remit a case to the High Court for sentencing 
where he considers the risk criteria may be met, for the RAO, the ICO with assessment of risk, 
and the OLR, respectively. In determining whether the risk criteria are met, the court must 
have regard to: the RAR, and defence report if there is one;86 a report in respect of a person 
 
80 Ibid, para. 44. 
81 Ibid, para. 45. 
82 Ibid, paras. 49 – 50. 
83 Ibid, para. 51. 
84 This is returned to in section 6.5.1. 
85 s. 210F(1). 
86 s. 210F(1)(a). 
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subject to an ICO with assessment of risk;87 any evidence led in the section 210C(7) hearing, 
if there was one;88 and any other information the court has before it.89 If the judge concludes 
that, on the balance of probabilities, the risk criteria are met he has no option but to make an 
OLR. The only exception is where the court has the option of making a compulsion order. In 
that case the judge may make either an OLR or a compulsion order.90 Where the risk criteria 
are not found to be met, it will not be competent for the court to impose a life sentence.91 The 
Crown has a right of appeal against the court’s refusal to make an OLR in cases where the 
prosecutor contends that the risk criteria are, on the balance of probabilities, met.92 The key 
terms in section 210E are not further defined in the legislation, but the requirements for 
satisfying the risk criteria have received judicial consideration. The following sections 
consider the constituent elements of the risk criteria in turn, with reference to case law, in 
order to construct a detailed account of the substance of the risk criteria and their application. 
6.3.1 THE CONVICTION-RISK RELATIONSHIP 
The primary aim of the OLR is the protection of the public,93 though as a sentence of life 
imprisonment it would be absurd to suggest that it is not a punishment.94 The risk criteria have 
been drafted in such a way as to permit them to be satisfied either by a serious index offence, 
or by a less serious offence which is part of a pattern of behaviour.95 Kinloch v HM Advocate96 
concerned two prisoners in HMP Edinburgh who had been seeking transfer to another prison. 
Apparently frustrated at their lack of success, they held a fellow prisoner at knifepoint: 97 
[The appellants] entered the complainer’s cell, pretending they had 
something to tell him. They closed the cell door. Mr Quinn put a bladed 
weapon to the complainer’s neck while Mr Kinloch stood nearby…They 
held the complainer hostage with the use of two homemade weapons. 
Demands were made for Kentucky Fried Chicken, Chinese food, a pouch 
 
87 s. 210F(1)(b). That report being, for all practical purposes, the same as a RAR.  
88 s. 210F(1)(c). 
89 s. 210F(1)(d). 
90 s. 210F(1). It is interesting that the provision does not specify a compulsion order with a restriction order, but 
it seems extremely unlikely that anyone who met the criteria for an OLR would ever be made subject to the 
compulsion order alone. This is returned to later.  
91 s. 210G(2). 
92 s. 210F(3). 
93 Henderson, at 10; RAR Standards, 7, para. 26. 
94 McCluskey v HM Advocate 2013 J.C. 107, at 18. 
95 Kinloch v HM Advocate 2016 J.C. 78, at 24. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid, at 4. 
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of tobacco and a bus to HMP Barlinnie…The incident lasted six hours, 
after which it was resolved peacefully. 
The first appellant, Kinloch, had numerous previous convictions, including offences of 
dishonesty, assault, robbery, and culpable and reckless fire-raising. He had breached 
community service orders and failed to comply with conditions of probation and bail. The 
RAR risk formulation described him as having ‘a propensity to utilise threats and coercion 
alongside physical violence to achieve his aims. His actions are underpinned by violent 
ideation and intent, use of aggression in order to maintain his self-esteem and feelings of 
control and assessed Personality Disorder traits that affect his attitudes, perceptions and 
behaviours’.98 He was classified as high-risk. The second appellant, Quinn, had a long history 
of public order offences, possession of weapons, and assault, including an assault to severe 
injury and permanent disfigurement in which he stabbed his victim. The assessor concluded 
that he was high-risk having ‘a personality disorder characterised by pervasive self-
centredness, lack of concern for others, impulsivity, aggressive and antisocial attitudes, poor 
anger control, lack of trust and stubbornness’.99 Both offenders received OLRs and appealed 
on the grounds that the judge erred in finding that the risk criteria had been met. 
The court held that the risk criteria had not been met. The reason for this is the need for a 
causal connection between the index offence and the need for detention.100  
The language of the legislation is clear in requiring not only that there be 
a serious risk posed by the offender but also a link between the offence and 
that risk. If there is no such link, the risk criteria cannot be satisfied, 
irrespective of the general level of risk posed by the offender in terms of 
the risk assessment report. 
The court considered that, ‘while serious in terms of prison discipline’ it was significant no 
injury or attempt to cause injury to the complainer occurred.101 The incident was not in itself 
regarded as capable of giving rise to the inference that there was a likelihood the offenders 
would, if at liberty, seriously endanger the lives of the public.102 Despite the appellants’ 
previous convictions, the court also held that the offence could not be construed as part of a 
pattern of behaviour that demonstrated such a likelihood: the offence having taken place 
during the offenders’ imprisonment as a means to obtain transfer meant that it was too highly 
 
98 Ibid, para. 8. 
99 Ibid, para. 11. 
100 Ibid, para. 27; see also Johnstone, at 21; M v Germany (2010) 51 E.H.R.R. 41, at 88; van Droogenbroeck v 




contextualised to suggest a risk was presented to the public at large.103 The OLRs were 
quashed and extended sentences substituted. 
Three things are worthy of note. The first is that fact of an offence having taken place in a 
prison does not, in itself, rule out the possibility of the risk criteria being met. In the case 
McKinlay v HM Advocate,104 which was discussed earlier,105 the appeal against the making of 
an OLR was refused in circumstances where a very serious assault upon another prisoner was 
deemed to be part of a pattern of behaviour. Second, although the risk criteria are drafted to 
require a serious offence against the person or to require a pattern of behaviour be 
demonstrated, in practice, cases in which there is no pattern are likely to be disposed of 
otherwise than by OLR; usually, this will mean an extended sentence.106 Finally, even if one 
accepts that – notwithstanding the histories of instrumental violence, and use of bladed 
weapons – the index offence in Kinloch was not part of a pattern of behaviour, it seems 
appropriate to make the observation that it was a horrifying attack upon an individual who 
was held in a cell for six hours at knifepoint. The victim’s prisoner status in no way diminishes 
that. It is therefore somewhat discomfiting to see it described in the judgment only as ‘serious 
in terms of prison discipline’. The offence was serious, even if the court could not envisage 
the offenders carrying out a similar offence against a non-prisoner victim. 
It is also worth noting that an offence can be deemed to be part of a pattern of behaviour that 
satisfies the risk criteria in the absence of any violence whatsoever. In McFadyen v HM 
Advocate,107 the complainer became aware that the appellant had entered her bedroom in the 
early hours of the morning, the front door apparently having been left unlocked by one of her 
daughters. When asked who he was and what he was doing in her bedroom, the appellant, 
Jason McFadyen, replied ‘I’m Kev’ before running from the house with the complainer’s 
laundry basket.108 Subsequently, the woman’s daughters were found to have various items of 
clothing missing including underwear. The appellant also removed a handbag and makeup 
box. This offence is clearly alarming and capable of causing significant fear and distress, but 
it is difficult to see how it could satisfy the risk criteria in isolation. The incident does, 
 
103 Ibid, para. 28. 
104 [2019] H.C.J.A.C. 15. 
105 See section 5.4.2 of the thesis. 
106 Fyfe and Gailey (2011), 209. 
107 2011 S.C.C.R. 759. 
108 Ibid, at 2. 
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however, take on a somewhat different character when considered in light of the appellant’s 
history.  
Prior to the index offence, the appellant had acquired several convictions which included two 
charges of theft by housebreaking, and one assault to severe injury and permanent 
disfigurement.109 These offences spanned several years. The assault to severe injury occurred 
when he entered the home of a woman who, upon hearing someone in her house, had emerged 
from the bedroom to look. McFadyen struck her on the face, forced her to the floor, sat on top 
of her and attempted to strangle her. He then removed a knife from his pocket and began 
stabbing her. The complainer managed to get hold of the knife and snap the blade, but he 
continued to stab her with the broken blade. He then stood up and began kicking and punching 
her on the face and body before ordering her back into the room. McFadyen then ran into 
another bedroom, stole a handbag, and ran from the house. He was sentenced to a hospital 
order with restriction order which was automatically converted to a CORO when the MHA 
2003 came into force.110 The offence which led to the OLR occurred during a period of 
conditional discharge to supervised residence in his own tenancy.  
The RAR concluded that the appellant presented a high risk, with women, intimate partners 
and hospital staff the most likely targets for violence. Of particular significance were the 
repeated pattern of entering houses and stealing women’s clothing – the RAR noted that he 
had previously worn stolen clothing while carrying out violent offending111 – and that the 
violence he employed went far beyond that which was required to accomplish the thefts. This 
led the assessor to conclude that the purpose of the violence was gratification.112 The court 
concluded that the sentencing judge had been correct to impose the OLR. Attempts made to 
manage the risk presented by means of a CORO had failed, as had previous prison sentences. 
The RAR, and psychiatric reports the court had before it, had also concluded that the appellant 
did not have a mental disorder of the type that could be responsive to medical treatment in 
hospital.113 
In contrast to Kinloch, therefore, it did not matter that no physical harm had been done to the 
complainer, or that no attempt to inflict such harm had been made. It was sufficient that the 
 
109 Ibid, at 3. 
110 See 6.5.2.B.  
111 Ibid, at 8 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid, at 10. 
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offence had similar characteristics to previous offending where serious harm had been done. 
McFadyen is also significant in that it addresses the relationship between the OLR and other 
disposals that might be considered, and it will be returned to in this context later. At this stage, 
the point to be emphasised is that the purpose of the OLR is to prevent serious offences; it 
does not have to be imposed for such an offence, nor does the offence have to be one of violent 
or sexual offending. What matters is the complete picture, as it were.  
6.3.2. ‘LIKELIHOOD’ 
There must be a likelihood that the offender, if at liberty, will seriously endanger the public. 
‘Likelihood’ was defined straightforwardly in Liddell v HM Advocate114 as ‘something that is 
likely; a probability’,115 the court having decided that the dictionary definition should be 
applied. This is consistent with the approach taken by the courts in other contexts.116 In 
Ferguson v HM Advocate,117 counsel for one of the appellants submitted that the court had 
erred in adopting the dictionary definition: ‘likelihood’ should be construed as requiring a 
‘real and substantial risk’, that was more than a bare possibility, but not necessarily more 
probable than not.118 Lord Carloway, in delivering his opinion, noted that Liddell was binding 
upon the court, and along with it the definition. However, he went on to expand somewhat 
upon it: 119 
[G]iven that the statutory context is liberty of the person, the meaning of 
likelihood must be that of probability; the court requiring to be satisfied, 
before making an OLR, not just that there is a substantial or real chance of 
serious endangerment but that such endangerment is more likely than not 
to happen or, put another way, that it will occur. 
This is something of a departure from Liddell, and from section 210E. A ‘substantial or real 
chance’ would seem to set a lower threshold than ‘more likely than not;’ but the level of 
certainty implied in ‘that it will occur’ requires something more than being satisfied the 
occurrence is more likely than not. Lord Drummond Young in his judgment in Ferguson agrees 
that ‘likelihood’ means probable, in the sense of more likely than not; that it is a stringent 
 
114 2013 S.C.L. 846. 
115 Ibid, para. 52. 
116 See, for example, Fotheringam v Dunfermline District Council 1991 S.L.T. 610, at 611 (‘more likely than 
not’); and North Uist Fisheries Ltd. v Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 S.C. 33, at 39 (‘what is probable’). 
117 2014 S.L.T. 431. 
118 Ibid, para. 76. 
119 Ibid, para. 98. Emphasis added. 
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construction, which is clearly justified by the fact that the liberty of the individual is involved’120 
but does not go so far as Lord Carloway’s ‘that it will occur’. Clearly, if the sentencing judge 
was satisfied such endangerment would occur, the risk criteria would be met, but the language 
of section 210E does not set that high a standard. RARs address likelihood in probabilistic 
terms, and assessors are required to emphasise limitations of long-term projections:121 simply 
put, an assertion of that degree of certainty would not be compatible with defensible risk 
practice. Since the RAR has been given ‘a very particular significance’122 as regards the 
application of section 210E, it seems odd that it should be read into the risk criteria.  
6.3.3 ‘IF AT LIBERTY’ 
The risk that an individual poses can only ever be assessed at the point of sentence, but the 
risk criteria direct the judge to look forward to the point at which the offender will be at 
liberty.123 This is not a question of what the risk of serious endangerment would be if he were 
immediately liberated; what is to be contemplated is the point at which the offender would be 
at liberty if he were not sentenced to an OLR.124 It is difficult to envisage any circumstance in 
which a person subject to a RAO/ICO with assessment of risk ultimately receives a non-
custodial disposal and, since it is not competent for a court to impose a life sentence where an 
OLR is not made,125 this means that what must be considered is the risk the offender will pose 
at the conclusion of a determinate and most likely extended sentence.126 Lord Carloway in 
Ferguson put it in the following terms:127 
[T]he judge contemplating making an OLR is looking at the likelihood of 
serious endangerment when the offender is at liberty, but taking into 
account what he/she might be anticipated to have achieved by way of 
rehabilitation whilst in custody and the predicted effects of post release 
supervision. However, the judge has to bear in mind that, under standard 
(not OLR) sentencing regimes: first, rehabilitation programmes, including 
courses, cannot be forced upon the offender; and, secondly, any period of 
post release supervision will inevitably expire. If serious endangerment is 
regarded as likely at any point in what, but for the imposition of an OLR, 
would have been the offender’s post release future, an OLR must be made. 
 
120 Ibid, para. 128. 
121 RAR Standards, 25, para. 49. 
122 Ferguson, per Lord Clarke at 139. 
123 Ibid, at 99. 
124 Ibid, at 100. 
125 s. 210G(2). 
126 Ferguson, at 100. 
127 Ibid, at 102. Emphasis in original.  
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Thus, ‘at liberty’ refers, not only to the point at which the offender is no longer in custody, 
but to the time at which he is no longer subject to the conditions of a licence. This does not 
require a ‘precise calculation’ of the date that such measures would cease, or certainty as to 
the offender’s condition at that time.128 All it means is that the judge will consider, having 
regard to the RAR and other sources of information before him, whether measures short of an 
OLR will result in any ‘material reduction’ of the risk of serious endangerment.129 If he 
considers that they will not, he will be entitled to conclude that the risk criteria are met. The 
significance of this is that, were ‘at liberty’ to be construed as immediate release, far more 
people would meet the risk criteria because the potential for risk mitigation by measures short 
of an OLR would not be part of the deliberation. It also means that – while there is no 
requirement for judges to move up a ‘ladder of escalating punishments’ before imposing an 
OLR130 – the risk criteria, properly applied, preclude the making of an OLR in circumstances 
where the offender’s risk could be adequately addressed by an extended sentence.  
6.3.4 SERIOUS ENDANGERMENT  
The risk to which section 210E refers is that the offender ‘will seriously endanger the lives, 
or physical or psychological well-being of members of the public at large’. Clearly any offence 
which threatens life entails serious endangerment, but what may constitute serious 
endangerment in the context of non-life-threatening physical injury, and especially 
psychological harm sufficient for the purposes of section 210E, is less certain. Like other 
elements of the criteria, the concept of serious endangerment is not further defined in the 
legislation, nor has it received substantial judicial consideration. That may simply be because 
the cases which have arisen are those in which the nature of the risk presented is regarded as 
self-evidently serious enough. Alternatively, it might be that risk level serving as a proxy for 
dangerousness means that the same difficulties arise in determining what is sufficiently 
serious as they do in defining dangerousness. In any case, it is necessary to look beyond 
section 210E to the case law, pre-legislative materials, and other aspects of the framework to 
develop an understanding of what serious endangerment actually encompasses for the 
purposes of the OLR.  
 
128 Ibid, at 101. 
129 Ibid.  
130 Ibid, at 104. 
 187 
It will be recalled that the first constraint on the use of the OLR is section 210B(1), which 
prescribes the offences in respect of which a RAO or section 210D order can be made: 
(a)  ... 
 
(i)  a sexual offence (as defined in section 210A of [the 1995] Act); 
 
(ii)  a violent offence (as so defined); 
 
(iii)  an offence which endangers life; or 
 
(b)  is an offence the nature of which, or circumstances of the 
commission of which, are such that it appears to the court that the 
person has a propensity to commit any such offence as is mentioned in 
sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii) of paragraph (a) above. 
 
(2)  Where subsection (1) above applies, the court, at its own instance or 
(provided that the prosecutor has given the person notice of his intention in that 
regard) on the motion of the prosecutor, if it considers that the risk criteria may 
be met, shall make [a RAO]... 
 
From this it is apparent that – notwithstanding the conceivability that some sorts of property 
offences may result in serious psychological harm – the OLR framework is concerned with 
offences against the person. Subsection 210B(1)(b) is different from the others in that it 
contains both a backward-looking and forward-looking element requiring the court to consider 
possible future offending scenarios. This might appear to replicate the exercise in section 
210B(2), but it should be emphasised that (b) is about the offence of which the individual has 
already been convicted; the forward-looking element serves only to broaden the scope of the 
OLR so that conviction for a sexual, violent or life-endangering offence is not necessary for 
its application. This is one of the aspects of the legislation that have led some commentators 
to raise concerns about the potential for ‘net-widening’ over time.131 Nevertheless, it is 
generally consistent with the scope and recommendations of the MacLean Report which was 
discussed in detail earlier in the thesis.132 It is, however, worth noting that the number of OLRs 
made each year has been relatively stable.  
 
131 McSherry and Keyzer (2009), 102; Fyfe and Gailey (2011), 205; and Gailey et al. (2017), 119. This is 
returned to later. 
132 See part 4.5.  
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The spikes visible in Figure 6.1 above are likely the result of RAOs awaiting disposal.134 The 
MacLean Committee tasked, it will be recalled, with making proposals for the management 
of ‘serious sexual and violent offenders who may present a continuing danger to the public’,135 
interpreted ‘continuing danger’ as referring to a high risk of serious violent or sexual offending 
in the future.136 It did, however, also consider that, whilst the emphasis was on serious sexual 
and violent offending, the OLR should be available in cases where index offence was neither 
sexual nor violent:137 
The option of imposing an OLR should be available only in the High 
Court. The court should have the power to impose an OLR where the 
offender has been convicted on indictment of (a) an offence of violence, 
(b) a sexual offence, or (c) any other offence which is closely related to, 
or reflects a propensity for violent, sexual, or life-endangering 
offending. 
The Committee was also clear that the residual category should only serve as grounds for an 
OLR where the offender had a history of violent or sexual offending and the “other” offence 
was related to or otherwise reflective of that history.138 No such qualification appears in the 
legislation though, as was discussed earlier, a pattern of behaviour is normally required when 
the offence is not a serious violent or sexual offence. There is thus some divergence between 
the Committee’s recommendations and the wording of section 210B. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that it is the infliction of physical harm upon others with which 210B is concerned and section 
210E must be read in this context.   
 
133 Source: RMA Annual Reports 2013-14 to 2019-20. Available at: https://www.rma.scot/resources/annual-
reports/ Accessed 18/11/2020.  
134 See Fig. 6.2 below.  
135 MacLean Report, 1. 
136 Ibid, 8, para. 2.6. 
137 MacLean Report, 40, rec. 16. 
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The constraining effect of section 210B on the risk criteria is important. The MacLean 
Committee’s formulation of the statutory criteria for making an OLR differ quite considerably 
from section 210E:139 
The High Court [must be] satisfied that there are reasonable grounds 
for believing that the offender presents a substantial and continuing risk 
to the safety of the public such as requires his lifelong restriction. If the 
Court is so satisfied, it must make the Order. 
Two aspects of this recommendation are key. First is the requirement for a ‘substantial and 
continuing risk to the safety of the public’, and second is the necessity of ‘lifelong restriction’. 
Section 210E instead describes the risk as being one that the offender ‘if at liberty, will 
seriously endanger the lives, or physical, or psychological well-being, of members of the 
public’. This risk is a long-term risk since, as was discussed above, it is one presented at the 
conclusion of determinate – and likely extended – sentence, but it need not be thought to be a 
lifelong risk. The statutory risk criteria had not been drafted at the time the White Paper was 
published, but they are more closely reflective of the ‘substantial and continuing risk to public 
safety’ to which the white paper refers.140 Section 210E does not, however, use the word 
‘safety’, instead employing the terminology of danger to life or to ‘physical or psychological 
well-being’.  
The line between safety and well-being is undoubtedly blurred; but they are not synonymous. 
For example, in public health well-being is a subjective measure associated with the concept 
of quality of life; it is considered to be of value precisely because it encompasses something 
more than freedom from disease or injury.141 The 1995 Act makes a distinction between safety 
and welfare in the context of mental health disposals, the latter being deemed insufficient to 
authorise detention in the interests of a third party.142 Notwithstanding that the contexts here 
are different – although the compulsion order is a competent disposal in some cases where the 
section 210E criteria are met143 – the risk criteria as enacted do appear set a lower threshold 
in terms of both duration and intensity of risk: whilst one’s wellbeing is undoubtedly 
 
139 Ibid, 41, rec. 17. 
140 SVSO White Paper, 23, para. 2.8. 
141 See, for example, S.M. Skevington and J.R. Böhnke, ‘How is subjective well-being related to quality of life? 
Do we need two concepts and both measures?’ (2018) 206 Social Science & Medicine 22; M. Fisher, ‘A Theory 
of Public Wellbeing’ (2019) 19 BMC Public Health 1283; and P. Walker, ‘Wellbeing: Meaning, Definition, 
Measurement and Application’, in P. Walker and M. John (eds.) From Public Health to Wellbeing (London, 
2012), esp. 26-27.  
142 s. 57A(3)(c) and s. 59A(3)(c). This replicates the so-called civil commitment provisions of the Mental 
Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003. 
143 This is touched upon later. 
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endangered by conduct which makes one unsafe, it does not follow that all threats to wellbeing 
threaten one’s safety.  
The overall picture though is one that centres on violent and sexual crimes: the MacLean 
Committee’s terms of reference, its recommendations, the publication of the white paper titled 
Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders, and the criteria for making a risk assessment order have 
the same general focus, even if their wording differs somewhat. This is reflected in the 
reported cases which, at the time of writing, have addressed OLRs made in respect of  rape,144 
sexual offences (other than rape),145 breach of a sexual offences prevention order (SOPO),146 
attempted murder,147 (non-sexual) assault,148 possession of indecent images of children,149 and 
breach of the peace.150 Some cases involved more than one category of offending, and some 
involve multiple appellants.151 In cases in which there was no physical contact with any 
person,152 there was found to be a risk of some form of contact offending with, it seems, the 
exception of Johnstone.153 It therefore seems likely that, while psychological suffering is – 
rightly – recognised as being worthy of prevention, it is the psychological impact of offending 
of a sexual or violent nature that is in contemplation.  
6.3.5 ‘THE PUBLIC AT LARGE’ 
The construction of ‘public at large’ has received little judicial treatment, but its placement in 
the risk criteria does not amount to a requirement that the offender is likely to seriously 
endanger any member of the general public. In M v HM Advocate154 it was argued that, since 
 
144 Petch and Foye v HM Advocate 2011 J.C. 210 (second appellant); GWS v HM Advocate [2011] H.C.J.A.C. 
45; MacLennan v HM Advocate 2012 S.C.C.R. 625; Munro v HM Advocate 2015 J.C. 1; Laird; McIntosh v HM 
Advocate 2016 S.C.L. 923; Daly v Scottish Ministers 2016 Rep. L.R. 38; R(J) v HM Advocate 2017 S.C.L. 814; 
Beattie; and Moynihan v HM Advocate 2017 J.C. 71. 
145 Liddell; McCluskey; Byrne v HM Advocate 2016 S.C.L. 998; G v Scottish Ministers [2017] C.S.O.H. 10 
146 McMillan v HM Advocate 2012 S.C.L. 547. 
147 Ross v HM Advocate 2013 S.C.L. 1054; Ferguson; Connors v HM Advocate [2018] H.C.J.A.C. 5 
148 Ferguson; O’Leary v HM Advocate 2014 S.C.C.R. 422; Simpson v HM Advocate 2015 S.C.L. 510; and 
McKinlay v HM Advocate [2019] H.C.J.A.C. 15.  
149 HM Advocate v McCuaig [2018] H.C.J.A.C. 55. 
150 M; Johnstone; and McFadyen. These cases involved offending of sexual nature, stalking behaviour, and the 
entry to a woman’s home in the early hours of the morning and taking of underwear, respectively. 
151 For example, Petch and Foye; and Ferguson.  
152 M v HM Advocate; McFadyen; Johnstone; and McMillan. 
153 Though it should be emphasised that this understanding is derived from the case report; it is possible that the 
RAR and/or RMP contemplate future offending scenarios in which a violent or sexual offence occurs and that 
this was not mentioned in the judgment. Given what has been said above about the case, however, that would 
seem a strange omission.  
154 2012 S.L.T. 147. 
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the appellant’s risk was specifically one of sexual offending against young girls, the risk criteria 
had not been satisfied. This was given short shrift.155 
The court is also unable to agree that a risk to a section of the public “at large”, 
such as young girls, does not constitute a risk to the public “at large” as set 
out in the section. The use of the term “at large” is primarily intended to 
exclude those offenders who pose a risk to an individual or individuals as 
distinct from posing a general danger to persons, such as young girls, whoever 
they may be.  
 
A distinction must therefore be made between risks to specific, identifiable individuals, and 
risks to classes of persons. This means, for example, that an offender who attempted to murder 
his wife because she had an affair with his best friend may not meet the risk criteria; but one 
who seriously assaulted his husband because he victimised intimate partners might. Evidence 
of a pattern of behaviour will be useful in distinguishing between cases where it really is an 
individual that is at risk, and those when an individual is at risk because of a role they happen 
to fulfil at the time.156 The rationale behind such making such a distinction is likely that if the 
risk is in fact to a specific individual, it may be mitigated by measures short of an OLR. 
Whether one accepts this as legitimate or not, a finding that the risk criteria are not met does 
not amount to a finding that an offender is worthy of less punishment; it is a judgment on the 
manageability of risk only. Classes of person, risk to which has resulted in an OLR, include 
intimate partners,157 females,158 professional caregivers,159 and children.160 Despite the 
judgement in Kinloch discussed above, an OLR was made in the case of McKinlay161 where 
the victim was the offender’s fellow prisoner. In Kinloch, however, the motivation for the 
offence – the desire to obtain a prison transfer – was regarded as specific enough to warrant its 
consideration as an isolated incident despite a history of serious violent offending involving 
similar weapons. In McKinlay, the appellant had a history of serious violent offending against 
fellow prisoners across multiple custodial sentences as well as a history of attacks on members 
of the public. Notwithstanding the criticisms made of Kinloch earlier in the chapter, it seems 
that the distinction between these two cases turned, not so much on the class of persons to 
which the victims belonged, as to the instrumental nature of the offending in Kinloch. A risk 
to prisoners may therefore satisfy the risk criteria, though if the risk were only to other prisoners 
 
155 Ibid, at 12. 
156 See the discussion at 6.3.1 above.  
157 For example, McFadyen; Ferguson; McKinlay; Laird; O’Leary. 
158 For example, Johnstone, McFadyen, Ross, Ferguson, Laird, R(J); McIntosh. 
159 For example, McFadyen; Johnstone. 
160 For example, M; McMillan; Ferguson; Byrne; McIntosh; R(J). 
161 [2019] H.C.J.A.C. 15; see also 6.3.1. 
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one might wonder what special protection an OLR would confer, since the major distinction 
between it and any other custodial sentence to which an offender might be subject is that it 
permits detention in prison indefinitely. Regardless, as was said earlier, risks of serious harm 
to prisoners ought to be treated as seriously as those to any other section of the community.  
6.3.6 CONCLUSION TO SECTION 6.3 
Despite occupying a central role in the OLR sentencing framework, the risk criteria set out in 
section 210E have received little academic attention. This section of the chapter has sought to 
go some way to addressing that gap in the literature. The criteria were broken down into their 
constituent parts and addressed in detail with reference to case law, other parts of the statute, 
and other sources such as pre-legislative material. The risk criteria are satisfied where, on the 
basis of the RAR and any other information before the court, the sentencing judge considers 
that the offender is more likely than not to perpetrate a serious offence of a violent or sexual 
nature. That offence may be directed at any section of the community. The offence for which 
the offender falls to be sentenced will reflect the risk that he poses, and that risk will not be 
substantially reduced in the course of a determinate sentence. Where the judge finds that the 
risk criteria are, on the balance of probabilities, met he has no option but to make an OLR 
unless a compulsion order is made. The next section of the chapter considers the variety of 
sentencing scenarios that follow from consideration of whether the risk criteria are met.  
6.4 FINAL DISPOSAL  
It was said earlier that where the court finds that on the balance of probabilities the risk criteria 
are met, the judge has no option but to impose an OLR. The only exception to this is where the 
offender also meets the criteria for a compulsion order. In that case, the court may make either 
a compulsion order or an OLR.162 The interaction between the OLR and the other sentences 
that could be made is complex, and for reasons of space it cannot be fully explored; the focus 
of this section will therefore be on the making of the OLR, but some consideration of the 
decision process at the point of sentence is warranted. In most cases, the judge will have made 
a RAO. Where he has considered that the risk criteria may be met and that a compulsion order 
 
162 s. 210F(1). 
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or hospital direction may be appropriate, he ought to have made an ICO with assessment of 
risk under sections 53 and 210D of the 1995 Act.163  
There are thus six possible sentencing scenarios:164 (1) a RAO was made and the court is 
satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the risk criteria in section 210E are met; (2) a 
RAO was made and the court is not satisfied that the risk criteria are met; (3) an ICO with 
assessment of risk was made, and the court is satisfied that the risk criteria are met, and is 
satisfied that the criteria for making a compulsion order are met; (4) an ICO with assessment 
of risk was made, and the court is satisfied that the risk criteria are met, and is not satisfied that 
the criteria for making a compulsion order are met; (5) an ICO with assessment of risk was 
made, and the court is not satisfied that the risk criteria are met, and is satisfied that the criteria 
for making a compulsion order are met; and (6) an ICO with assessment of risk was made, and 
the court is not satisfied that the risk criteria are met, and is not satisfied that the criteria for 
making a compulsion order are met. However here, for simplicity – and to keep the emphasis 
on the OLR – these outcomes will be considered in terms of those where an OLR is made, and 
those where it is not.  
6.4.1 WHERE AN OLR IS IMPOSED 
An OLR is imposed where the risk criteria are met. The offender may have been subject to a 
RAO or an ICO with assessment of risk.165 Despite its categorisation in section 210F(2) as a 
‘sentence of imprisonment...for an indeterminate period’, the OLR operates as a life sentence 
on much the same basis as the MLS for murder. The sentencing judge must fix a punishment 
part which is the minimum period of time that the offender will spend in custody before being 
eligible for release.166 The Parole Board for Scotland sitting as a Tribunal will decide whether 
to direct his release,167 and will do so only where satisfied that his continued detention is not 
necessary for the protection of the public.168 If he is released, he will be subject to a licence – 
and recall for any breach of its conditions – for life.169 He will also be subject to a risk 
management plan (RMP) for the duration of the sentence, i.e. for the rest of his life.170 If the 
 
163 See section 5.3 of the last chapter. 
164 Assuming best practices have been followed and an ICO has been made where it ought to have been.  
165 Scenarios 1, 3, and 4.  
166 Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993, s. 2(3). Hereafter ‘the 1993 Act’. 
167 s. 2(4). 
168 s. 2(5)(b). 
169 s. 2(4). 
170 CJ(S)A 2003, s. 6(1).  
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OLR is made following on from an ICO with assessment of risk, and the criteria for making a 
compulsion order were also found to be met, there are two options: the OLR could be made on 
its own, or it could be combined with a hospital direction (HD). This section of the chapter first 
sets out the key aspects of the OLR, before discussing the HD briefly.   
A. THE PUNISHMENT PART 
For the purposes of parole and licensing, the OLR operates as a life sentence. The 1993 Act 
requires that the judge, when imposing an OLR, sets a punishment part.171 The punishment part 
is the period of imprisonment the judge considers ‘necessary to satisfy the requirements of 
retribution and deterrence’,’172 and is the minimum term that the offender will spend in custody. 
Although the punishment part is a feature of the MLS the calculation is quite different – and is 
considerably more complex – in the case of the OLR. In section 6.5.1.A of the chapter, 
references are to the 1993 Act unless otherwise specified.  
In setting the punishment part, the judge must take into account the seriousness of the offence 
in respect of which the OLR is being imposed, and the seriousness of any other offences of 
which the offender was convicted on the same indictment;173 any previous convictions;174 and 
the sentence that the judge would have passed, had he not imposed the OLR.175 This ‘notional 
determinate sentence’ is the starting point, and is what makes the OLR’s punishment part 
calculation more complicated than that of a MLS. Once the starting point has been selected, 
the judge must identify the part of that period which is appropriate for the purposes of 
retribution and deterrence.176 In identifying this part, the judge must ignore any element of the 
notional determinate sentence that would have been attributable to public protection;177 there 
is no need to reflect the need to protect the public in the punishment part, because this is 
addressed by the imposition of the indeterminate sentence.178 Once the public protective 
 
171 s. 2(1)(ab) inserted by CJ(S)A 2003, Sch. 1, para. 1(2)(a). 
172 s. 2(2). 
173 s. 2(2)(a). 
174 s. 2(2)(b). 
175 s. 2(2)(d) and s. 2A(1)(a). 
176 s. 2A(1)(b).  
177 s. 2A(2)(a). 
178 O’Neill v HM Advocate 1999 S.C.C.R. 300, at 307E. It is the whole of the element for public protection that 
is stripped out, not simply that reflecting the particular requirements that led to the making of the indeterminate 
sentence: Petch and Foye, at 44. 
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element has been stripped out, a downward adjustment is made: this will usually mean halving 
the figure that has been arrived at,179 but may be a lesser reduction.180  
The purpose of this adjustment is to reflect, at least broadly, the early release provisions as they 
operate in relation to determinate sentence prisoners.181 Determinate sentence prisoners subject 
to a sentence of 4 years or more are entitled to have their case referred to the Parole Board for 
Scotland (PBS) when they have served one half of their sentence,182 though they will not 
necessarily be granted parole at that point. Since the OLR prisoner will be eligible to apply for 
parole once the punishment part has elapsed, setting that period at one half of that calculated 
on the basis of the notional determinate sentence is intended to go some way to achieving 
comparative justice.183 That makes sense: it is risk that has necessitated the imposition of the 
OLR; not desert, and therefore the OLR prisoner should afforded the opportunity to 
demonstrate his suitability for release at the same stage he would have if he were subject to a 
determinate sentence. However, the period that is (usually) halved is not the duration of the 
notional determinate sentence – it is the duration of the notional determinate sentence with the 
public protective element stripped out.  
The result is that the punishment part is less than half the duration of the determinate sentence, 
and therefore the prisoner is eligible to be considered for parole earlier than he would have 
been had he been given a determinate sentence instead. This anomaly was raised in argument 
by the advocate depute in O’Neill v HM Advocate184 though, as the court pointed out, the reality 
is that very few life prisoners are released at the conclusion of their punishment part and so it 
considered the problem ‘may be more apparent than real’.185 Still, the anomaly’s 
‘unsatisfactory’ existence was again addressed in Petch and Foye v HM Advocate,186 where the 
court considered that – because it arose from section 2 of the 1993 Act – if it were to be 
 
179 s. 2B(1)(a). 
180 s. 2B(1)(b). 
181 O’Neill, at 962; Ansari v HM Advocate 2003 J.C. 105, at 111F; Petch and Foye, at 29; s. 2(2)(aa)(iii) as in 
force until 23/09/2012.  
182 s. 1(3)(a). Those on short sentences (i.e. of less than 4 years) are eligible for automatic release at the halfway 
point: s. 1(1).  
183 O’Neill, at 962; Petch and Foye, at 29; see also J. Chalmers, ‘Punishment parts and discretionary life 
sentences’, (2003) 24 Scots Law Times 199; and D. Thomson, ‘The Scottish Ministers try to resolve the issue of 
punishment parts in discretionary life sentence cases – but do they succeed?’ (2012) 5 S.L.T. 23, 26. 
184 1999 S.L.T. 958, at 962. 
185 O’Neill, at 963. According to Thomson, only around 1 in 4 Life Prisoner Tribunals result in a direction to 
release the prisoner on licence. This is not limited to cases which are being heard by the Parole Board for the 
first time. See. Thomson (2012), 26. The odds of being granted parole for OLR prisoners are even less 
favourable. This is discussed below.  
186 2011 J.C. 210, at 53. 
 196 
remedied, then Parliament would have legislate. This Parliament did in the form of the Criminal 
Cases (Punishment and Review) (Scotland) Act 2012, which amended (and rather significantly 
complicated) the procedure for setting the punishment part of an OLR to provide inter alia that 
the punishment part should normally be set at half of the stripped down notional determinate 
sentence,187 but that it could be longer if the court considers it appropriate.188 In determining 
whether it is appropriate to specify a longer period, the court must consider the seriousness of 
the offence on its own or alongside other offences of which the offender was convicted on the 
same indictment;189 where applicable, the fact of the offence having been committed during 
imprisonment for an earlier offence;190 and any previous convictions.191 Once this exercise has 
been completed, any discount to be applied for a guilty plea will be applied.192  
 
                               Fig. 6.2193 
 
These amendments to the 1993 Act were intended to rectify the anomaly identified in O’Neill194 
but they are convoluted and repetitious. For example, in identifying the period that is 
appropriate to satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence, the judge is required by 
section 2(2) to consider the seriousness of the offence,195 and any previous convictions;196 this 
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188 s. 2B(2). 
189 s. 2B(5)(a). 
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191 s. 2B(5)(c). 
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reduced in virtue of the plea, or – if no discount is to be granted – to explain why it is unwarranted. 
193 Source: RMA FOI(S)A 2004 response dated 24/10/2019. 
194 Scottish Government, Criminal Cases (Punishment and Review) (Scotland) Act 2012 Policy Memorandum, 
para. 34. Available at: 
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period – the requirement for public protection having been stripped out – is then required by 
section 2B(1)(a) to be halved unless, that is, the judge in virtue of section 2B(1)(b) considers 
that a lesser reduction is appropriate having considered the seriousness of the offence and any 
previous convictions. This seems an extremely complicated way of saying that the punishment 
part should be set at one half the stripped down determinate sentence unless the judge considers 
it appropriate to specify a longer period. Regardless of the complexity, it is the manner in which 
the length of the punishment part is calculated – specifically the reduction to reflect the point 
at which a determinate sentence prisoner would be eligible for consideration for release – that 
means the punishment parts in OLRs are significantly shorter than those in MLSs in which no 
such reduction takes place.197 The mean OLR punishment part length across the years that the 
order has been available is shown in figure 6.2. It should, however, be noted that there is 
nothing to prevent a punishment part being set which exceeds the life expectancy of the 
offender,198 and whether or not the offender is paroled, he will remain subject to the sentence 
and therefore risk management measures for the rest of his life. Central to this is the risk 
management plan which was discussed briefly in the last chapter, and is considered in more 
detail below.  
B. RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
The key legislative provisions are set out in the CJ(S)A 2003, and references to legislation in 
this section are to that Act unless otherwise specified. The RMP is the responsibility of the 
Lead Authority which, it will be recalled, is determined by where the offender resides. At the 
point the OLR is imposed the Lead Authority will – in most cases – be the Scottish Ministers, 
though in practice this function is discharged by the Scottish Prison Service on their behalf.199 
If a hospital direction was made with the OLR, the offender will go to hospital and the Lead 
Authority in that case will be the hospital managers.200 The Lead Authority must inform the 
RMA immediately that it assumes responsibility for an OLR offender; this is so the RMA can 
 
197 This is returned to below. 
198 s. 2(3A)(b). This is why populist whole life sentence policies to ensure ‘life means life’ – like that most 
recently touted by Scottish Conservative MSP Liam Kerr, and in the process of being revived by its now leader 
Douglas Ross – are, aside from being morally repugnant, redundant.  
199 s. 7(1); Standards and Guidelines for Risk Management (2016), 45. 
200 s. 7(2); RAR Standards (2016), 45. Who constitutes hospital management depends on the hospital in which 
the individual in a patient, such as the Special Health Board responsible for the State Hospital: see s. 329 of the 
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003.   
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assist the Lead Authority in meeting the requirements of the Standards and Guidelines and in 
discharging statutory functions. 201  
The Lead Authority must convene a ‘multi-agency, multi-disciplinary group’ which will be 
responsible for the ongoing assessment and management of the risk the offender poses; this is 
called a Risk Management Team (RMT).202 This is often accomplished via established 
structures such as MAPPA, or Restricted Patient Multi-disciplinary Teams but, if appropriate, 
the Lead Authority may establish a group specifically for the management of the individual.203 
The precise make-up of the group is dependent upon the offender’s circumstances, needs, and 
risks and thus can – and should – change over time; a range of professionals, such as 
psychologists, addiction workers, prison staff, police, and prisoner or hospital management 
may be part of it.204 Criminal justice social workers may be part of the RMT’s composition but 
even if not, RMA guidelines are that they should always have the option to attend.205 The author 
of the RAR may be invited to attend the first meeting.206 There will be a Case Manager (CM) 
appointed by the Lead Authority. The CM is supported by, and accountable to, the RMT and 
co-ordinates the completion and delivery of the RMP.207 
Section 6(3) of the CJ(S)A 2003 provides that the RMP must set out an assessment of risk;208 
set out the measures to be taken for the minimisation of risk, and how such measures are to be 
co-ordinated;209 and be in such form as is specified by the RMA.210 The Standards and 
Guidelines for Risk Management contain the relevant guidelines, and also a template for the 
RMP.211 The template requires analysis of previous offending behaviour, including the index 
offence, and a risk formulation. This includes a description of the ‘cycle of events, thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviours that precede and follow an episode of seriously harmful offending’.212 
The wording is of interest since it presupposes a history of seriously harmful offending, but as 
has been discussed no such history is required for the imposition of an OLR. The risks that the 
plan has been created to manage are then set out. The author of the plan must identify 
 
201 RAR Standards (2016), 52 
202 Ibid, 46. 
203 Ibid.  
204 Ibid, 47. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid, 48. 
207 Ibid, 49. 
208 s. 6(3)(a). 
209 s. 6(3)(b). 
210 s. 6(3)(c) and s. 6(5). 
211 An editable Word template is available at https://www.rma.scot/standards-guidelines/risk-management/  
212 See the ‘Analysis of Offending and Risk Formulation’ section of the template. 
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predisposing, precipitating, perpetuating, and protective factors along with early warning signs. 
Indicators of positive change are also included, and this is important. The OLR was – as has 
been discussed – designed to be a means of risk management where community reintegration, 
where possible, is the goal. This optimism is, however, less visible when OLR prisoner 
progression is considered. This is returned to later. The RMP is structured around four risk 
management strategies: supervision; monitoring; treatment or other intervention; and victim 
safety planning. These measures should be proportionate to the risks they aim to address and 
should be tailored to the individual offender’s needs.213 The RMP may make provision for any 
person who ‘may reasonably be expected to assist in the minimisation of risk to have functions 
in relation to the implementation of the plan’,214 but such a role should be collaboratively 
agreed rather than imposed.215 The template requires that requires that collaborative RMP 
development has occurred. Once prepared, the RMP will be submitted to the RMA for 
approval.216  
The OLR offender will be subject to the RMP for life, but the plan should evolve over time as 
his needs and risk change. The RMT is required to keep the plan under review and identify 
circumstances in which it may no longer be appropriate.217 Where there has been, or is likely 
to be, a significant change in circumstances, the Lead Authority must conduct a formal review 
of the plan.218 If the Lead Authority concludes that the plan has become, or is likely become, 
unsuitable, it must prepare a new RMP.219 In circumstances where it is concluded that a new 
Lead Authority requires to be designated, then that agency will prepare the new RMP.220 
‘Significant change’ is not further defined in the legislation, and it is for the Lead Authority to 
determine whether one is or is not likely to occur, however, the RMA gives the following 
examples: transfer to conditions of lower security; change of place of detention, such as transfer 
to another prison or movement between hospital and prison; where the offender is in the 
community, a change of address; changes in physical or mental health. 221 Transfer to a new 
Lead Authority is itself a significant change.222 
 
213 Standards and Guidelines for Risk Management, 27 – 30. 
214 s. 6(4). 
215 Standards and Guidelines for Risk Management, 36. 
216 This process was discussed at section 5.2.3 of the thesis.  
217 Ibid, 46. 
218 s. 9(5). 
219 s. 9(6)(a). 
220 s. 9(6)(b). 
221 Standards and Guidelines for Risk Management, 59. 
222 Ibid.  
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There is no statutory requirement for a formal annual review of the RMP, but the RMA requires 
that an annual implementation report (AIR) be submitted within 12 months of the RMP’s 
approval and thereafter.223 It consists of a copy of the current RMP and a progress record,224 
and serves as evidence that the RMP is being implemented and kept under review by the Lead 
Authority.225 The AIR can accommodate minor changes, i.e. those which are not significant 
enough to render the RMP unsuitable.226 The AIR is also the responsibility of the RMT and, 
while it is expected the RMT will meet regularly – with the frequency of meetings determined 
by the individual case227 – the requirement to agree and prepare the AIR means that the RMT 
must convene at least once a year.228  
C. PAROLE AND MANAGEMENT IN THE COMMUNITY 
Perhaps the most significant change in an OLR offender’s circumstances is his transition from 
custody to the community. Although the offender is entitled to be considered for release on 
licence at the expiry of the punishment part, OLR offenders will normally require to have 
progressed from closed conditions before being tested in conditions of lower security in the 
National Top End,229 and then open estate before parole can be considered.230 He will also have 
had periods of temporary release; this is to help prepare the offender for release, and to test him 
to ensure that he may be adequately managed in the community.231 Progression is not linear, 
and the individual may be returned to conditions of increased security if this is necessary.  
 
223 Ibid, 58. 
224 Ibid, 92. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid, 37. 
228 Ibid, 48. 
229 NTE facilities are part of the closed prison estate to which offenders may be transferred before release or 
transfer to open conditions. They allow offenders to be tested in conditions of lesser security while accessing 
greater privileges. NTE facilities are located at HMP Shotts, Peterhead, Perth, Edinburgh, and Cornton Vale.  
230 See, for example, Beattie, at 4; and Gailey et al. (2017), 137. But the Parole Board has directed the release of 
an offender who had not been tested in open conditions before his release. See O’Leary v Scottish Ministers 
[2020] C.S.O.H. 81. This is returned to shortly.  





445Lmq_fvn0ko9 Accessed 28th Oct 2020. For the purposes of the first grant of temporary release (FGTR) the 
OLR is treated as if it were a life sentence, and the Scottish Ministers – in practice the Minister for Community 
Safety – must approve it. See G. Nicholson, Ministerial Decision Making in Criminal Justice Cases (Edinburgh, 
2008), ch. 3, paras. 3.9 to 3.11. 
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When the case comes before the PBS, the tribunal will direct the prisoner’s release on life 
licence only if it considers that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that he 
remain confined.232 In assessing whether this test is met, the tribunal has a statutory obligation 
to ‘have regard’ to the plan;233 this does not mean that it is bound to ‘slavishly obey’, but it 
must demonstrate that the RMP has been carefully considered.234 In O’Leary v Scottish 
Ministers,235  the petitioner had been granted parole despite an RMP which assessed his risk as 
unmanageable in the community and with which community based social work agreed. All the 
risk management measures identified in the RMP were custodial. In short, Mr O’Leary was 
released in circumstances where the relevant agencies simply did not know what to do to 
protect others from him. On the day of his release, the Lead Authority – now Glasgow City 
Council – submitted a breach report. It did not allege, or provide evidence of, any breach of 
licence conditions. Instead it said that the petitioner had been ‘released without a forward facing 
community risk management plan being in place to adequately meet critical elements of 
Supervision, Monitoring, Intervention and Victim Safety Planning…’ and that ‘his risk in the 
community is assessed as unmanageable’.236 The petitioner was recalled to custody three days 
after his release.237 The procedural history from this point is complex. However, in response to 
a query from the petitioner’s solicitor, the Parole Board intimated that, in a case such as this, it 
would expect to have sight of a ‘community facing’ RMP; that is, a RMP which sets out 
measures that will be taken to ensure adequate risk management in the community.238 Standing 
the Scottish Prison Service’s position that he was not yet manageable in the community, no 
such plan was forthcoming. The petitioner’s solicitor sought to have the Parole Board compel 
the production of such a plan and, having been unsuccessful on more than one occasion, lodged 
a petition for judicial review in which it was argued inter alia that the Scottish Ministers had 
acted unlawfully in refusing to prepare such a plan, and that their failure amounted to a breach 
of article 5. The court held that the only obligation on the Scottish Ministers was to produce an 
RMP, and that they had done this. An RMP, as a creature of statute, was a plan prepared 
according to the requirements of the CJ(S)A 2003, the relevant standards and guidelines, and 
approved by the RMA. It would be ‘absurd’ if the law were construed as compelling production 
 
232 s. 2(5)(b). 
233 1993 Act, s. 26B. 
234 O’Leary [2020] at 55. 
235 [2020] C.S.O.H. 81. 
236 Ibid, at 53. 
237 Though the Parole Board maintained that the recall was incidental to the breach report, it having considered 
‘intelligence’ under r. 6 of the Parole Board (Scotland) Rules 2001 at the same time that had a bearing on risk. 
See para. 23.  
238 O’Leary [2020], at 53. 
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of a plan stating that a prisoner was ready for release when, in the opinion of the Lead Authority 
he was not.239 Counsel for the RMA, intervening in the proceedings, had gone further than this, 
pointing out that there ‘was no basis to suggest that a risk management plan required (or even 
was permitted) to be produced which misrepresented as manageable in the community risk 
which had been assessed to be unmanageable there’.240 Additionally, the court held that 
‘satellite reports’ i.e. those supplementary to the RMP, for example a contingency plan for 
unexpected release, ought to be discouraged. Satellite reports, the court said, could undermine 
the RMP to which the statutory framework has given centrality.241 At the same time the court 
relied on the Parole Board’s powers to obtain information on risk from other sources to reject 
the contention the petitioner was disadvantaged by reliance on the RMP.242 
This case is interesting for a variety of reasons but, for the present purposes, it is of significance 
because of what it tells us about the role of the RMP in parole decision-making. First, given 
the duty to have regard to the RMP but not to ‘slavishly follow’ it, it appears that the role of 
the RMP in parole decision-making is analogous to that of the RAR in sentencing. However, 
at sentencing the practice of consideration of sources other than the RAR is routine.243 Second, 
the nature of the duty to have regard – especially if, following this decision, the Parole Board 
declines to obtain other risk reports – is such that it will be very difficult for the Board to justify 
departure from it, especially in cases where the RMP’s author considers the offender is not 
ready for release. One other point is worthy of consideration. The court decided that the Parole 
Board (Scotland) Rules 2001 could not reasonably be interpretated as empowering the Board 
to compel a Lead Authority to produce a report that it considered appropriate. That would be, 
as the court held, ‘absurd’. It is, however, submitted that the court – and perhaps even the RMA 
– has understated the position somewhat. No plan that set out measures that, evaluated against 
the risk assessment, were inadequate to manage the risks identified would be capable of 
conforming to the standards and guidelines, or of being approved by the RMA. Since a RMP  
is a plan conforming to these requirements, it could not, in fact, be a RMP. Any Lead Authority 
who prepared such a plan would therefore be failing in its statutory obligations.  
 
239 Ibid, at 61. 
240 Ibid, at 52. 
241 Ibid, at 81. 
242 Ibid, at 55. 
243 As noted earlier, it is competent to impose an OLR on the basis of reports which conflict with the RAR. For 
example, Laird.  
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Finally, it is worthy of note that parole is exceedingly rare in the OLR population. Of the 206 
OLRs that have been made244 – 193 of which are ‘active’245– 11 offenders have been released 
on licence, four of whom were recalled to custody.246 As of 31st March 2020, 66% of offenders’ 
punishment parts had expired.247 This will be returned to later, but it should be remembered 
that the OLR is a risk-focused sentence, and the decision as to whether to release is based on 
the manageability of that risk. OLR punishment parts are also relatively short owing to the 
manner in which they are calculated. Simply put, the punishment part should not be regarded 
as a measure of the appropriateness (or otherwise) of an offender’s continued detention.  
D. HOSPITAL DIRECTION 
The HD is a mental health order that can be made in either the sheriff court, or the High Court 
of Justiciary in respect of offenders convicted on indictment.248 The criteria for making the 
order are virtually identical to those for making a CO, which are outlined in section 6.5.2.B 
below. The HD cannot be made without a sentence of imprisonment, thus its duration is 
determined by the length of the custodial sentence it is made alongside.249 Consequently, where 
an HD is attached to an OLR, the OLR renders the period of detention in hospital 
indeterminate.250 Patients subject to a HD are restricted patients and therefore decisions about 
discharge rest with the Scottish Ministers;251 there is, however, a right of appeal which can be 
exercised in the same way as an appeal against sentence.252  
The HD is, in effect, a prison sentence served in hospital, and if the patient’s mental health 
improves to the extent that it is no longer appropriate for him to remain in hospital, he will 
serve the remainder of his sentence in prison253 and the hospital direction will cease to have 
effect.254 That is the key difference, in practical terms, between the CORO, and an HD: whereas 
the HD is ancillary to the custodial sentence, the compulsion order is the sentence. This is why 
the MacLean Committee recommended that in cases where the criteria for both an OLR and 
 
244 RMA, Annual Report and Accounts 2019-20, 39.  
245 Ibid, 36. 
246 Source: RMA unpublished data received 12/10/2020. 
247 Annual Report 2019-20, 36. 
248 1995 Act, s. 59A(1), although those made alongside an OLR will only be made in the High Court. 
249 MHA 2003, s. 217(2). 
250In the case of a compulsion order with restriction order, it is the restriction order that renders the period of 
detention indeterminate. 
251 2003 Act, s. 216(2). 
252 s. 60. 
253 2003 Act, s. 216(2). 
254 2003 Act, s. 216(3). 
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CO are met, the only competent disposal should be an OLR combined with a HD.255 It would 
have reduced the risk of high risk offenders being detained indefinitely on COROs because 
their mental disorder was subsequently found not to be treatable. This is returned to in section 
6.6. Finally, before moving on, it should be emphasised that the HD is a disposal upon 
conviction: it cannot be made on acquittal, as a CO or CORO can. In 2018/19, two HDs were 
made.256 
6.4.2 WHERE AN OLR IS NOT IMPOSED 
The focus of this chapter – and, indeed, the thesis – is the OLR, but it is worth saying something 
of the disposals which may be made where the OLR is not made because the OLR does not 
exist in isolation: it is part of a framework of risk-based disposals and it is important to consider 
it in that context. Section 210G(2) provides that, where an OLR is not imposed because the 
court is not satisfied that the risk criteria are met, the judge may dispose of the case as he sees 
fit, but must not impose a life sentence. In any case where an offender has been considered for 
an OLR, any alternative disposal will be a custodial sentence and – as has already been said –
most likely a section 210A extended sentence. Where the offender has been found to meet the 
criteria for imposing a compulsion order, but has not met the risk criteria, he may be made 
subject to a CO, possibly alongside a restriction order (RO). This part of the chapter considers 
both the extended sentence and the CO, before the chapter moves to an evaluation of the OLR.  
A. THE EXTENDED SENTENCE 
The extended sentence (ES) is a form of determinate sentence that is available in respect of 
certain violent or sexual offenders, and terrorist offenders under section 210A of the 1995 
Act.257 It represents a middle-way between an ordinary determinate sentence and the OLR.258 
Its purpose was described in the leading case of S(D) v HM Advocate259 as ‘to allow the court 
 
255 MacLean Report, 49, rec. 27. 
256 Mental Welfare Commission, Mental Health Act Monitoring Report 2018-19 (Edinburgh, 2019), 48. The 
report does not say whether either were associated with an OLR.  
257 Section 210AA, inserted by section 20 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, also allows for an 
extended sentence be passed in respect of persons convicted on indictment of abduction without the requirement 
for that conduct to fall within the categories of sexual offence specified in s.210A(10). Nothing further will be 
said of it here.  
258 See, for example, Petch and Foye, at 43; also, Liddell, at 45; Ferguson; R(J), at 3, in which appeals against 
the making of OLRs were based on the extended sentence being the appropriate sentence in cases where 
ordinary determinate sentences were inadequate to manage the appellants’ risk. Appeals of this nature 
succeeded in respect of one of the accused in Ferguson (Cameron, at 117); and in Kinloch. See also Fyfe and 
Gailey (2011), 209. 
259 2017 S.C.C.R. 129. 
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to make provision for public protection…while not imposing a custodial sentence, which from 
other perspectives, might be disproportionate’.260 The ES for violent and sexual offenders was 
introduced by section 86 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and more recently expanded to 
include terrorism.261 The present discussion is concerned with violent and sexual offences only. 
Offences which count as violent or sexual offences for the purposes of an extended sentence 
are set out in section 210A(10) which, it will be recalled, is also the provision to which section 
210B cross-refers. Section 210A provides that where an offender is convicted on indictment of 
an offence in section 210A(10) and the court intends to pass a determinate sentence of 
imprisonment,262 it may instead make an extended sentence if it considers that any period of 
time during which the offender would be subject to a licence would not be adequate for the 
purposes of protecting the public from serious harm.263 
‘Serious harm’ is not further defined in the legislation, however it requires more than a finding 
that it is in the ‘public interest’ that the offender spend a prolonged period on licence.264 It is 
also not sufficient that the offender requires to attend courses that cannot be completed in the 
absence of the long licence period,265 nor is the requirement for a lengthy period of supervision 
and community rehabilitation at the conclusion of a custodial sentence in itself sufficient.266 In 
S(D) v HM Advocate,267 the court emphasised that, whilst pre-sentence risk assessment is 
important to establish whether an extended sentence is necessary, the judge must consider the 
likely impact an ordinary determinate sentence is likely to have on that risk. 268 It is only if the 
court considers that the offender would still present a risk of serious harm to the public at the 
conclusion of ordinary determinate sentence that the test for imposing an extended sentence 
would be met.269   
The sentence itself is comprised of two parts: the ‘custodial term’ which is the period of 
imprisonment the offender would have been sentenced to had the court decided not to impose 
an extended sentence;270 and the ‘extension period’ during which the offender will be subject 
 
260 Ibid, at 21. 
261 Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 1999, s. 10. 
262 s. 210A(1)(a). 
263 s. 210A(1)(b). 
264 Kelly (Sean) v HM Advocate 2018 S.C.C.R. 104, at 9. 
265 Wood v HM Advocate 2017 J.C. 185, at 27. 
266 S(D) v HM Advocate 2017 S.C.C.R. 129, at 22. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid, at 21. 
269 Wood, para. 27; S(D), at 21; Kelly (Sean), at 27. 
270 s. 210A(2)(a). 
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to a licence in the community.271 Both are parts of a single sentence; the extended sentence is 
not an extra period of licence attached to an ordinary determinate sentence.272 The judge must 
specify the duration of the whole sentence, and how that is apportioned between the custodial 
term and extension period when passing sentence.273 The custodial term is determined 
primarily by the requirements for retribution and deterrence,274 and is served in much the same 
way as any long determinate sentence275 with the offender becoming eligible to apply for parole 
when half of the custodial term has been served.276 Offenders subject to an extended sentence 
imposed on or after 1st February 2016 are not, however, eligible for automatic early release.277  
If released on parole, offenders will be subject to a licence for the balance of the custodial term 
plus the duration of the extension period.278 Those not paroled will be released at the expiry of 
the custodial term and will remain on licence throughout the extension period.279 If he fails to 
comply with the conditions of his licence it may be revoked and he may be recalled to prison.280 
The maximum extension period is ten years for all offence categories,281 but the sentencing 
judge can select a shorter period if he considers it sufficient for the protection of the public 
from serious harm. As the ES is a determinate sentence the licence will, eventually, expire. For 
this reason the ES will not be appropriate for the minority of offenders who require the 
‘concerted lifelong efforts’ to manage their risk that the MacLean Committee identified.  
B. THE COMPULSION ORDER 
 
The CO without restrictions is broadly similar to the civil compulsory treatment order (CTO) 
to which an individual requiring compulsory treatment for mental disorder would ordinarily be 
made subject.282 It may be made under section 57A of the 1995 Act where an offender is 
 
271 s. 210A(2)(b). 
272 S(D) v HM Advocate 2017 S.C.C.R. 129, at 23. 
273 O’Hare v HM Advocate 2001 G.W.D. 29-1160, at 5. 
274 Jordan v HM Advocate 2008 J.C. 354, at 19. 
275 That is, a sentence of four years or more: Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993, s. 27(1); 
Robertson v HM Advocate 2004 J.C. 155, at 30. It is no longer served in exactly the same way as is said in 
Robertson because of changes to the automatic early release provisions in the 1993 Act that have taken place 
since the case was decided. 
276 1993 Act, s. 1(3)(a). 
277 s. 1(1A)(b)(ii) as inserted by the Prisoners (Control of Release) (Scotland) Act 2015, s. 1(2)(a).  
278 Robertson, para. 30. 
279 1993 Act, s. 11(1). 
280 Ibid, s. 17(1). Though he may subsequently be released once again on the recommendation of the Parole 
Board for Scotland: s.3A(4) of the 1993 Act. Licences and their conditions are discussed later in section 5.4.3 of 
this chapter. 
281 s. 210A(3). 
282 The Scottish Executive, Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 Code of Practice, Vol. 3. 
(Edinburgh, 2005), page 126 at para. 14.  
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convicted in the sheriff court or High Court for an offence, other than murder, that is punishable 
by imprisonment;283 or where the person has been remitted by the sheriff to the High Court for 
sentencing for such an offence.284 The court must be satisfied, on the basis of oral or written 
evidence by two medical practitioners, that the person concerned has a mental disorder;285 that 
medical treatment is available for the person that would be likely to prevent the mental disorder 
worsening, or that would alleviate the symptoms or effects of the disorder;286 and that if such 
treatment were not provided, there would be a significant risk to the health, safety or welfare 
of the person or to the safety of any other person.287 The CO authorises the offender’s detention 
in hospital288 – which may be the State Hospital the person requires to be detained in conditions 
of special security289 – and the giving of medical treatment in accordance with part 16 of the 
MHA 2003.290 Like other criminal justice mental health orders including the HD, and contrary 
to the civil provisions of the MHA 2003,291 the CO authorises medical treatment even if the 
patient refuses it and is fully capable of doing so. The ordinary duration is six months,292 but it 
is renewable.293 In some cases, the court will also make a restriction order (RO) under section 
59 of the 1995 Act.   
The RO may be made where it appears to the court that, having regard inter alia to the nature 
of the offence,294 that it is necessary for the protection of the public that the offender be subject 
to special restrictions because of the risk of further offences resulting from his mental 
disorder.295 Like the HD, the RO is an ancillary order attached, in this case, to a CO. It can only 
be made with a CO and, when it is, the disposal is called a CORO. The effect of the RO is that 
the CO applies without limit of time296 (though it is still subject to review),297  and therefore 
the CORO is an indeterminate sentence. It will be recalled that a CO is an alternative disposal 
 
283 s. 57A(1)(a). 
284 s. 57A(1)(b). It should not be confused with the CO made under s. 57 of the Act which is a disposal on 
acquittal. 
285 s. 57A(2)(a). 
286 s. 57A(2)(a). 
287 s. 57A(2)(a). 
288 s. 57A(8)(a). It can also authorise treatment in the community and will unless the court is satisfied on the 
evidence of two doctors that hospitalisation is necessary, but only hospital-based COs are considered here since 
it is inconceivable that anyone who was under consideration for an OLR would be given a non-custodial 
disposal. 
289 s. 57A(6)(a). 
290 s. 57A(8)(b). 
291 MHA 2003 ss. 36(4)(b), 44(4)(b), and 57(3)(d). 
292 s. 57A(2A)(b). 
293 MHA 2003, s. 148. 
294 s. 59(1)(a). 
295 s. 59(1)(c). 
296 s. 57A(7)(b). 
297 MHA 2003, s. 148. 
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to the OLR where the risk criteria and the criteria for making a CO are met. Though section 
210F does not specify that it must be a CORO, given its requirements, it seems inconceivable 
that anyone who also satisfies the section 210E risk criteria would not be made subject to 
restrictions. In 2018/19, seven COROs were made.298  
Finally, it should be remembered that the CORO, contrary to the MacLean Committee’s 
recommendations, is a competent disposal where the OLR’s risk criteria are also met. The 
provision allowing for indefinite detention of those considered untreatable, but presenting a 
significant risk to others, was transported to the current legislation;299 however no particular 
record is kept of those patients who fall into this category. This is because the public safety test 
is at the top of the ‘hierarchy’ of tests to be applied when release is considered: simply put 
neither the Scottish Government nor the Mental Welfare Commission knows how many people 
are detained indefinitely in our hospitals with no prospect of treatment.300 That is, to put it 
mildly, concerning. It also remains the case that those no longer considered to have a mental 
disorder must be discharged even if it emerges the risk the present was not causally connected 
to it.301 Thus, the issue that ultimately led to the OLR’s creation has not been resolved.  
6.5 ASSESSING THE OLR FRAMEWORK 
Chapters two and three presented a theoretical framework for the evaluation of OLR’s 
operation. It was said that an ethically defensible model must include the following elements: 
A. It must only be a disposal upon conviction for an offence; 
B. It must only be employed to protect the public from violations of the sort expected to 
result in serious physical or psychological harm; 
C. The subject must have been convicted of an offence of the type the PD is to be imposed 
to prevent, though this need not be the index offence; 
D. There must be an individualised risk assessment based on best practices as recognised 
by a responsible body of experts and which is capable of informing risk management; 
and  
 
298 Mental Welfare Commission, Mental Health Act Monitoring Report 2018-19 (Edinburgh, 2019), 48. 
299 MHA 2003, s. 193(2)(b). 
300 Source: FOI(S)A 2002 Response from the Scottish Government’s Restricted Patient Team. Received 
19/07/2019. 
301 MHA 2003, s. 193(3).  
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E. It must incorporate opportunities for risk reduction geared towards progression to 
release and management in the community.  
Each of these points has been elucidated in the preceding chapters, and the OLR has been 
subject to critical analysis throughout. This section therefore draws the preceding discussion 
together in a succinct application of the characteristics of the OLR that have been identified to 
the elements of the defensible PD model outlined above. Some further observations are made 
on some of the issues that have been raised in the evaluative literature as it currently stands.  
6.5.1 THE OLR AND ETHICAL DEFENSIBILITY 
A. A DISPOSAL UPON CONVICTION 
The requirement for a conviction serves three purposes: (a) it ensures the PD is imposed in 
virtue of voluntary criminal conduct i.e. that there is a culpability constraint; (b) it requires that 
those imposing PD recognise its inherent punitiveness; and (c) means that its imposition is 
subject to the ordinary safeguards of the criminal justice system. The OLR, though imposed on 
risk grounds, may only be imposed where an offender falls to be sentenced for an offence. 
Those who face the prospect of an OLR have made a choice to engage in offending behaviour; 
one is not made subject to it on the grounds of risk alone, or of possession of traits alone. The 
OLR satisfies, prima facie, the conviction requirement, though this is subject to certain 
qualifications and is returned to below.  
B. THE SERIOUS VIOLATION CONSTRAINT 
The OLR must only be used where the threat presented is serious enough to warrant an 
indeterminate sentence: i.e., it must be proportionate to the threat. There are two elements to 
this: (a) the conduct must amount to a violation of other persons such as is likely to result in 
long-term physical and/or psychological harm; and (b) the OLR must be necessary to prevent 
that conduct. The risk criteria in section 210E are broadly drafted, requiring that the OLR be 
made in cases where the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that it is more likely 
than not that the offender – if not subject to an OLR – would seriously endanger the lives, 
physical or psychological wellbeing of the public. As regards (a), it is apparent that the focus 
of the OLR, from the point at which its introduction was recommended by the MacLean 
Committee, has been on preventing serious violent and sexual offending. As discussed in 
 210 
chapter three, however, it is appropriate to extend the protection of PD to non-violent and 
sexual offences that place someone at risk of long-term harm. The caveat is that where we are 
concerned with prevention of psychological harm alone, it must be associated with a threat of 
violent or sexual offending. This is intended to prevent net-widening, and to restrict the use of 
PD to the most uncontroversially serious cases.   
The risk criteria do not contain such a qualification in relation to psychological ‘wellbeing’, as 
it is termed there; nor do they require a threat of long-term harm. Leaving to one side, for the 
moment, whether wellbeing really is the same as harm – as discussed above,302 it is probably 
not – it seems that in practice OLRs are used to prevent violent and sexual offences. Among 
the reported cases, there seems only to be one in which there was no particular apparent concern 
of progression to such offending.303 As discussed, the court considers risk at the point of 
sentence but takes account of any risk mitigation that may result from imposition of a lesser 
custodial sentence, such as the extended sentence. In addition, the RMA’s risk definitions 
distinguish between high, medium, and low-risk offenders.304 High risk offenders are those 
with an ‘enduring propensity’ to seriously endanger the public, limited capacity for change, 
and who require ‘concerted long-term measures’ to manage their risk. Medium risk means that 
there is a propensity to endanger the public, but that there are factors that indicate measures 
short of lifelong restriction will be sufficient to manage that risk. An OLR may, as has been 
said, still be made where the risk classification is one of medium.  
The constraints on interpretation of the risk criteria are therefore substantially applied by the 
courts and the RMA. Whilst it is apparent that there is no deluge of OLRs being made, it is 
submitted that the legislation should have more constraining force than it does. Section 210E 
ought to be amended to better reflect the language of the MacLean Committee’s 17th 
recommendation, for example:305 
[T]he risk criteria are that the nature of, or the circumstances of the 
commission of, the offence of which the convicted person has been found 
guilty either in themselves or as part of a pattern of behaviour are such as to 
demonstrate that the offender presents a substantial and continuing risk to the 
safety of the public such as requires his lifelong restriction.  
 
302 At 6.3.4. 
303 Johnstone, discussed in detail above: see 6.2.1. 
304 See 5.4.4. As discussed there, low risk offenders will not be given an OLR. 
305 See s. 210E as in force, and the MacLean Report, 41, rec. 17. 
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Such a formulation would have effect of making it clear that the risk presented must be serious 
enough, and difficult enough to manage, that measures short of an OLR would be inadequate. 
Where the risk classification is accepted by the court, it would effectively restrict the OLR to 
high-risk offenders. On that basis it is sufficient that the court considers that the criteria are met 
on the balance of probabilities, as that amounts to a finding that the offender is more likely than 
not to seriously endanger the public if not subject to an OLR.  
C. PAST OFFENDING  
Past offending includes the index offence, any other offences on the indictment of which the 
individual was convicted, and any offences of which he has been convicted previously. The 
index offence triggers the application of the risk framework where the court considers the risk 
criteria may be met and, along with any other offences on the indictment, is the basis for the 
calculation of the punishment part. Prior offences inform the risk assessment, and the assessor’s 
opinion on risk and assist the judge to determine whether the risk criteria are met. Section 210B 
requires that the index offence be a sexual offence, a violent offence, an offence which 
endangers life, or an offence which suggests to the court the offender has a propensity to 
perpetrate one of the three preceding types. Murder is, of course, excluded. As was discussed 
earlier, it is generally the case that where the OLR is imposed on the basis of one offence it is 
a particularly serious offence, and OLRs have been imposed on first-time offenders. In most 
cases, however, the OLR will be imposed on the basis that there is a pattern of behaviour 
evident. In addition, the risk assessor is empowered to consider allegation information and 
include it in the RAR, though most of the time it does not impact the risk classification assigned.  
It is submitted that, so far as index offence goes, the OLR complies with the model proposed. 
Section 210B is clearly focused on crimes against the person, and this is reflected in RMA 
statistics. As of 2015-16, when such a breakdown was last published, 34.4% of OLRs were 
imposed in respect of violent offences; 49.7% sexual offences; 13.9% in respect of both a 
violent and sexual offence (charged separately); and 2% fell into the residual category of ‘other’ 
offences.306 Nevertheless, if PD is to be morally permissible, then the offender’s forfeiture of 
the right to be presumed harmless must be unequivocal. On that basis, where the index offence 
is an ‘other’ offence, there ought to be a requirement (a) that the offender has, at some point, 
been convicted of a violent, sexual or life endangering offence; and (b) that it, alongside the 
 
306 RMA, Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16 (Paisley, 2016), 22.  
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index offence, is part of a pattern of behaviour which meets the amended risk criteria, as 
proposed. It might be objected that this sacrifices some protective efficacy, and it might. But it 
is simply not reasonable to consider the application of the OLR to have been foreseeable and 
avoidable in a case where the offender has no history of violent or sexual offending to any 
degree. Section 210B(1)(b) ought to be amended to require such a history.  
In the case of the first-time offender, it is accepted that there may be incidences where a first 
conviction is for an offence so serious that it properly gives rise to concern that the risk criteria 
may be met; for this reason there should be no explicit prohibition on making the OLR in such 
circumstances. This brings us, once again, to the issue of seriousness. As was discussed in 
chapter three, the difficulties of articulating a standard of seriousness capable of being applied 
in every case are substantial. It was, however, said that the CJS routinely distinguishes between 
offences and harm of differing severity, and that we generally accept this, though we may of 
course disagree on individual cases. On that basis, admittedly somewhat unsatisfactorily and 
arbitrarily, the present requirement for conviction on indictment and sentence in the High Court 
means that the framework as it stands is considered to comply with the seriousness requirement. 
Concerns about culpability-constraint, foreseeability, and the opportunity to avoid should be 
somewhat mitigated by requiring a violent, sexual, or life-endangering offence where the index 
offence falls into the residual category.  
Finally, whilst it is accepted that, in risk management terms, there is a sound basis for inclusion 
of allegation information in the RAR, it is important that the presumption of harmlessness is 
rebutted by conduct of which the offender has been convicted beyond reasonable doubt. 
Allegation information should not be used to inform risk classification, given the centrality of 
its role in determining whether the risk criteria are met, and should be confined to assisting risk 
management planning, though it is appreciated that it may be difficult in some cases to separate 
these. This is broadly consistent with current practices, but section 210C(2) should nevertheless, 
it is submitted, be amended to clarify the limits of the use of allegation information and section 
210C(2)(c), which permits allegation information to be used to assign risk classification, should 
be repealed.  
D. RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk assessments must be individualised and grounded in methods and practices regarded as 
robust and defensible by the those with expertise in their development and application. Rather 
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than aiming at binary predictions of recidivism, risk assessment should be capable of accounting 
for the individual circumstances of the offender, and of informing risk management 
interventions. In particular, it should provide guidance as to the necessity of PD, indicating 
cases where measures short of an OLR may be sufficient. In cases where an OLR is imposed, 
the risk assessment must support risk management planning that permits, where possible, 
progression to conditions of lesser security. The standard-setting function in relation to the OLR 
is fulfilled by the RMA which has special expertise in risk assessment and management: this 
was the reason for its creation. The RMA, it will be recalled, accredits risk assessors, tools, and 
publishes the Risk Assessment Tools Evaluation Directory which provides impartial advice to 
professionals on the strengths, weaknesses, and appropriate application of various instruments. 
It will also be recalled that SPJ is the standard prescribed for RAR production. Subject to the 
caveats raised above in relation to use of allegation information, it is submitted that the 
legislative framework therefore conforms to the requirements outlined for the role of risk 
assessment in relation to the OLR.  
E. OPPORTUNITIES FOR REINTEGRATION 
Autonomy is the thread that runs through the thesis’ theoretical framework. It is the basis on 
which a conviction is required, that the presumption of harmlessness is rebutted, and the 
redistribution of the burden of uncertainty is grounded. Since the offender must, in effect, 
choose to run the risk of an indeterminate sentence, it follows that he should have the 
opportunity to choose to address the risk of reoffending that he poses. This means that the state 
is under an obligation to keep risk status and risk management under review, and to provide 
access to appropriate courses and treatment. The MacLean Committee envisaged that time spent 
supervised in the community would be a core part of the sentence.307 But, as discussed earlier, 
though most of the OLR population is beyond punishment part expiry, roughly 6% of OLR 
offenders have been paroled, and, of these, just under half were subsequently recalled. Because 
of this there is little information on OLR offender progression available. Though this thesis is 
concerned with the moral permissibility of imposing sentence, respect for autonomy – and for 
human rights308– means that we must be satisfied that the sentence provides opportunities for 
re-integration. Although the judicial reviews that have been brought so far averring that the 
Scottish Ministers are failing in their obligations to facilitate the progression of OLR prisoners 
 
307 MacLean Report, 2. 
308 See 6.2.1.D. 
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have been unsuccessful, there is not currently enough information available to determine 
whether or not the OLR meets the requirement under consideration here. More research is 
required on OLR offender movement through the prison estate, the courses and therapies 
provided to them, and the way that they experience their sentences.  
Finally, though space precludes examination of related disposals such the HD and the CORO, 
it must be observed that the failure to include capacity or decision-making criteria such as that 
in the MHA 2003’s civil provisions does not respect autonomy. Persons ought to have the 
chance to choose to address their risk, but equally, they ought to have the opportunity to choose 
not to. Offenders subject to the OLR and the HD, and who have the ability to take treatment 
decisions, should have the freedom to refuse it if they wish; the consequence of a refusal would 
then be transfer back to prison where progression may be delayed if treatment refusal means 
risk is not addressed. For this reason, it is tentatively suggested that the MacLean Committee’s 
recommendation that an OLR plus HD should be the only competent disposal where the risk 
criteria and the criteria for making a CO are met, is the correct one. This aside, it would prevent 
people being kept on COROs indefinitely with no therapeutic intention because detention was 
necessary to protect the public: in other words, it would address the issue that led to the OLR’s 
creation in the first place.  
6.5.2 THE NATURE OF THE OLR  
The practical implication of the suggestions made above is that there are people currently 
subject to OLRs at present who would not – and, it is contended, ought not – be subject to the 
revised framework. The case of Johnstone in particular is called to mind. The OLR, though 
identified in section 210F as an indeterminate sentence, is, in fact, a life sentence, and in terms 
of the 1993 Act’s application is indistinguishable from the MLS. An OLR remains in effect 
until the person subject to it dies. Former chief executive of the RMA, Yvonne Gailey, and her 
colleagues, have argued that a formal review mechanism should be introduced that could see 
the OLR itself revoked where no longer required for public protection.309 This would mean, in 
effect, that the ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ criteria of the OLR as it currently stands were the same, and 
people who no longer required lifelong restriction were no longer subject to the order and, on 
the face of it, that would reflect respect for offender autonomy. As above, far more information 
about offender progression and release would be needed to assess the potential impact of such 
 
309 Gailey et al. (2017), 138.  
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a reform, and it could not be done within the scope of a work such as this. Nevertheless, if it is 
and remains the intention of the Scottish Parliament that the sentence is one of lifelong 
restriction, the legislation should identify it as such; not as an indeterminate sentence, but as a 
life sentence imposed on risk and which can never, for all an offender’s best efforts, and despite 
any level of risk reduction, be lifted. 
6.6 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER SIX 
 
This chapter has given a detailed and analytical account of the OLR from the point at which 
the risk criteria are applied. The requirements that must be met for article 5 compliance were 
considered, and then the risk criteria in section 210E were subject to detailed treatment. The 
OLR is, it was argued, despite the wording of sections 210B and 210E, a sentence for the 
prevention of serious violent and sexual offences. Notwithstanding its classification as an 
indeterminate sentence, it was argued that the OLR is really a life sentence – only the period 
of imprisonment is indeterminate; the duration of the sentence itself lasts for the whole of an 
offender’s life and leaves him liable to continuous or repeated detention during that time. 
Finally, the statutory framework was evaluated against the theoretical framework set out in 
chapters two and three. It was concluded that, whilst the OLR is consistent with most of its 
requirements, there are areas in which it could be improved to accord proper respect to 
autonomy. Three proposals for reform were then made: (1) that the risk criteria be amended to 
require a ‘substantial and continuing risk’ that requires lifelong restriction, though not 
necessarily lifelong imprisonment, as recommended by the MacLean Committee; (2) that 
section 210B be amended to require that where the index offence falls into the residual 
category, the offender has been previously convicted of at least one violent, sexual, or life-
endangering offence; and (3) that section 210C be amended to preclude the use of allegation 
information for risk classification.  





7.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER SEVEN 
This thesis presented a critical analysis of the order for lifelong restriction and the legal 
framework that supports its operation. Chapter one set out four specific objectives. First, to 
identify and develop a theoretical framework of preventive detention capable of supporting a 
principled, workable model of preventive detention; second, to provide a detailed, critical 
account of the procedural framework that supports the OLR’s operation; third, to assess the 
extent to which the current statutory framework conforms to the requirements set out in the 
analytical model identified in the first aim; and finally, on the basis of conclusions relating to 
aims one to three, to identify areas where consideration should be given to amending the 
relevant legislative provisions. These conclusions are summarised below, along with areas 
identified for potential reform and for further research.  
7.2 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Chapters two and three considered the theoretical basis for the imposition of sentences of 
preventive detention. Chapter two concerned the more philosophical literature and addressed 
the objection that preventive sentences are impermissible as a matter of principle. It was argued 
that preventive detention is best conceptualised as a form of societal self-defence grounded in 
the communication of a credible threat of serious harm to others; this threat must be sufficient 
to rebut the presumption that the offender is harmless. Measures of this nature are, it was said, 
properly considered punitive, but they represent a derogation from the principle that punishment 
must be proportionate to wrongdoing. Nevertheless, a culpability constraint is required in the 
form of a requirement for a conviction, since we must be sure that the offender has chosen to 
open himself to the risk he will be preventively detained. The offender’s exercise of free-will 
in order to offend permits us to redistribute the burden of uncertainty as to what he may or may 
not do in the future. The right of members of the public not to be made victims is thus preferred 
to the right of an offender to create victims. The imposition of a sentence on the basis of what 
it is thought an offender will do does not amount to a claim about his capacity to choose to 
conform his conduct to law and does not, therefore, treat him as though he lacks autonomy: on 
the contrary, it recognises and responds to his exercise of autonomy. It was emphasised that 
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preventive detention does not create the burden of uncertainty as to the offender’s future 
conduct; it merely redistributes it. It was said that we ought nevertheless to recognise the 
peculiar burdens associated with indeterminate detention, and the difficulties that arise in terms 
of our ability to determine future conduct. The suggestion was made that we should consider 
the criteria for use of preventive detention in terms of defensibility rather than justification. 
Chapter three continued the discussion with in-depth consideration of the concepts of 
dangerousness and risk and how these had evolved over time. It was said that dangerousness, 
despite being regarded by some as meaningless and pejorative, does have some substance. This 
substance relates to the threat of repeated rights violations that carry the potential for physical 
and psychological harm. In particular, the dangerousness is associated with a present threat of 
violent and sexual offending. It was argued that the terminology of dangerousness is not 
inappropriate in the context of OLRs first, because it does describe a type of offending; and 
second because the OLR requires neither a finding of high-risk nor a conviction for a sexual or 
violent offence. It was submitted that preventive sentencing is defensible in a context where (a) 
an offender has a history of violating the rights of others in such a way that long-term physical 
and/or psychological offending would be expected; (b) in cases where psychological harm 
alone is anticipated, the conduct entails a threat of physical harm; and (c) where a robust, 
individualised risk assessment capable of informing risk management indicates that measures 
short of indeterminate sentencing are likely to be inadequate to manage risk. The effect of (b) 
is to remove from scope any offence that could not properly be described as an offence against 
the person and that does not in itself present a physical threat to another person. This sacrifices 
some preventive efficacy but maintains some degree of proportionality between the threat 
presented, and the harms of an indeterminate sentence.  
From this, five requirements were identified:  
1. It must only be a disposal upon conviction for an offence; 
2. It must only be employed to protect the public from violations of the sort expected to 
result in serious physical or psychological harm; 
3. The subject must have been convicted of an offence of the type the PD is to be imposed 
to prevent, though this need not be the index offence; 
4. There must be an individualised risk assessment based on best practices as recognised 
by a responsible body of experts and which is capable of informing risk management; 
and  
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5. It must incorporate opportunities for risk reduction geared towards progression to 
release and management in the community.  
These are returned to in section 7.4 below.  
7.3 THE PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK 
Chapters four, five, and six set out a critical account of the OLR and the framework that 
supports its operation. Chapter four considered the OLR’s legal background and policy 
development. It was demonstrated that the OLR arose from a perceived loophole in mental 
health legislation that pertained to people who were detained in hospital by the criminal justice 
system. Particular attention was paid to the work of the MacLean Committee that recommended 
the OLR’s introduction, having concluded that sentencing options for a minority of offenders 
were insufficient at that time. Though there are some disparities, the OLR as implemented 
closely reflects the recommendations in the Report.  
Chapter five discussed in detail the procedures to be followed before the OLR can be imposed. 
The interim orders that may be made, and the criteria for making them were considered and the 
centrality of formalised risk assessment to the sentencing framework was emphasised. As well 
as addressing the key legislative provisions, attention was paid to the RMA’s standards and 
guidelines for risk assessment, and the process by which the RAR is produced received 
substantial treatment. This included consideration of the use allegation information in these 
reports which is expressly permitted by the legislation. It was noted that, whilst most often 
allegation information does not impact the risk classification, it may do so and may therefore 
lead to the imposition of an OLR where it is given sufficient weight. The lack of clear authority 
on the weight that it can be given was identified as problematic. It was subsequently concluded 
that, while it may have value in terms of establishing behaviour patterns and in risk management 
planning, risk classification ought not to be based on allegation information.  
Chapter six progressed the discussion from the pre-OLR procedure to the point at which the 
RAR is before the judge for consideration. This is the point at which the statutory risk criteria 
fall to be applied. The requirements for ECHR article 5 compliance in relation to the OLR were 
discussed, before the risk criteria were broken down into their constituent elements and subject 
to detailed analysis. Two main arguments were advanced in relation to them: first that they 
were concerned primarily – and consistently with the MacLean Committee’s terms of reference 
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– with offences against the person. Second, that despite the absence of any statutory 
requirement to consider alternative sentences, taken alongside the RMA’s risk classifications, 
it should be considered that the risk criteria cannot be met where a lesser sentence – specifically 
the extended sentence – is found to be adequate for the purposes of risk management. The 
chapter then progressed to evaluate the OLR against the analytical framework proposed in 
chapters two and three. 
7.4 EVALUATION AND PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT  
When this project began some years ago, the researcher’s starting view was that indeterminate 
sentences are unjust, morally repugnant, and should form no part of any jurisdiction’s 
framework. Whilst certain aspects of this viewpoint are valid – these are terrible sentences, and 
that must never be lost sight of – it proved, perhaps predictably, to be somewhat naïve. The 
absolutist position against is easy to maintain when considerations are confined to the offender 
and the restrictions of a prison sentence, whether the offender is in prison or supervised in the 
community. The difficulty arises when one is forced to ask the question: ‘what happens at the 
end of the sentence?’ The precise point at which this realisation occurred cannot be recalled 
but, in any case, some months into the work it became apparent that there is a need for the 
lifelong management of a small group of offenders, and the Reports of the MacLean and Floud 
Committees were instrumental in this realisation being reached. Though the author of this thesis 
has, in some respect, come full circle, the necessity for a sentence like the OLR has not been 
accepted uncritically. Indeed, with the realisation that such sentences are necessary evils comes 
the need for more scrutiny; not less. Though it was ultimately considered that the OLR strikes 
an appropriate balance overall between the rights of potential victims to be protected, and the 
offender’s right to liberty, this was arrived at by way of critical evaluation. The conclusions 
reached are summarised below. 
In relation to the first requirement identified, the OLR satisfies the requirement that the 
preventive detention in respect of voluntary conduct be imposed as a sentence upon conviction. 
It is quite obviously a punishment and could not reasonably construed as anything other than a 
punishment.  
In relation to the second, the OLR was found to conform broadly to the requirement that 
preventive sentences be used to protect the public from serious offences of the kind that are 
likely to present a threat of long-term psychological or physical harm. These offences ought to 
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have the character of personal violations, i.e., offences against the person, though it may be 
legitimate to detain to prevent offences of other kinds that threaten serious physical harm. This 
constraint is to remove from the OLR’s scope property offences that do not in themselves, or 
in the manner of their commission, place persons at risk. This, it was accepted, limits preventive 
efficacy somewhat but it was argued that it was justified in order to retain some proportionality 
between the threatened conduct and the likely impact of the sentence on an offender. It is also 
broadly reflective of the way the OLR operates in practice. It was recommended that 
consideration be given to amending the risk criteria in section 210E to better reflect the 
formulation of the risk criteria proposed by the MacLean Committee. This would require that 
the offender present a ‘substantial and continuing risk’ to public safety such that lifelong 
restriction was required, rather than the likelihood of serious endangerment at the end of a 
determinate sentence, as the criteria currently stand. 
In relation to the third, it was found that the OLR as it stands partially complies with the 
requirement for a conviction of an offence of the type we are concerned to prevent. Although 
most OLRs are imposed in respect of violent or sexual offences, or life-endangering offences, 
the legislation includes a residual category. The residual category allows the OLR to be imposed 
where the index offence is not violent, sexual, or life-endangering where it suggests to the court 
that the offender has a propensity to perpetrate one of those offence types in future. This, it was 
argued, is insufficient to ground a determination that an offender has autonomously forfeited 
his right to be presumed harmlessness.  
It was recommended, therefore, that consideration be given to amending section 210B to require 
that, where the index offence is of ‘other’ type, the offender must have been convicted of a 
violent, sexual, or life endangering offence at some point. It was further suggested that the use 
of allegation information should be confined to establishing patterns of behaviour and 
informing risk management. Section 210C should be amended to this effect, and, if this is done, 
section 210C(2)(c), which permits allegation information to be used to assign risk classification, 
would require to be repealed. 
In relation to the fourth, it was concluded that the RMA’s standard setting and accreditation 
role means that the OLR conforms to the requirement for robust, individualised risk assessment 
capable of informing risk management practices, and of identifying cases where measures short 
of indeterminate detention may be sufficient.  
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In relation to the fifth, it was concluded that the OLR at least partially conforms to the principle 
that offenders ought to be afforded opportunities to choose to address their risk so that they may 
progress through the prison estate. It was noted that there is insufficient information to ascertain 
whether, in practice, such adequate opportunities are presented. It was further observed that few 
offenders have been paroled, and a number of them have been recalled to custody at some point. 
The need for a presumption of progression to the community, where possible, was emphasised: 
this is consistent with way in which the OLR was envisaged by the MacLean Committee. No 
recommendations were made in respect of this, rather the need for further research on the 
pathways offenders follow through the OLR was identified.  
Finally, it was noted that the OLR, while described as an indeterminate sentence by section 
210F is, to all intents and purposes, a life sentence. It was tentatively suggested that there may 
be a case for review of the sentence itself, rather than merely the RMP or conditions of licence. 
Like the matter of progression generally, the ability to take a view on the matter is significantly 
hampered by the lack of available information. Further research is therefore required.  
7.5 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER SEVEN AND TO THE 
THESIS 
The primary purpose of this thesis was two-fold: (a) to set out what are extremely complex 
provisions in a coherent and – so far as possible – accessible manner and (b) to subject the OLR 
to extensive critical analysis. In relation to (a), there is, as was noted at the outset, only a very 
small existing literature base, the core of which is really three book chapters which address 
aspects of the framework.1 Thus even the descriptive elements of the thesis make an original 
contribution. 
In relation to (b), the implications of this sentence for those subject to it are dire, and there is a 
need to ensure that it is subject to a level of scrutiny that is commensurate with that impact. 
Here too, the thesis makes an original contribution, by undertaking that detailed and 
comprehensive scrutiny and identifying areas for potential improvement. The hope is that this 
might help to encourage further (especially legal) academic discussion about the nature of the 
OLR and the constraints there should be on its use. Although it was argued that there is a need 
 
1 Gailey et al. (2017); Darjee and Russell (2011); and Fyfe and Gailey (2011). These works have been 
referenced throughout.  
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for the OLR, or a disposal like it, it should never be the case that we are comfortable with its 
use. The deprivation of liberty it entails should never be lost sight of, and this is so even though 
the number of people subject to it is relatively small. The requirements set out earlier for an 
ethically defensible model of indeterminate sentencing can be reduced to one: the obligation to 
do all that we can to ensure that no one is made subject to it unless it is absolutely necessary; 
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